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Editorial – “Glocal”, “Glocavores”:  Good Gadgetry? 
 
Bharath Sriraman 
The University of Montana 
 
In the movie “Up in the Air”, Glocal is a neologism, a clever witticism conjured 
up by a naïve business school graduate at an agency hired by corporations to let 
go of employees that become redundant in corporate mergers/cuts.  Her solution 
to the unpleasant nature of telling real human beings that they no longer had a 
job was to try and automate this inhumane process, i.e., have a scripted 
flowchart be read out at a safe distance via computers. In theory, a local call 
center could take care of firings done globally, at very little cost to the agency. 
Thus the neologism “glocal” suggests the gadgetry of global connectivity 
afforded through computer networks at our disposal for destructive and 
constructive purposes. The reader is wondering what the editorial alliteration 
has to do with the present issue of the journal. An explanation is in order. 
 
First, the journal would not exist but for the support of the global community of 
scholars regularly contributing to it. Second, the title of the journal no longer has 
the local label “Montana” attached to it. This Spanish word meaning “land of 
mountains” has already been appropriated by a Danish furniture company that 
makes high end wooden furniture for homes, as well as characters from the film 
and cine media. It was high time for the journal to shed old skin and embrace the 
generic title “The Mathematics Enthusiast”, which more accurately reflects the 
nature of the journal, and the directions in which it has grown. 
 
 In the last 6 years, approximately 5% of the submissions have come from 
Montana, and usually from my prodding locals to contribute to the journal.  A 
perusal of the table of contents of the journal will reveal that a very large 
proportion of the articles come from the global community of scholars, and a 
smaller portion from those in the U.S. To this end the journal has begun to 
support The Psychology of Mathematics Education- North America (PME-NA). In 
October 2010, I was approached by several colleagues at the annual meeting in 
Columbus, Ohio with the suggestion that the journal be open to submissions 
from the community of scholars that form this professional organization. Given 
the sheer abundance of unread Conference proceedings conveniently available in 
pdf format, which can be mined via search engines, it seemed worthwhile to re-
publish a selection of interesting papers in a special issue each year provided 
they passed an additional burden of peer review. This relationship with PME-
Sriraman 
 
NA is meant to be anti-symbiotic, i.e., The Mathematics Enthusiast does not 
depend on PME-NA in any way- We do quite well on our own and do not need 
any professional organization to support or sustain us. In a similar vein PME-NA 
does not depend on The Mathematics Enthusiast either, since it publishes its own 
conference proceedings each year, and has been a tremendous professional 
organization for many mathematics education scholars in the U.S, myself 
included. The only reason the journal is supportive of PME-NA, is to give a 
possible journal outlet for colleagues at Institutions that do not recognize or 
value online conference proceedings. It is more or less a bibliometric fact that 
many Institutions do not give the same point value to a proceedings paper as 
opposed to a journal article unless the proceedings is listed in a recognized 
academic index (Sriraman, 2011). Vol8,no.3 of The Mathematics Enthusiast 
contains 6 extended contributions from the 2010 meeting of PME-NA. The theme 
of these papers is “optimizing student understanding in mathematics”.  
 
The Mathematics Enthusiast is not a periodical like The Mathematics Teacher or 
The College Mathematics Journal. However, there are some elements of these 
two journals in articles addressing the teaching of mathematics content or simply 
mathematical content at the school and university levels respectively. The journal 
is also not a pure mathematics education research journal either, although it 
regularly features articles from the mathematics education research community. 
Our goal is to remain eclectic and open to the wider community of scholars 
besides mathematicians and mathematics educators. It is often the case that those 
looking into mathematics through a different disciplinary lens can offer 
perspectives that are surprisingly refreshing, and of interest to the community of 
readers. 
 
Vol9, nos 1&2 [January 2012] of the journal will also be available in early August, 
in the online medium 6 months in advance. The print version of this issue will 
become available from Information Age Publishing in January 2012. Vol.9, no.3 
[June 2012] will contain extended papers from the North Calotte Conference in 
Mathematics Education that took place in Tromso, Norway in 2010. The delay is 
due to being unable to locate appropriate reviewers for the submissions. The 
journal strives to find researchers who are capable of giving constructive reviews 
and familiar with the content of the article. Sometimes this becomes difficult, and 
the “objectivity” or the “black box” of blind review often results in reviews that 
are not helpful to the author in question, nor the journal. There is an analogy to 
the “firing” process at corporations mentioned in the first paragraph, and the 
“rejection” process of manuscripts in many journals. We are trying very hard to 
devise a completely open peer review system, where Latourian black boxes do 
not govern decisions that can affect authors (Sriraman, 2011). 
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The monograph series affiliated with the journal retains the “Montana” moniker 
and has 5 monographs in development for release in the next two years. One of 
these monographs is particularly ambitious because it attempts to cover the state 
of the art of mathematics education in China, Korea, Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, 
and India. This is slated for release late next year with a preliminary book of 
extended abstracts available free on the website for those interested.  
 
On a parting note and in keeping with the neologism “glocal”, the community of 
21st century readers of the journal can be thought of as glocavores (as opposed to 
locavores), since we readily consume ideas that spawn all around the world. In a 
more global sense, the Arab Spring is a testament to the fact the connectivity can 
be construed as a useful/constructive tool for instigating change- of the self, of 
ideas, and of the notion of “glocal” as a good thing, as opposed to the way it was 
conceived of by the female protagonist in “Up in the Air”. 
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Research on Practical Rationality:  
Studying the Justification of Actions in Mathematics Teaching 
 
Patricio Herbst1 
University of Michigan 
& 
Daniel Chazan 
University of Maryland 
 
 
 
Abstract: Building on our earlier work conceptualizing teaching as the management of 
instructional exchanges, we lay out a theory of the practical rationality of mathematics 
teaching—that is, a theory of the grounds upon which instructional actions specific to 
mathematics can be justified or rebuffed. We do that from a perspective informed by what 
experienced practitioners consider viable but also in ways that suggest operational 
avenues for the study of instructional improvement, in particular for improvements that 
enable students to do more authentic mathematical work.  We show how different kinds of 
experiments can be used to engage in theory building and provide examples of initial 
work in building this theory. 
 
Keywords: Mathematics instruction; Practical Rationality; Theory of teaching; 
Teacher education 
 
 
Introduction 
In this paper we address the work of the mathematics teacher in instruction and 
the rationality behind this work. We first sketch out how the teacher’s work 
could conceivably contribute to the creation of opportunities for students to do 
authentic mathematical work. In that sense we expect that the paper will add to 
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our collective sense of what is conceivable and perhaps desirable to happen in 
classrooms. Most of the paper, however, is concentrated on elaborating on the 
grounds for possibility and justification of teachers’ actions. In particular, what is 
the rationality that might (or might not) support teachers’ management of 
authentic mathematical work by students?  
In accounting for the rationality beneath teachers’ actions and in regard to the 
possibility of enabling authentic mathematical work by students, we take some 
distance from two relatively commonplace ways of responding to a vision 
sketch. In one of these approaches, a vision of conceivable mathematical work in 
classrooms might be followed by an acknowledgment and analysis of the forces 
and structures that make the vision not viable. Such an approach would summon 
us to be like social critics of the current educational system, and to endorse a new 
educational system that would bring all our hopes to fruition. In the other 
approach, the vision sketch is followed by a busy shaping of persuasive rhetoric, 
design of efforts, and organization of resources, all of them aimed at making the 
vision happen against all odds. Such an approach would summon us to be like 
social engineers, relentlessly working to realize the vision, as if the only thing 
that separated the conceivable from the viable was the existence of the will to 
make the vision happen.  
Without meaning to disrespect proponents of either of those approaches, we 
take a third approach, which combines the orientation to improvement of the 
second with the analytic disposition of the first but poses questions that call 
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neither for critique nor for engineering but rather for theory and research. We 
elaborate on the notion that the actions of teachers in classrooms are not mere 
expressions of their free will and personal resources; rather their actions also 
attest to adaptations to conditions and constraints in which they work. And yet 
that realization does not necessarily condemn us to accept the status quo; rather, 
it can suggest ways of working toward improvement in viable, incremental, and 
sustainable ways.  
How can we think about the distinction, and the gap, between what is 
conceivable and what is viable in mathematics teaching? How can we find out 
how much of the vision can be realized within existing conditions and 
constraints? We argue below that what is required is first to understand and then 
to co-opt what we have been calling the practical rationality of mathematics 
teaching (Herbst & Chazan, 2003; Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011). We first 
recount how the story of practical rationality began and the big picture it serves. 
 
How We Started Our Efforts to Explain Teaching 
We started to work together back in 2000, following our common interest in 
understanding the teaching of mathematics at the secondary level and our 
shared sense of the importance of learning the wisdom of the practice (Shulman, 
2004). But while the focus of our interest was convergent, our theoretical 
perspectives and our methods required some work. Chazan had been doing 
what Ball (2000) calls first-person research: He had been using his own practice 
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teaching Algebra I to investigate the dilemmas and dynamics that a teacher 
needs to manage (see Chazan, 2000; Chazan & Ball, 1999; also Lampert, 1985). 
Herbst had been using the more structuralist notions of didactical contract 
(Brousseau, 1997) and didactical transposition (Chevallard, 1985) to provide 
detached observer descriptions and explanations of the work of teaching and its 
effects on the classroom representation of knowledge (see Herbst, 1998; 1999; 
2002a; 2002b). Our conversations at the time had found a good anchor concept in 
Bourdieu’s (1998) notion of disposition: an element of practical reason that could 
be conceived as having two sides, like a coin. Dispositions could be seen by an 
observer as ordinances to which the individual is subject given the position in 
which they are, but dispositions could also be experienced as tendencies 
emanating from the individual and compelling them to act in particular ways 
(see Herbst & Chazan, 2003; cf. how Lampert, 1985, speaks of commitments). Early 
on the conversation was mostly theoretical, as we searched for ways to 
complement our perspectives; but then our conversation took a methodological 
turn.  
At about the same time that we started talking about dispositions, the 
educational research community was dealing with a renewed interest in the use 
of experimental methods in education, which culminated with reports like 
Shavelson and Towne (2002) and the establishment of the What Works 
Clearinghouse by the US Department of Education 
(http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/).  The notion was in the air that educational 
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research should aspire to the gold standard of using experimental design, 
randomly assigning participants to conditions; and our conversations started to 
include considerations of hypothesis testing in research on mathematics 
teaching. As we considered what experimental research in mathematics 
instruction could look like, it was odd to us that the image that first came to 
mind was that of research on whether the implementation of an instructional 
intervention might affect students’ performance: Does curriculum X produce 
better gains than curriculum A on the scale N? To be clear, nothing is odd about 
thinking of curriculum or pedagogy implementation in terms of experimental 
research. What seemed odd to us was that those types of questions would appear 
as the prototypical examples of how our field might take on the challenge of 
experimental research.  
Experimental research that gauged the achievement gains that could be 
caused by a particular treatment were clearly worthwhile questions, important 
for policy and practice, but they were also applied questions, not necessarily 
illuminating the fundamental phenomena of mathematics instruction. We 
wondered whether embracing an experimental paradigm would necessarily 
mean that research on mathematics instruction would be limited to asking 
questions of an applied nature, questions that took for granted that we knew the 
nature of mathematics instruction well and just had to design and test ways of 
improving it. Given our experience as classroom researchers, we knew that, at 
the time, mathematics education research (for a long time focused on learning 
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and the learner, and later on the individual teacher) still had some ways to go as 
far as understanding the nature of the activity of mathematics teaching. We 
thought there was a great need for basic (as opposed to applied) research on 
mathematics teaching, not just basic research on students or teachers. And so we 
wondered whether basic research on mathematics instruction had some use for 
an experimental paradigm.  
Instructional Situations and their Norms:  
A Focus for Basic Research on Mathematics Teaching 
The fundamental idea, proposed by David K. Cohen among others (see 
Cohen, Raudenbush, and Ball, 2003; also Chevallard, 1985; Hawkins, 1974; 
Henderson, 1963), that instruction consists of the interactions among teacher, 
students, and content in environments was compelling to us and essential for 
defining an emerging field. We pondered what basic research on the nature of 
mathematics instruction could look like if it embraced an experimental 
paradigm: What kind of interventions could reveal aspects of the nature of 
mathematics instruction? And what aspects of mathematics instruction could we 
expect to find out about? These questions seemed important, on the one hand, in 
order to respond to the challenge of using an experimental paradigm. Those 
questions seemed important, on the other hand, in order to establish a 
foundation for basic (rather than applied) research on instructional practice in 
mathematics--research that asked questions distinct from the study of instruction 
writ large (which might assume that the subject does not matter or that it matters 
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the same regardless of the particular discipline from which it comes) as well as 
questions distinct from the study of people (teachers or students) which might 
perpetuate the reduction of mathematics education research to psychology.   
One key idea presented itself as an aspect of mathematics instruction that we 
wanted to find out more about: If the subject matters in instruction, that is, if 
mathematics instruction in geometry is a practice distinct from instruction say in 
Calculus, American History, or Organic Chemistry, we would expect to see 
regularities of some sort across different cases of instruction in a specific domain. 
This was anchored by our mutual interest in justification and proof and our 
question of why, while those practices were current in geometry, they continued 
to be absent in algebra, in spite of calls for it in reports over the decades: How 
could it be that the same teacher with the same class, but perhaps at one year’s 
remove, would talk and act so differently in regard to the source of mathematical 
truth simply due to a shift from geometry to algebra instruction? Additionally, if 
the regularities observed concerned mathematics instruction as an activity, we 
would expect to observe regularities that went beyond the knowledge being 
transacted to include similar ways in which teacher and students managed those 
knowledge transactions. The word “norm” used in the sociological sense as the 
normal or unmarked behavior that is tacitly expected in a setting, suggested itself 
as the name of the object of study. We hypothesized that instruction in specific 
courses of mathematical study (algebra, geometry, etc.) could be described as 
abiding by consistent sets of norms, much as other human practices like eating in 
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a formal dinner or getting a table in a restaurant abide by consistent sets of 
norms (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). And we thought that experimental research 
could be used to confirm that those norms exist. 
Instructional Situations, their Norms, and the Notion of Breaching Experiment 
While the observance of norms could be found at various layers of classroom 
activity (as we indicate below, in particular at the layer of the didactical contract 
and the layer of the mathematical task), we concentrated on studying norms at 
the layer that we’ve called the instructional situation (Herbst, 2006). Conceptually, 
an instructional situation is a type of encounter where an exchange can happen 
between (1) specific mathematical work done by students and their teacher in 
moment-to-moment interaction and (2) a claim on students’ knowing of a 
specific item of knowledge at stake. Intuitively one could think of an 
instructional situation as including a mathematical task and the element of the 
curriculum that the completion of the task enables the teacher to lay claim on. 
We model instructional situations by spelling out norms that describe the 
knowledge and the work being exchanged, who is expected to do what, and 
when those different actions are supposed to happen (see Herbst & Miyakawa, 
2008; Herbst, Chen, Weiss, & González, 2009).         
Herbst’s own research studying the work of the teacher managing the 
instructional situation of ‘doing proofs’ in high school geometry provided an 
example of a norm: students are expected to justify a statement in a proof with a 
reason before they move on to make the next statement. In proposing it as a 
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norm, we did not mean to endorse the norm as appropriate, but to describe what 
classroom participants—teacher and students—would consider appropriate. We 
were not willing to posit that those norms would necessarily be explicit for 
teachers or students: We expected that people might act as if they followed 
norms but not necessarily bring them up if and when they were asked to 
describe the activities they do. And we realized also that, unlike physical laws 
those norms of human activity could not be thought of as inevitable; they could 
in fact be broken—one could conceive of and actually find a teacher who had let 
a student make a new statement without having justified the previous one. While 
one would expect that a large number of observations of a similar instructional 
situation would reveal compliance with norms more often than non compliance, 
the notion that mathematics instruction is regulated by norms could not be 
validated solely through the observation of regularities in action. We needed 
empirical ways of attesting that even if a norm had actually been breached, 
people familiar with the practice would have expected it to be fulfilled.  
The notion that basic research on mathematics instruction could consist of 
finding out about the norms of instruction in subject specific situations, along 
with the particular notion of a norm as a tacit, shared expectation for action, led 
us to an idea for how to pick up the challenge of doing experimental research. 
We were inspired by the ethnomethodological notion of breaching experiments 
(Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Mehan & Wood, 1975), which the first author was 
already adapting for use in classroom research (Herbst, 2003, 2006). We thought 
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this notion could be adapted to deliberately bring to the surface practitioners’ 
sense of the norms of instruction.  If we could represent to practitioners (for 
example, through a videotaped episode of instruction, but also possibly through 
an animation or through a virtual reality experience) action that purported to be 
of the same kind of what they would ordinarily do, but where a hypothesized 
norm of that action had been breached, we might be able to hear from 
practitioners whether they had expected the norm to hold. In that sense, a 
representation of teaching that included the breach of a norm could be expected 
to reproduce deliberately the phenomenon of interest, namely, that practitioners 
expected that norm to hold. The extent to which those procedures could be called 
experiments refers to Francis Bacon’s notion of experiment in scientific inquiry: 
“there remains simple experience; which, if taken as it comes, is called accident,” 
“if sought for, experiment” (cited in Durant, 1926, p. 146). That is, our earlier 
conception of doing experimental research only abided by the notion of 
experiment as the deliberate reproduction of a phenomenon. But one could also 
see at least as a possibility that the modern conception of experiment, which 
emphasizes reproduction of the phenomenon under controlled conditions by 
way of random assignment of participants to conditions, could be used to 
confirm that a norm holds: Imagine having two representations of teaching that 
differed only in that in one of them (the control condition) a hypothesized norm 
held while in the other  (the treatment condition) the hypothesized norm has 
been breached. Imagine a sample of practitioners who have a comparable degree 
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of socialization in the practice where the norm is supposed to hold. Imagine 
randomly assigning those participants to one or another representation. Imagine 
having a way of gauging their satisfaction with the instruction experienced and 
comparing both groups in regard to that assessment. That gave us a skeleton of 
what basic experimental research on instruction could look like and some 
impetus for initial work on a project that we would later call Thought 
Experiments in Mathematics Teaching (ThEMaT).  
Thought Experiments in Mathematics Teaching 
The notions of instructional situation, norm, and breaching experiments led 
us first to gather video records from a geometry lesson on proofs where the 
teacher allowed a student at the board to omit the justification of a statement and 
to move on with the proof. We started by gathering focus groups of geometry 
teachers that looked at that video record and then examining the discourse of 
those focus groups for comments that might provide evidence that teachers in 
the focus groups had seen the actions of the videotaped teacher as breaching a 
norm (Herbst & Chazan, 2003; Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009; Weiss, Herbst, & Chen, 
2009). At the same time that this work was being done we started exploring the 
use of animations to represent classroom scenarios and we wrote a grant 
proposal for Thought Experiments in Mathematics Teaching to the National 
Science Foundation, asking for support to create animations that helped us study 
what by then we had started calling the practical rationality of mathematics teaching.  
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Thought Experiments in Mathematics Teaching (ThEMaT) was funded in 
2004 and, among other things, it enabled us to create seventeen families of 
animated classroom stories (the stories can be seen in LessonSketch, 
www.lessonsketch.org). The animations use simple cartoon characters and voice 
over to represent scenarios of classroom instruction. The use of animations 
allowed us to control the content of those scenarios, allowing us to design 
scenarios that breach a norm but comply with others. Animations also allowed 
us to produce breaches that had not been observed in actual classrooms (thus 
showing one important advantage over video records). And this media also 
allowed us to create stories that branched, thus depicting alternative scenarios 
that proceeded from a common trunk (thus our reference to families of stories, 
since many of them have several alternative stories; see Chazan & Herbst, 2012; 
Herbst, Chazan, Chen, Chieu, & Weiss, 2011; Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011). 
The generous support of the National Science Foundation has been crucial for us 
to maintain a research program that, in our view, has contributed to the field not 
only an important technique for data collection but also some useful theoretical 
and methodological ideas.   
The goals of the research program are quite ambitious: To develop and test a 
theory of the rationality of instructional practices in mathematics. This theory of 
the rationality of instruction explains what instructional actions are justifiable by 
drawing on two elements (1) the norms that the practice of teaching a particular 
mathematics course imposes on whoever plays the role of teacher, and (2) the 
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obligations that the profession of mathematics teaching requires of anybody 
taking the position of mathematics teacher. Combined with the personal assets 
(including knowledge, skills, and beliefs) that an individual teacher brings with 
them to that position and that role, those norms and obligations can help explain 
teacher action and decision-making.  The project is now on its second funding 
cycle in which we are designing and using an online interface (LessonSketch, 
www.lessonsketch.org) to deliver online multimedia experiences that include 
animations and other cartoon-based representations of teaching. The project 
designs multimedia experiences and questionnaires that confront individuals or 
groups of teachers with representations of teaching; the project will investigate 
how responses to those questionnaires correlate with measures of mathematical 
knowledge for teaching (MKT; Ball, Thames, & Phelps, 2008). Over the years, 
project ThEMaT has allowed us not only to probe and ground our ideas about 
norms and develop instruments but also to deepen the theory and make 
progress, though we have not yet used an experimental paradigm in quite the 
sense described above. Our interventions thus far are experiments in the sense 
that they reproduce predicted phenomena (evidence of the breach of a norm), 
but they have not yet reached the gold standard of controlled conditions by 
random assignment. These conditions may be fulfilled through our current 
efforts with LessonSketch: An authoring tool in the LessonSketch environment 
allows us to create online multimedia experiences that may be randomly 
assigned to participants (see Inglis & Mejía Ramos, 2009, for an example of a 
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similar use of the internet in experimental research in mathematics education).  
While the foregoing describes the story of our work, we use the following 
sections to expand on the ideas and some of the methods.   
Explicating Practical Rationality 
A Classroom Scenario 
Consider what we would call a thought experiment in mathematics 
teaching. The action happens in a high school geometry course in late November. 
The class has spent some time learning to use triangle congruence to prove 
statements and has begun the study of quadrilaterals.  The teacher, Mr. Jones, 
has drawn a figure on the board (see Figure 1) and wants the class to prove a 
statement about the relationship between the sides of the rectangle ABCD. There 
is some hesitation. Somebody asks whether they could prove that AB  is longer 
than BC  while another student asks what they have to go on; the teacher lets 
those comments pass. A student asks whether triangles ADE and BCE are 
congruent. Mr. Jones writes this question on the board and draws two arrows 
from it. One arrow points toward a question he writes, “how would it help to 
know that those triangles are congruent?” The other arrow points toward 
another question he also writes, “what would you need to assume to be able to 
say that those triangles are congruent?” You can hear somebody say that it’s 
obvious that they are congruent while another says that they could then say the 
triangles are isosceles. Another student says, “you’d need to know that AEB is a 
right angle;” Mr. Jones writes this on the board and asks the class what they have 
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to say about that (see Figure 2). Some students claim to not really know what the 
teacher means with that question but others raise their hands. One of these 
students says that she thinks it would be useful if the angle were right because 
then the angles at the top would be congruent with the small angles at E. Some 
kids perk up and one kid says, “and you could then say that AB is twice BC.” 
The teacher asks them to take a few minutes and see if they can prove that the 
ratio between the sides is 2 assuming as little as possible. You see a kid write, 
“Prove: The ratio is 2 ” while others have written “Given:” and are pensive.  
  
  
Figure 1. Mr. Jones diagram Figure 2. Discussing given and prove 
 
 
For a few years now, in the context of the project Thought Experiments in 
Mathematics Teaching, we have been creating cartoon-based representations of 
teaching that illustrate conceivable scenarios of instruction.  One of them is the 
story “A Proof about Rectangles,” a version of which we’ve just described. Now 
we want to use that episode to raise a few questions about mathematics 
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instruction in school classrooms and to elaborate on the ideas that this kind of 
material has helped us explore.  
Some of these questions concern the substance of this conceivable episode: 
What opportunities for students’ mathematical work are made possible by how 
the teacher has been managing the instruction? Other questions are about theory: 
What kind of considerations about classroom instruction could help us describe 
and explain how teacher and students ordinarily transact mathematical ideas, in 
such a way that we could also account for possible avenues for improvement and 
foresee their consequences? Finally, other questions are about research 
methodology: What kind of data can help us ground those theoretical 
considerations? How to obtain it? These questions, though large, serve to 
explicate the program of research that we call the practical rationality of 
mathematics teaching (Herbst & Chazan, 2003; Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011).  
Desirable and Customary Mathematical Work 
What mathematical work are students doing in the episode described above? 
We could describe it as listing plausible statements about a figure and 
considering whether these plausible statements could be connected through 
logical necessity. The source of some of those statements seems to be 
perceptual—for example, the observation that angle AEB is right. Other 
statements seem to result from deduction—notably, the observation that if the 
angle AEB was right then one could conclude that side AB would be twice as 
long as side BC . But regardless of the origin of each of those statements, the 
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teacher is helping students connect all statements through abduction and 
deduction: Asking what assumptions would enable one to infer the plausible 
statement made and asking what inferences could be made if one took that 
plausible statement for granted. The assertion about the relative length of the 
sides of the rectangle eventually derives from the plausible truth of those earlier 
statements. The teacher is thus helping students reduce a question of truth (what 
could be true about an object) to a question of deducibility from possible 
statements about an object. They are using proof as a method to find things out.  
Such use of proof as method in knowledge inquiry is essential to the 
discipline of mathematics (Lakatos, 1976). It is also behind the drive to 
mathematically model other fields of experience: The expectation that in those 
fields it will also be possible to reduce the problem of truth to a quest for 
deducibility, which can then warrant new, still unknown, possible truths is 
important in pure and applied science. Hanna & Jahnke (1996) have argued that, 
by using an empirical theory to predict empirical phenomena, scientists engage 
in modeling the world and deductively producing inferences based on 
assumptions, predictions that are eventually subject to confirmation by 
experimentation.  
Being able to master such a form of inquiry can make a child resourceful in 
ways that can add to methodological resources they get from the study of other 
disciplines. Mathematical work of the kind depicted in the scenario is not only 
authentic mathematical work (Weiss, Herbst, & Chen, 2009) but also embodies 
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skills and processes that might empower students to contribute to knowledge 
production writ large. In that sense we would argue that Mr. Jones’s questions to 
students about what could be deduced from a given statement, or what 
statement could entail what they think is true, are helpful ways of educating his 
students in the use of mathematical reasoning for making predictions about the 
world, in this case about the world of diagrams. A scenario where students could 
work on connecting plausible statements deductively is therefore conceivable 
and it could be represented using animations or comic strips with cartoon 
characters.  
However, it is likely the case that few students encounter such opportunities 
to engage with proof in school mathematics in the way outlined by the foregoing 
scenario. The work they do during their school years rarely includes chances to 
acquire the skill or the appreciation of the methodological, model-making 
function of proof or even experiences doing work that could have had that 
exchange value.  
It is more likely that the problem above would be presented to high school 
geometry students as shown in Figure 3. In particular, while students are 
ordinarily expected to prove propositions in high school geometry, it is 
ordinarily the teacher (or the book) who will state the givens and the conclusion 
of the propositions they prove. While efforts to change these norms have been 
made (e.g., the work with the Geometric Supposers reported in Schwartz, 
Yerushalmy, & Wilson, 1993), it rarely falls on the students to determine the 
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givens for a plausible conclusion, to deduce the conclusion from a set of givens, 
or to find both the givens and the conclusion for a theorem that relates to some 
plausible naïve conjecture. 
 
•Given:  
 ABCD rectangle,  
  E midpoint of DC ,  
  AEB right angle 
 Prove: 
AB
BC
 2  
 
Figure 3. A more likely proof problem. 
 
 
The Scenario as an Example of Norms and Instructional Situations 
The expectation that, if students are to be held accountable for producing a 
proof, the teacher will have to provide for them the givens and the “prove” 
statement is an example of what we call a norm of the instructional situation 
“doing proofs.” It is a norm in the sense that an observer can describe teachers 
and students acting as if they expected that this would be the case. In 
consequence, if students and teacher were involved in an interaction about a 
problem for which the teacher did not provide the given and the “prove”, then it 
is likely that neither teachers nor students would describe those activities as 
doing proofs—they might describe them as something else (e.g., having a 
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discussion). The norm is that anytime the students are expected to produce a 
proof, teachers are expected to provide the givens and the conclusion to prove. 
Of course by “norm” we don’t mean ‘the correct thing to do’; it is certainly not 
“correct” from our perspective informed by our understanding of mathematical 
practice, though it may be experienced as correct or appropriate by teachers and 
students. We use “norm” and “normative” in two complementary senses: First, 
the sense in which ‘normative’ means ‘frequent’ or ‘usual;’ this could be 
corroborated empirically by observing, over a large number of high school 
geometry classrooms, the recurrence of this feature in proof activity. Second, the 
sense in which the participants in the situation act as if they expected such 
behaviors to be appropriate or correct.  
Such norms are not just arbitrary belief systems, idiosyncratic and completely 
changeable; they are norms of interaction between teacher, students, and specific 
content and are thus ascribed not to individuals but to the specific instructional 
situation where that interaction happens. They have a particular purpose; they 
regulate the division of labor over time between student and teacher vis-à-vis a 
specific kind of instructional exchange. In this case, this norm regulates the 
exchange between the work students do when proving a proposition and the 
claim (that the teacher needs to substantiate in high school Geometry) that 
students know how to do proofs. In that sense, this norm is different in scope 
than the more general norms of the didactical contract, which are present across 
different instructional exchanges (e.g., the expectation that when the teacher asks 
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students a question, she already knows the answer).  In trying to understand the 
practical rationality that underlies that norm and the possibilities to depart from 
it we are therefore asking not a question about instruction in general (e.g., Do 
teachers see it as possible, desirable, or appropriate to have students work on 
tasks where they determine the givens or the goal?) but rather a question about 
what counts as doing a proof in high school geometry: Do teachers see it as 
possible, desirable, or appropriate to hold students accountable for doing a proof 
and to do so in the context of tasks where students are in charge of providing the 
givens or the conclusion of the proof problem? To us it seems that such tasks 
would enable students to experience and learn about the methodological role of 
proof: Its instrumentality in finding new knowledge. But, such tasks are not 
common in classrooms. 
“Doing proofs” in high school geometry illustrates what we mean by an 
instructional situation. These are frames for the encounter among teacher, 
students, and specific content: In these encounters an instructional exchange 
takes place—the exchange between the work that students do, for example, on a 
particular task, and the knowledge claim that such work enables the teacher to 
make by virtue of having done that work. Instructional situations can be 
modeled as systems of norms such as the one described above. Instructional 
situations are content-specific in two regards: They accommodate or make room 
for specific tasks, and they permit the exchange of work on those tasks for 
specific items of knowledge. The instructional situation “doing proofs” does not 
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customarily accommodate students’ work in which students produce the givens 
or the ‘prove’ for a proof problem; rather, if they are ever involved in such work, 
their involvement does not count as knowledge of proof. Based on our 
understanding of the methodological role of proof in mathematics (Lakatos, 
1976) we argue that such work (figuring out the givens or the conclusion) does 
not always precede but it is often part of the work of proving in mathematics. 
 Is it Feasible to Change Instructional Situations? 
A motivation for our work has been to understand better whether the kind of 
mathematical work described above—the use of proof as a tool to know with—
could feasibly be deployed in classrooms. One way of addressing that question 
focuses on the design of resources that can support that work. And some of our 
instructional experiments (e.g., Herbst, 2003, 2006) have included developing 
resources, including special lessons and units co-developed with teachers. In 
those, problems were designed to create contexts where proving could help 
students come up with an answer to the problem. Our focus on the feasibility of 
that work led us not only to investigate whether proof could play a role as a tool 
to know with (see Herbst, 2005) but also to investigate what kinds of disruptions 
of the work of teaching those tasks would cause (Herbst, 2003) and what sorts of 
negotiations a teacher needed to make to restore a sense of normalcy (Herbst, 
2006).  
Another way of addressing the feasibility question goes beyond investigating 
what is possible when teachers use different tasks to engage students in proving 
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and taps into the source of arguments that teachers could draw upon to justify or 
rebuff such tasks. Behind that version of the feasibility question is the 
fundamental hypothesis that classrooms are complex systems where actions are 
not merely a projection of the will or capacity of the actors or the richness of their 
resources. Rather, actions of individual actors contribute to the deployment of a 
joint activity system whose performance also feeds back, and thus gives shape, to 
the actions that the participants can take in that system. And at least tacitly and 
as a group, teachers of a given course know the demands of that system to the 
point that we should be well advised to canvass that knowledge if we intend to 
understand whether a particular improvement will be feasible or not. The 
question then is not simply how to design materials that enable desirable 
mathematical work or how to create in teachers the desire to promote that work. 
We also need to ask about the structure and function of the activity system where 
that work might be deployed and how this system might accommodate or resist 
attempts to deploy that work. In particular this requires thinking of mathematics 
instruction in school classrooms as a system of relationships that are deployed 
under various conditions and constraints. A conceptualization of this system 
could enable us to think in a more sophisticated and potentially accurate way 
about what teacher and students do and thus be able to foresee if given 
improvement efforts have a prospect of success.  
An analogy with how mathematics educators have evolved in their thinking 
about students’ errors can illuminate this conceptualization of instruction as a 
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system. There used to be a time when student errors were seen as indications of 
misfit, mishaps, or forgetfulness. Things changed when research on students’ 
mathematical work started to be treated within a cognitive paradigm. For 
example, an international study led by Lauren Resnick, Pearla Nesher, and 
François Leonard (see Resnick, Nesher, Leonard, Magone, Omanson, & Peled, 
1989) on students’ sorting of decimal fractions showed that students’ errors had a 
conceptual basis: Their errors could be explained by the existence of conceptual, 
tacit controls such as the “fraction rule” or the “natural number rule.” These 
were mathematical quasi-truths, or epistemological obstacles (Brousseau, 1997), 
true within a limited domain but false when that domain was extended. Students 
that made errors did so not out of the lack of knowledge but out of the 
possession of some knowledge. As a field, our stance toward students’ errors 
thus changed from an early judgment stance to a later inquiry stance: Rather 
than judging students as irrational when they make errors, we now strive to 
understand what rationality leads them to make those errors.   
We propose that we should think of the actions of teachers (and students) in 
the classroom by analogy with how we have come to think about error in 
children’s mathematical thinking. The analogy we propose is that we could think 
of “error” in instruction—really teaching that deviates from what might be 
deemed desirable—not as an indication of misfit, ill will, or lack of knowledge, 
on the part of the practitioner. Rather, we should think of this “error” as an 
indication of the possible presence of some knowledge, knowledge of what to do, 
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which is subject to a practical rationality that justifies it. This is a rationality that 
we should try to understand better before judging teachers or attempting to 
legislate their practice. It is this rationality, rather than simple stubbornness, that 
explains why many reforms are not able to make their way into classrooms. 
Teachers and students act in classrooms in ways that attest to the existence of 
specialized knowledge of what to do; knowledge that outsiders to those 
classrooms are less likely to have even if they know the knowledge domain being 
taught and learned. For example, as it relates to the scenario narrated above, 
teachers and students of geometry would likely see it as strange for Mr. Jones to 
ask the students for the givens of the problem. We focus here on the rationality 
associated with the role of the teacher and how this might warrant or refute 
actions like that one. 
Practical Rationality and the Role of the Teacher 
 The “teacher” of a specific course of mathematical studies, such as high 
school geometry, is an institutional role, not just a name to describe an aspect of 
an individual’s identity (Buchmann, 1986). There is a person who plays the role, 
for sure; that person comes to play the role with personal assets that are likely to 
matter in what he or she chooses to do. These assets are likely to include 
mathematical knowledge for teaching and skill at doing some tasks of teaching 
(Ball, Thames, and Phelps, 2008). It is widely believed that those assets make a 
difference; that teachers who have those assets may be able to figure out and do 
things that others may not be able to do. But while teachers’ causes and motives 
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to do things may have personal grounds, it is unlikely that their actions could be 
justified on personal grounds. One could imagine that Mr. Jones in the scenario 
above might have been bored with the prospect of giving his students another 
routine proof exercise or wanted to have a fun day teaching geometry. But we 
could not really expect him to use any of that as the warrant for doing what he 
did—his job is not to find activities that amuse him, but rather to teach geometry 
to his students. Even if the actual basis for his actions had been his own 
amusement, how could he justify having done that when talking with his peers? 
Those grounds for justification are what we call practical rationality. 
The notion of practical rationality points to a container of dispositions that 
could have currency in a collective, for example, within the set of colleagues who 
teach geometry in similar settings. These are dispositions to abide by the norms of 
the specific instructional situation a teacher is engaged in (i.e., the norms of the 
situation of doing proofs in high school geometry) as well as dispositions to 
honor the obligations to the profession of mathematics teaching. 
By dispositions we mean what Bourdieu (1998) describes as the categories of 
perception and appreciation that compel agents in a practice to act in specific 
ways. We interpret categories of perception to include the taken as shared ways 
in which practitioners perceive people, events, things, and ideas in the shared 
world of the classroom, as instantiated, for example in the language tokens they 
use to talk about the world of the classroom. We interpret categories of 
appreciation to include the principles and qualities on which practitioners rely to 
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establish an attitude toward people, events, things, or ideas. Dispositions tend to 
be tacit but they can be articulated to others when justifying to one’s peers (or to 
other stakeholders) why one might or might not do something like what Mr. 
Jones did with that proof problem. The high school geometry course and the 
work of doing proofs, in particular, have been particularly fertile grounds for us 
to develop theory about instruction and the practical rationality of mathematics 
teaching.  
Didactical Contract and the Role of the Teacher 
To conceptualize the work of the teacher as the playing of a role, we start 
from the notion of the didactical contract (Brousseau, 1997): The hypothesis that 
student and teacher have some basic roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis a body of 
knowledge at stake. What does it mean that there is knowledge at stake? The 
relationship between teacher and students exists because of the assumption that 
there is knowledge that can be communicated from one to the other; this 
knowledge is at stake because such communication may or may not happen. The 
didactical contract is a tacit assignment of rights and responsibilities between 
teacher and student vis-à-vis the communication of that knowledge. These 
responsibilities include the expectation for the teacher to give students work to 
do that is supposed to create opportunities to learn elements of that body of 
knowledge, and the expectation for the student to engage in the work assigned, 
producing work that can be assessed as evidence of having (or not yet having) 
acquired that knowledge.  
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We use the word norm to designate each of those statements that an observer 
makes in an effort to articulate what regulates a practice: Actors act as if they held 
such statement as a norm, though they may be quite unaware of it. Each class has 
a didactical contract that can be modeled by listing its norms. From the 
perspective of the teacher, the didactical contract authorizes a basic exchange 
economy of knowledge that he or she has to manage: An exchange between 
work designed for, assigned to, and completed by students and elements of 
knowledge, prescribed by the curriculum, at stake in that work, and hopefully 
embodied in students’ productions. The role of the teacher includes managing 
those exchanges between work and knowledge. This management includes, first, 
enabling and supporting mathematical work; and second, interpreting the results 
of this work, exchanging it for the knowledge at stake.  
The hypothesis of a didactical contract only says that a contract exists that 
fulfills those goals; the hypothesis means to describe any mathematics teaching 
inside an educational institution. But it is also obvious that the teacher and 
student roles and responsibilities are under-described by that hypothesis: There 
are many ways in which the didactical contract could be enacted that would 
have at least those characteristics; contracts could be quite different from each 
other not the least because the mathematics at stake could be very different from 
course to course and thus require very different forms of work to be learned. 
Even for the same course of studies, say high school geometry, different contracts 
could further stipulate the roles and responsibilities of teacher and student 
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differently. In particular, it is conceivable that some contracts might include the 
expectation that every new task would require negotiation about how the 
general norms of the contract apply (e.g., What is it required of the teacher to get 
students to work on a particular task? What does it mean for students to work on 
that task?). It is also conceivable, and we argue more likely, that contracts rely on 
a manifold of instructional situations that forego the need for some of those 
negotiations much of the time. These instructional situations include mostly tacit 
but specific norms that specify how the didactical contract applies for a range of 
tasks and the specific items of knowledge to be exchanged for the students’ work 
on those tasks.  
While some research has endeavored to conceptualize, enact, and study the 
characteristics of alternative contracts (e.g., Chazan, 2000; Lampert, 1990, 2001; 
Yackel & Cobb, 1996), the first author has been interested in using a variety of 
approaches to study the usual high school geometry contract and the practical 
rationality behind the teachers’ work managing the exchanges enabled by that 
contract. The reason for that is founded on the considerations about 
improvement made earlier. Sustainable improvement in instruction will not only 
need to provide new and better resources but also to be able to deal 
constructively with the inertia and possible reactions from established practice. 
Knowledge of how instruction usually works and what rationality underpins its 
usual operations is key for the design of reforms that are viable and sustainable. 
Furthermore, knowledge of how usual instruction works can encourage 
Herbst & Chazan 
 
piecemeal, incremental changes that don’t throw the proverbial baby with the 
bathwater.  
Instructional Situations and the Role of the Teacher 
The situation of “doing proofs” has been a useful starting point in that 
research agenda. Historical analysis (Herbst, 2002b; González & Herbst, 2006) 
has showed how the general skill “how to do proofs” became an object of study 
in and of itself, leaving behind the important relationships between proofs and 
specific concepts, theorems, and theories. The work that students do has also 
evolved to the current state in which what a student can prove from available 
givens matters much less than whether and how well they carry out a proof.  In 
exchange for a claim on that knowledge (to show that they know “how to do 
proofs”) students are to show that they can connect a “given” with a “prove” by 
making a sequence of statements justified with prior knowledge (regardless of 
the strength or the importance of the proposition proved): In other words 
students are learning the logical form of proof at the expense of its 
methodological function. In describing such exchange as an instructional 
situation, we posit that this exchange is facilitated by a specialized set of norms 
that elaborate how the didactical contract applies.  
From observing work in geometry classrooms we have noted that implicit 
expectations of who is to do what and when vary depending on the specifics of 
the object of study. In relation to diagrams, for example, the extent to which 
students can draw objects into a diagram or draw observations from a diagram 
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varies according to whether the work is framed as a construction, an exploration, 
or a proof (Herbst, 2004). While the didactical contract for a course may have 
some general norms that differentiate it from a contract for a different course, 
there is also differentiation between the more specific norms within a given 
course of studies, depending again on what is at stake. Much of those rules are 
cued in classroom interaction through the use of selected words such as prove, 
construct, or conjecture. These words frame classroom interaction by summoning 
special, mutual expectations, or norms, of who can do what and when. As noted 
above, we use the expression instructional situation to refer to each of those 
frames. Instructional situations are specialized, local versions of the didactical 
contract that frame particular exchanges of work for knowledge, obviating the 
need to negotiate how the contract applies for a specific chunk of work.  
“Doing proofs” is an example of an instructional situation in high school 
geometry; “solving equations” is an example of an instructional situation in 
algebra I (Chazan & Lueke, 2009). We contend that these frames for classroom 
interaction, these instructional situations, are defaults for classroom interaction, 
tacit knowledge held by the classroom as an organization (Cook & Brown, 1999) 
that specifies what to do; knowledge perpetuated through socialization (and 
with the aid of textbooks and colleagues) that, in particular, provides cues for the 
teacher on what to do and what to expect the student to do. Instructional 
situations are sociotechnical units of analysis; they organize joint action with 
specific content.  
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Our perspective centers on the situation rather than the individual and has 
the power to explain why the same individual might happen to do quite 
different things in different situations by no fault of their own. To implement this 
focus on the situations thus far we have created models of those situations. A 
model is not a portrait of what is desirable but rather a simplified operational 
description of a reality, in this case a human activity. Our models consist of 
arrays of norms that describe each situation in terms of who has to do what and 
when (Herbst & Miyakawa, 2008). Those models facilitate research on the 
content of practical rationality.  
Practical rationality is a container whose content includes the categories of 
perception and appreciation that are viable within the profession of mathematics 
teaching to warrant (or refute) courses of action in teaching. The notions of 
instructional situation, norm, and breach of a norm are the points of departure to 
study this rationality empirically. Based on the ethnomethodological notion of a 
breaching experiment (Mehan & Wood, 1975) we propose, as a methodological 
hypothesis, that if participants in an instructional situation are immersed in an 
instance of a situation where one of its norms has been breached, they will 
engage in repair strategies that not only confirm the existence of the norm but 
also elaborate on the role that the norm plays in the situation or on what might 
justify departing from the norm.  
Our data collection technique relies on representations of breached instances 
of instructional situations—representations made in videos, slideshows, or comic 
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strips, sometimes using real teachers and students (e.g., Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009) 
or using cartoon characters (Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011). We confront 
usual participants in an instructional situation with a breached representation. 
For example, the classroom scenario narrated above is quite close in content to an 
animated classroom story, “A Proof about Rectangles,” that we produced in 
order to study the rationality behind the tacit norm that the teacher is in charge 
of spelling out the givens and the prove. To find out about that rationality we 
attend to participants’ reactions to the representation: Do they perceive the 
breach of the norm? Do they accept the situation in spite of the breach? What do 
they identify as being at risk because of the breach? What opportunities, if any, 
do they see being created or lost because of the breach?  
Our aim is not to understand the participants themselves; our aim is to use 
the participants’ experience with the situation to understand the situation better. 
In particular we want to discover the elements of the practical rationality of 
mathematics teaching that teachers consider viable justifications of breaches of 
situations that would arguably be desirable, say because they might create a 
more authentic kind of mathematical work (see Weiss, Herbst, & Chen, 2009). In 
the case of the story narrated above we would pose the following concrete 
question:  On what account could a teacher justify (or rebuff) an action like the 
one Mr. Jones took? Clearly, researchers might be able to justify Mr. Jones’ action 
and we have tried to articulate that from a mathematical perspective. But in spite 
of the fact that some of us have had experience teaching we don’t know teaching 
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now in the way practitioners do. By virtue of the role that they play and the 
position from which they take on that role, teachers have to respond to specific 
obligations that shape their decisions.  
Experimentation and Teachers’ Responses to a Breach of a Norm  
In the previous section we noted that our technique to study the practical 
rationality with which practitioners might justify abiding by or departing from a 
norm in an instructional situation consists in creating a representation of practice 
that instantiates the situation and where the norm in question has been breached, 
then listening to how teachers respond to that representation. When teachers 
respond to a breach in an instructional situation, they might reject the situation 
or might repair the situation. By reject the situation we mean that they would 
come across as saying “this class is not doing a proof;” key in such a 
categorization is (1) the recognition that someone might argue that the target 
situation (doing proofs) describes the scenario being enacted and (2) their denial 
of the validity of such a description.  By repair the situation we mean a softer 
version of rejection: participants come across as describing the events using a 
different situation or as conforming to a contract different than the normative. 
For example, some teachers have said that Mr. Jones is leading students in an 
exploration rather than a proof.  
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“the only thing I could see him doing is that he was trying to get them the 
idea of making conjectures, okay?  What, what can we assume about this 
picture” (ITH062806, 4, 81, Tina)2 
“Maybe it's just like a -- kind of a like a blank canvas for just discussing 
without all of the restrictions tied on at this point just y'know lighter form 
of conversation y'know.” (ThEMaT082206, 10, 109, Lucille) 
Key in categorizing those expressions as repairs of the situation are that (1) 
participants are describing the events in terms of the larger grain size of the 
teacher’s instructional goal and that (2) participants are using some conventional 
labels for recurrent classroom activity to describe what happened in ways that 
fail to recognize the situation as one of “doing proofs” (e.g., conversation, 
making conjectures).  
 A third alternative, also present in our data, can be described as 
participants’ acceptance of the situation, namely recognized it as a case of “doing 
proofs.” For the sake of coding data, whenever participants don’t reject or repair 
the situation we take that as an acceptance, even if this is tacit. In some of these 
cases their acceptance of the situation came with comments that indicated that 
something about the particular task in which “doing proofs” was embodied had 
not been done as it should have been done. For example, some of our 
participants said  
                                                 
2 References to session data follow the convention (sessionid, interval, turn, speaker). 
All names are pseudonyms. 
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“So the fact that he's y'know not marking anything and asking them to 
kinda trust that drawing is kind of odd” (ThEMaT082206, 20,227, Edwin) 
“we tell them not to assume anything that we draw.” (ThEMaT082206, 
5,112,Tina) 
Among those comments accepting the situation as doing proofs, some comments 
indicated a positive appraisal of what the teacher had done. For example: 
“In the books we always go given-prove, right? So we don't really give 
them the option to even explore some of the nature of the figures.” 
(ThEMaT082206, 10,116, Jillian) 
We describe those responses as accepting the situation (the participant identifies 
or at least does not deny that the goal of the activity is to “do a proof”) but 
repairing the task (while the participant does not cast the situation as different 
than doing proofs, the participant recognizes some actions as deviating from the 
norm in that situation). A complete enumeration of contingencies includes, at 
least conceptually, the possibility that participants may accept the situation and 
accept the task: However, empirically one might observe those cases to be 
unmarked (e.g., the participant talks about something other than the breach). 
Incidentally, note that in this discussion we are proceeding rather globally and 
omitting considerations of the possible complexities of the unit of analysis for the 
sake of proposing how the experimental data could be aggregated: While the 
present considerations might be used to examine data gathered from individual 
practitioners providing a one-time response to a representation (for example, 
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responding to a multimedia questionnaire), data gathered from groups of 
practitioners in more extended conversations (such as those reported by Chazan 
& Herbst, 2012, or Herbst, Nachlieli, & Chazan, 2011) require more sophisticated 
considerations of the unit of analysis.  
From those broad considerations about the way we might code data from 
practitioners’ responses to a representation of an instructional situation we can 
anticipate a way of using this data to gauge the extent to which a hypothesized 
norm pertains to the situation under consideration—and in that way use 
experimentation to build basic knowledge about the practice of mathematics 
teaching. Consider first the case of practitioners responding to a representation 
of an instructional situation in which a hypothesized norm of that situation has 
been breached (e.g., the teacher asks students to provide the givens for a proof 
exercise). Consider further that the encounter between practitioners and 
representations is framed for them as a case of the situation (e.g., the instrument 
declares something to the effect of “we are going to see how a class works on a 
proof”) but no mention is made of the possibility that a norm might be breached 
nor is attention explicitly directed to the actions by which the breach is manifest. 
After the encounter, participants are asked to comment on how appropriately the 
teacher handled the situation (e.g., “what do you think of the way the teacher 
managed the class’s engagement in proving”). The data is then coded in ways 
that permit the aggregation shown in the contingency table below (and drawing 
on the definitions of reject, repair, and accept given above). 
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 Accept Situation Reject or Repair 
Situation 
Reject or Repair Task 2 1 
Accept Task 4 3 
 
 
The hypothesis that the norm breached is a norm for the situation being 
represented would justify the expectation that data would aggregate in cells 2 
and 3. Cell 2 represents responses of the kind ‘in this situation you’d rather do 
this other work instead’ (e.g., if you want students to do a proof, you give them 
the givens and the prove). Cell 3 represents responses of the kind ‘the kind of 
work you are doing there fits better in this other kind of situation’ (e.g., a 
question like that would be better off in a conversation than in a proof). Data that 
could be classified in any of those cells would provide evidence that adds 
credibility to the hypothesis that the norm applies. (Note that this evidence could 
but would not solely include repairs that specifically mention the norm 
breached—norms could stay tacit in spite of being breached and the evidence 
provided by participants might just reveal their sense that something has gone 
awry.) In contrast, cells 1 and 4 provide evidence that contradicts or at least 
provides no evidence in favor of the normative nature of the hypothesized norm.  
Intuitively, under the hypotheses that the norm applies to the situation, that 
the representation breaches the norm, and that the participants are experienced 
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enactors of the situation, one would expect the aggregate of Cells 2 and 3 (repairs 
of situation or of task) to be higher than the aggregate of Cells 1 and 4. One could 
define a measure of the extent to which the representation elicits repairs (2 + 3) 
or percentage of teachers who repaired over those who provided comments.. 
More generally, given a representation (related to a norm N of a situation S) and 
a sample of practitioners, the representation could be classified a priori as 
breaching or non breaching N, and each practitioner could be classified as 
experienced or not experienced in S. The percentages of repairs could be used in 
particular, to test (this time using the modern sense of experiment) the extent to 
which experienced practitioners in a situation hold norm N.  
Imagine a sample of experienced practitioners randomly assigned to one of 
the following two conditions. In the experimental condition the practitioners 
consider a breached representation, while in the control condition the 
practitioners consider a compliant representation.  The responses from 
practitioners would then be summarized in corresponding repair ratios r1,e and 
r0,e as defined above and the difference between these proportions could be 
tested for significance. Similarly, one could pose the question of whether this 
norm is significantly more salient for teachers experienced in the situation of 
interest than for teachers who do not have such experience. This question could 
lead one to compare the ratios r1,1 and r1,0, that is, the repair ratios for 
experienced and non experienced practitioners confronting a breached 
representation. Finally, one could consider randomly assigning practitioners who 
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are either experienced or inexperienced in the situation to either a breached or a 
compliant representation, and analyzing the table of contingencies below. The 
Chi Square test could be used to examine whether acknowledgment of Norm N 
is specific to teachers experienced in Situation S.  
 Experienced in S Inexperienced in S 
Breached Representation (of NS) r1,1 r1,0 
Compliant Representation (of S) r0,1 r0,0 
 
 
Of course the preceding argument is only a sketch of what the research ahead 
requires. In addition to the problem of determining the unit of analysis noted 
above, there remains the problem of finding operational ways of determining 
repairs, rejections, and acceptances of task and situation. While we have made 
some important progress identifying norms of situations to be researched and 
creating representations that breach those norms, the work of developing 
measures of the repairs that practitioners produce in response to those 
representations is still incipient. Our current work in this area investigates the 
use of elements of systemic functional linguistics, particularly the notions of 
modality and appraisal (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004; Martin & White, 2007), to 
anchor the notion of repair in linguistic performance. Furthermore, as far as the 
implementation of the technique, these considerations oversimplify the certainty 
with which one can say that a representation of a situation breaches a norm or 
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complies with all norms—it isn’t only that the provisional nature of models 
challenges the extent to which one can ever say that a representation will be 
compliant, but the multidimensional and interactive nature of human activity 
makes it hard to represent breaches of a norm without other remarkable 
entailments needed for continuity’s sake. Along those lines, and because of the 
extent to which an instance of a situation may instantiate more than the actions 
specific to a norm, a third challenge consists of being able to reproduce the 
phenomenon (participants’ recognition of the norm) independently of the 
representation used: Would representations R and R’ of different instances of the 
same situation S, each of which breaches the same norm N, produce similar 
responses from practitioners experienced in S? Considering those 
methodological challenges, it is fitting to say that so far we have only been able 
to show how our theoretical agenda and basic research goals could use an 
experimental paradigm and within that to indicate more specific methodological 
goals.          
The sketch above does indicate a path for using an experimental approach in 
basic research on mathematics teaching—specifically, research that identifies and 
confirms the existence of specific norms for specific instructional situations. But 
as noted above, practical rationality includes more than the norms of 
instructional situations; it includes the categories of perception and appreciation 
with which practitioners can relate to actual and possible actions in teaching. In 
particular, practical rationality includes the grounds on which a breach of a norm 
Herbst & Chazan 
 
might be recognized as a breach and yet appraised favorably. Notwithstanding 
the possible use of the experimental design sketched above to test hypotheses, it 
is probably just as important for theory and practice to deepen the descriptive 
research that can lead to more refined hypotheses, especially hypotheses that can 
account for the difference between justifiable and unjustifiable breaches of 
norms.  
Practical Rationality and the Justifications for Breaches of Norms 
The data that we collect from practitioners in response to breached 
representations usually contains more than repairs of those breaches. 
Practitioners not only recognize the presence of a norm when they repair its 
breach, quite often they do so using discourse that commits a stance toward such 
a breach. Those stances are not always negative; when these stances are positive, 
practitioners may engage in a rather visible practical argument to justify an 
action in spite of the norm against it. As part of the agenda to flesh out the 
content of practical rationality we are interested in inventorying and accounting 
for the dispositions used by practitioners to warrant actions that breach norms 
(as well as those actions that comply with norms).    
 Sometimes, teachers’ responses to breaches of a norm may indict the 
teacher for breaching a norm and justify it with an argument that explicates why 
the norm exists. In the case presented above, the evidence we found suggests 
that the norm of providing the given and the “prove” may be justified on the 
grounds that it keeps students from making knowledge claims by relying on the 
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looks of a diagram. Indeed the line between, on the one hand, assuming 
something as given so as to start drawing necessary consequences from it and, on 
the other hand, assuming something else as true while one is drawing those 
consequences, may be blurry enough to justify keeping students from having to 
manage it. One could represent this argument for a norm by adapting Toulmin’s 
(1969; see also Inglis, Mejía-Ramos, & Simpson, 2007) argument layout, as shown 
in Figure 4 (where instead of data and claim we use circumstances and action 
respectively). 
 
Figure 4. A practical argument using Toulmin’s layout. 
 
The data also shows that teachers’ responses sometimes acknowledge the breach, 
but rather than indicting the teacher for the breach they might justify it while 
relaying whatever reasons they might have for that justification. In this sense, the 
breaching experiments give access to other elements of the practical rationality of 
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mathematics teaching. In the data shown above, one of the comments appeared 
to justify the breach by elaborating on the grounds for exception noted above. 
 
Figure 5. A practical argument for and against an action using Toulmin’s layout. 
 
 
The Norms and Obligations that Span Practical Rationality 
From our work in the past five years, looking at the responses from teachers 
to animations that represent breaches of situations in geometry and algebra, we 
have built an initial model of this practical rationality. In this model, conceivable 
moves by a teacher are justified or rebuffed on the basis of principles or warrants 
that attest to the presence of two sets of regulatory elements. One of those sets of 
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regulatory elements describes the roles the teacher is called to play in the 
contract, the instructional situations, or in mathematical tasks. As noted above, 
we call all of those norms: Some are norms of the contract (they regulate work 
across the many objects of knowledge in a course of studies), while others are 
norms of the instructional situation (they regulate work that is specific to an 
object of knowledge). A third kind of norms, norms of the task (regulating how 
the teacher supports the milieu for the students’ mathematical task) is also part 
of the model but is not discussed here (see Herbst, 2003; also Brousseau, 1997). 
The other set of regulations, which we explicate below, includes the professional 
obligations that tie an individual to the position of mathematics teacher, beyond 
the specific demands of a particular contract, situation, or task.     
In general, the first set of regulations for actions in teaching come from the 
structure of the different ‘games’ the teacher and the student play with specific 
content. The various norms that justify teachers’ actions respond to the 
requirements of the role the teacher is called to play in the contract for a course of 
studies, the situation that frames the different kinds of work that exchange for a 
particular object of knowledge, and a specific mathematical task. But these norms 
by themselves don’t explain why practitioners see some breaches of norms as 
acceptable (see, for example, Nachlieli & Herbst, 2009; Herbst, Nachlieli, & 
Chazan, 2011). The data that we have gathered shows not only that the norm 
exists and what problems it would help solve, but also on what grounds it could 
be breached. As we analyze the data from study groups that considered the 
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many animations we created in ThEMaT, a more systematic way of accounting 
for those warrants has become useful to us.     
Both the presence of norms and the breaches of norms can be accounted for 
by appeal to various professional obligations that we posit apply to the 
mathematics teacher (to some extent these obligations may also apply to the 
elementary teacher who teaches mathematics part of their time, but they likely 
need to be adapted). We propose that four professional obligations can organize 
the justifications (or refutations) that participants might give to actions that 
depart from a situational (or contractual) norm. We call these four obligations 
disciplinary, individual, interpersonal, and institutional (Herbst & Balacheff, 2009; 
see also Ball, 1993).  
The disciplinary obligation says that the mathematics teacher is obligated to 
steward a valid representation of the discipline of mathematics. This may include 
the obligation to steward representations of mathematical knowledge, 
mathematical practices, and mathematical applications.   
The individual obligation says that a teacher is obligated to attend to the well 
being of the individual student. This may include being obligated to attend to 
individual students’ identities and to their behavioral, cognitive, emotional, or 
social needs. 
The interpersonal obligation says that the teacher is obligated to share and 
steward their medium of interaction with other human beings in the classroom. 
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This may include attending to the needs and resources of shared discursive, 
physical, and social spaces within shared time.  
And the institutional (schooling) obligation says that the teacher is obligated to 
observe various aspects of the schooling regime. These include attending to 
school policies, calendars, schedules, examinations, curriculum, extra curricular 
activities, and so on.  
These obligations are not specific to a contract for a course of studies; they 
describe equally the teacher of AP Calculus and the teacher of informal 
geometry. They coalesce to justify contracts and their instructional situations; 
and they may combine with norms of contract, situation, or task in order to 
justify extraordinary actions. In general, combined with the norms of contracts, 
situations, and tasks these obligations span the practical rationality of 
mathematics teaching. The dispositions that compose practical rationality could 
be accounted for as combinations of norms and obligations. One can then say 
that the justifications for actions in teaching, either those actions that are usual or 
those that are unusual but viable, can be found by combining norms of the 
contract and situations that the teacher is enacting with obligations the teacher 
has to the profession of mathematics teaching.  
Within that rationality one can see specific contracts (high school geometry, 
algebra I) and their instructional situations (doing proofs, solving equations) as 
sociohistorical constructions that have persisted over time by complying in some 
way with those obligations. To the extent that the obligations could contradict 
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each other, it is quite an accomplishment for teaching to have been able to 
develop stable contracts and situations over time (Herbst, 2002a).  
Conclusion: Practical Rationality and Instructional Improvement 
The theory of practical rationality is a way of accounting for existing, stable 
practices. To the extent that our interest in improving practice stresses the need 
for improvements to be responsible, incremental, and sustainable, it is 
appropriate for us to try to understand what justifies the norms of stable 
contracts and situations, even if we might want to modify or do away with some 
of them: Understanding stable systems of practices as well as understanding how 
those systems react to perturbations is fundamental for the design of new 
practices.  Indeed, since improved practices will need to subject themselves to 
similar grounds for justification, practices that are close to those that are normal 
in existing instructional situations (as gauged by how many norms of a situation 
a practice breaches) may be easier to justify than others.  
The theory also provides the means for the researcher to anticipate how 
instruction may respond to new practices: A novel task such as “what is 
something interesting that could be proved about the object in Figure 1” conjures 
up by resemblance one or more instructional situations (e.g., “doing proofs” and 
“exploration”) as possible frames for the work to be done. Models of those 
situations provide the researcher with a baseline of norms that could be breached 
as the work proceeds. Researchers can then use the obligations to anticipate what 
kinds of reactions teachers may have to the enactment those breaches. This 
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anticipation can be useful in examining the potential derailments in the 
implementation of new practices in classrooms. That anticipation may also be 
useful in the examination of teachers’ responses to assessments or development, 
or their reactions to instructional interventions.  
Thus the theory provides not only the basis for the design of probes for the 
rationality of teaching (Herbst & Miyakawa, 2008) but also a framework for an 
analysis of the reactions from participants. Combined with finer tools from 
discourse analysis (e.g., Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) teachers’ responses to 
representations of breaching (but arguably valuable) instances of an instructional 
situation can help us understand not only what justifies teaching as it exists 
today but also whether and how proposed new practices could be justified in 
ways that practitioners find compelling.  
Along these lines, the theory also provides a framework for teacher 
development. This framework puts a premium on the teachers’ noticing of 
actions in teaching, their consideration of alternative actions, and the 
consideration of justifications for those different actions. The various tools we 
have created, which include not only the animations and the cartoon characters 
but also software to create scenarios with them, software to annotate the 
scenarios individually or in forums, and software to author online sessions3 that 
                                                 
3 A dedicated software tool enables teacher educators to create an agenda for users to 
interact with representations of practice (e.g., videos, images), prompts and questions, 
and tools for the user to interact with the media (e.g., annotating, marking moments, etc.) 
and with each other. 
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use the materials, can be useful in implementing this development program.4 It is 
important to note that at the core of these developments there is a theory of 
teaching and its rationality that accounts for the teaching that is customarily seen 
in classrooms: At its base the theory attempts to be descriptive and explanatory 
rather than axiological or prescriptive. This is particularly visible in our 
identification of the obligations: We posit the institutional obligation in all its 
strength not necessarily out of advocacy for it but out of our recognition that 
practitioners are obligated to it regardless of anybody’s feelings about it.  
The theory does identify mechanisms for exploring empirically teaching that 
might be conceivable and desirable: The notions of situation, norm, breach, 
repair, and obligation can help examine a priori attempts to improve teaching 
and examine a posteriori the data from implementation. In that sense, the theory 
can support the piecemeal exploration of instructional improvement. The theory 
is a basic theory of mathematics instruction, a basic account of the activity of 
teaching mathematics in the school classroom—not an applied theory that 
reduces that phenomenon to the psychology of individual teachers. The 
psychology of mathematics teachers may still be useful to inform what enables 
and motivates individual teachers to do things, but the logic of action in 
mathematics teaching addressed by practical rationality may help us understand 
why some of those actions can be responsible, viable, and sustainable. 
                                                 
4 These tools and content, including examples of these learning experiences are available 
at www.lessonsketch.org 
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An important limitation of the theory in its current formulation is that it does 
not quite incorporate an explicit account of learning5 either by students or by 
teachers. Indeed the theory described above represents instruction as composed 
of stable patches of specific practices (contracts, situations, and tasks) and one 
might conclude that the theory describes only how knowledge is used by 
students and attested by teachers. Building on situated and socio-cultural 
accounts of learning and practice (e.g., Engestrom, 1992; Wenger, 1999) we 
contend that learning (by students and by the teacher) is accomplished in and 
through their practice in contracts, situations, and tasks.  Additionally, the notion 
that contracts and situations can be breached by tasks that fall outside the norms 
of a situation or a contract is key in describing how the teacher might promote 
adaptive learning deliberately; and it has been foundational for Brousseau’s 
(1997) theory of didactical situations. An explicit account of how this theory of 
instructional practice interfaces or complements accounts of student and teacher 
learning is needed and it remains a goal as we move ahead.    
  
                                                 
5 We appreciate Ron Tzur’s comment to this effect in the occasion of the first author’s 
plenary lecture at the 2010 PME-NA Conference. 
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Grossman and McDonald (2008) recently argued that the research community 
needs to move its “attention beyond the cognitive demands of teaching … to an 
expanded view of teaching that focuses on teaching as a practice (p. 185).” 
Building on the work of Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquent, 1992; Bourdieu, 
1985, 1998), Herbst and Chazan (2003, 2006) have written about mathematics 
teaching as a practice, just as law and medicine are considered practices, in an 
attempt to better understand the rationality that produces, regulates, and 
sustains mathematics instruction. This practical rationality is the commonly held 
system of dispositions or the “feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 25) that 
influences practitioners as to those actions that are appropriate in the classroom.  
It is practical rationality that: 
not only enables practices to reproduce themselves over time as the 
people who are the practitioners change, but also regulates how 
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instances of the practice are produced and what makes them count 
as instances. (Herbst and Chazan, 2003, p. 2) 
 
To better understand the practice of mathematics teaching, whether to 
improve it or communicate it to others, one must understand the practical 
rationality that guides it. However, practical rationality often “erases its own 
tracks” (Herbst and Chazan, 2003, p. 2) so that its practitioners come to view 
these practices as being natural. This rationality provides the regulatory 
framework that socializes its current and future practitioners into ways of 
thinking and acting that conform to expectations. For that reason, it is important 
to bring to the forefront a deliberate, conscious understanding of the rationality 
that drives the practice of mathematics teaching. 
While practical rationality allows for a certain amount of diversity in its 
similarity, it is nevertheless given structure and cohesion by a complex system of 
norms. The word “norms” is used here not in the sense of a “standard” or 
something that is necessarily desirable, nor in the sense of an absolute 
requirement, but rather to denote that which is customary, typical, commonplace 
— behavior that passes without remark. Departures from a norm may occur, but 
when they do they are usually remarked upon and justified, thereby 
simultaneously confirming the norm and articulating the conditions under which 
it may be breached. These norms, and the grounds to which practitioners appeal 
to justify the norms and their breaches, provide the persistent continuity of the 
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practice. 
Although norms are held in common among practitioners, they are usually 
not explicitly taught to novices. On the contrary, well before future teachers ever 
enroll in education courses, they already have firmly-established ideas about 
schools in general and mathematics instruction in particular (Ball, 1988a, 1988b). 
Through an apprenticeship of observation, they develop deep-seated ideas about 
mathematics and its teaching and learning (Lortie, 1975). These ideas often form 
the foundation on which they will eventually build their own practice of 
mathematics teaching (Millsaps, 2000; Skott, 2001).  
 
A Look at Geometry 
What do we know about the rationality that underpins geometry instruction? 
Herbst and Brach (2006) draw our attention to the practice of geometry 
instruction and provoke thought regarding the norms surrounding the teaching 
of proof,2 but what about other key components of geometry courses? For 
example, definitions play a critical role in geometry. What norms exist for the 
teaching of definitions in geometry? Is the norm for students to be presented 
with finalized definitions? Under what conditions are students given 
opportunities to create, reflect on, and compare definitions (de Villiers, 1998)?  
What is normative in regards to the introduction and use of the diagrammatic 
register (Weiss & Herbst, 2007) commonly encountered in geometry classes? 
                                                 
2 Additional information on norms surround proving and proof is found at Herbst and Brach (2006). 
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What rationality guides teachers’ and students’ expectations in regard to the role 
of perception in the reading of geometric diagrams? What norms influence the 
teaching of subtle, yet key, concepts of geometry like existence and uniqueness? 
Are students given impossible problems3 as a means to discover existence? Are 
students allowed to explore situations that demonstrate uniqueness?4 
 
Mathematics: Teachers’ Beliefs and Practices  
While many of the above questions are particular to geometry, others apply 
to the many branches of mathematics. Is it normative to encourage students to 
modify a problem (either to make it tractable, or to generate new avenues for 
exploration), or to introduce their own assumptions when solving problems? Do 
teachers commonly encourage students to pose their own problems? Do teachers 
model or introduce strategies like Brown and Walters’ (2004) “what-if-not” 
strategy as a relatively simple means of generating new problems in their 
teaching practice?5  
                                                 
3 Questions of existence (or non-existence) arise in a wide range of problems, such as:  Can one form a 
triangle with sides of lengths 2 cm, 3 cm and 10 cm? Can one locate a point in the interior of any polygon 
that is equidistant from all of its vertices? Under what conditions can a circle be constructed tangent to two 
intersecting lines at two specified points? This last problem is shown as a part of an instructional episode 
modeled in the ThEMaT (Thought Experiments in Mathematics Teaching) animations found at 
http:grip.umich.edu/themat.  
4 Questions of uniqueness in geometry likewise arise in a range of problems, such as:  Given two sides of a 
triangle and a non-included angle, how many different triangles can be constructed? Given any 
parallelogram, is there a uniquely determined quadrilateral whose midpoints are the vertices of the given 
parallelogram? 
5 For example of a what-if-not application, consider how a compass and straightedge are used to construct a 
perpendicular bisector for a given line segment. Applying the “what-if-not” strategy could lead to the 
following questions. What if you wanted to construct a bisector that was not perpendicular to the line 
segment? How could you construct a perpendicular that did not bisect the segment? 
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Unfortunately, a large number of teachers view mathematics “as a discipline 
with a priori rules and procedures that … students have to learn by rote” 
(Handal, 2003, p. 54). For many teachers in the U.S. “knowing” mathematics is 
taken to mean being efficient and skillful in performing rule-bound procedures 
and manipulating symbols (Thompson, 1992). Ball (1988b), in her doctoral study 
of preservice teachers’ ideas about the sources of mathematics and how 
mathematics is justified, found that many of them viewed mathematics as a 
mostly arbitrary collection of facts. While there are surely many factors that 
influence teachers’ practices, it would be naïve to assume that these and other 
beliefs teachers hold do not play a significant role. As a consequence, 
mathematics students often are “not expected to develop mathematical meanings 
and they are not expected to use meanings in their thinking” (Thompson, 2008, p. 
45).  
 
Targeting the Disciplinary Obligation 
Herbst and Balacheff (2009) have suggested four obligations of teachers that 
frame their practical rationality. These obligations — which they refer to as the 
disciplinary, individual, interpersonal, and institutional obligations — may be 
invoked by teachers to justify normal instruction, but they also have the potential 
to organize a departure from normative practice.  
Of the four, we focus here on the disciplinary obligation — the obligation of 
the teacher to faithfully represent the discipline of mathematics. We begin from 
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the premise that if teachers come to a more textured and authentic view of 
mathematics, this could lead to changes in what teachers deem as valid 
representations of mathematics, in the mathematical tasks they assign students, 
and in the ideas and attitudes they foster in students. Following Yackel and Cobb 
(1996) we note that what is taken as  
mathematically normative in a classroom is constrained by the current 
goals, beliefs, suppositions, and assumptions of the classroom 
participants. At the same time these goals and largely implicit 
understandings are themselves influenced by what is legitimized as 
acceptable mathematical activity. (p. 460) 
This focus on the disciplinary obligation brings into focus the question of 
what kind of work is “legitimized as acceptable mathematical activity” (in the 
words of Yackel and Cobb)?  How does it correspond to the kind of work that 
mathematicians do?  
 
Authentic Mathematical Practices 
In Weiss, Herbst and Chen (2009) it was noted that, while the notion of 
“authentic mathematics” is frequently invoked in the literature, nevertheless 
“many of those who call for ‘authentic mathematics’ (or who use similar words 
or phrases, such as ‘genuine’ or ‘real’) in the classroom are actually talking about 
different things” (p. 276). In particular, Weiss, Herbst and Chen identify four 
distinct meanings of the slogan “authentic mathematics education”. Of particular 
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interest to us here is the one they refer to as AMP, i.e. the call for the cultivation of 
the practices that characterize the work of research mathematicians. Note, 
however, that in acknowledging the polysemy of the phrase “authentic 
mathematics” we allow for, and even anticipate, the possibility that these 
multiple kinds of “authenticity” may come into conflict with one another. 
Mathematicians, those whose goals are to generate new and refine existing 
mathematical ideas and methods, are more than just proficient at mathematics. 
While they demonstrate exactly those qualities and competencies that have been 
identified by the National Research Council (2001) as goals of mathematics 
learning (namely conceptual understanding, procedural fluency, strategic 
competence, adaptive reasoning, and productive disposition), mathematicians 
also demonstrate habits of “mathematical wondering” and an appreciation of 
mathematics that extends past their professional careers into their personal lives. 
They spend much of their time crafting new problems from existing ones, both 
out of pragmatism (some problems are more tractable than others at a given 
time) and out of curiosity. 
In seeking to articulate the elements of the sensibility that characterizes 
mathematicians’ practices, Weiss (2009) analyzed a collection of narratives 
written by and about research mathematicians. This analysis reveals the 
fundamentally generative nature of mathematical practice, in which problem 
posing (asking fruitful and difficult questions of oneself and others) plays a role 
just as important as problem solving. The result of Weiss’ analysis is a partial 
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model of the mathematical sensibility, consisting of 15 mathematical 
dispositions, organized in 8 dialectical pairs (one disposition is its own dialectical 
counterpart). Weiss refers to the first five of those dispositions as generative moves 
by which a problem currently under consideration (whether solved or unsolved) 
can spawn a number of related problems. The five generative moves are shown 
in Fig. 1. 
 
 (strengthen/weaken) hypothesis (strengthen/weaken) conclusion 
 generalize   specialize 
 consider converse   consider converse 
 
 
Figure 1. Generative moves for problem posing taken from Weiss (2009), p. 81. 
 
Authentic Mathematical Practice in the Work of Teachers 
To what extent do the mathematical activities commonly seen in classrooms 
reflect authentic mathematical work? Do current norms in mathematics 
instruction promote either mathematical proficiency or curiosity? Does the 
rationality that drives mathematics teaching help encourage an appreciation of 
mathematics?  
Herbst and Chazan (2011) has suggested that it is crucial that we recognize 
how instruction typically works, understanding the practical rationality that 
underpins teaching, if we are to design reforms that are viable and sustainable.  
It is through incremental changes, which recognize current practice, that 
permanent transformation is most likely to occur, but how might incremental 
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changes be introduced? What form might such changes take? 
The key role of problem posing in mathematics instruction has long been 
recognized. Silver (1994) noted that problem posing is not only a prominent 
feature of mathematical activity; it also features heavily in “inquiry-oriented 
instruction” and can serve to create an environment in which students are more 
engaged. 
Here we describe briefly how the five generative moves for problem posing 
(Fig. 1) could be relevant when describing the potential for secondary 
mathematics education to include instances of “authentic mathematical work”. 
Suppose a high school geometry class has been studying the properties of 
triangles, and has found (either through empirical exploration, deductive proof, 
or a combination of the two) that the three angle bisectors of any acute triangle 
always intersect in a single point. The following scenarios show how 
instructional interventions can change the direction of the task and have the 
potential to depart from normative geometry instruction.6 
 One possibility is that the teacher might ask, “Does it really matter 
whether the triangle is acute or not?” Investigating this question could 
lead the class to the conclusion that, in fact, the initial restriction to the 
case of acute triangles was unnecessary, and that the conclusion obtains 
                                                 
6 The end goal is not for the instructor to make such interventions, but that all classroom participants, 
including students, begin to adopt this problem posing mindset.  
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for all triangles — a case of weakening the hypothesis, the first generative 
move in Fig. 1. 
 Another possibility is that the teacher might encourage the class to seek to 
strengthen the conclusion of what has been proven, for example by 
providing additional properties that characterize the intersection point of 
the three angle bisectors of a triangle such as offering, “Not only do they 
intersect at a single point, but that point is the center of a circle that can be 
inscribed in the triangle.” 
 A third possibility is that the class might seek to generalize their findings, 
for example by asking, “What happens if you construct the angle bisectors 
of other polygons? Do they meet at a point, and if not, what do you get?” 
 A fourth possibility is that the class might seek to specialize their findings, 
for example by observing, “If you do this with an equilateral triangle, there 
seems to be more than can be said about the resulting figure — for 
example the point of intersection seems to equidistant from the three 
corners of the triangle as well.” 
 A class that has observed this last property might then consider the converse 
question:  “If the angle bisectors of a particular triangle meet at a point 
that is equidistant from the three corners of the triangle, does that mean 
that the triangle in question must be equilateral?” 
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The examples above illustrate how the generative moves identified in Weiss 
(2009) can be used to describe and promote the practice of wondering 
mathematically about what is true, a core component of authentic mathematical 
practice. More examples could be generated ad lib by iterating and recombining 
these moves. For example, the generalization to the case of other polygons could 
lead to a subsequent specialization to the case of quadrilaterals (which in turn 
could be subsequently refined to the case of various “special quadrilaterals”). 
The many variations on this “angle bisector problem” have played a key role in 
the representations of mathematics teaching used by Herbst and his collaborators 
as probes of geometry teachers’ practical rationality (see Aaron, 2010; Herbst & 
Chazan, 2006; Weiss & Herbst, 2007; Weiss, 2009). 
 
Authentic Mathematical Practice in Teacher Education 
Many of the norms that characterize contemporary mathematics education 
are at a great distance from authentic mathematical practice. Herbst and 
Balacheff (2009) argue that an appeal to the disciplinary obligation can, in some 
cases, provide grounds for departing from those norms. This, however, requires 
that teachers hold a fuller and more nuanced view of authentic mathematical 
practice. In this section we address the role of teacher education in cultivating 
such a view. 
Ball (1988b) identified a number of widespread views among preservice 
teachers, including “Mathematics is a mostly arbitrary collection of facts,” 
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“Doing mathematics means following set procedures,” and “Doing mathematics 
means using remembered knowledge and working step-by-step” (pp. 104-108). 
Her findings showed that preservice teachers predominantly view mathematics 
as a “closed” field, one in which there are no new questions left to ask. When 
asked to respond to the statements “Some problems in mathematics have no 
answers” and “There are unsolved problems in mathematics”, the preservice 
teachers in Ball’s study expressed confusion. For them, “wondering 
mathematically” simply does not exist as an activity. 
The impact of these views of mathematical practice is significant. In a recent 
study, Cross (2009) showed that teachers who understand mathematics to be 
primarily about “formulas, procedures, and calculations” consistently defaulted 
to an initiate-respond-evaluate pattern in their interactions with students. In 
contrast, teachers who regard mathematics primarily as being about the “thought 
processes and mental actions of the individual” were more likely to engage their 
students in extended, continuous discourse (Cross, pp. 332-3). Cross concludes 
that teachers who do not hold beliefs consonant with supporting “learner-
oriented classroom environments” should be engaged in programs intended to 
transform their beliefs. 
The responsibility for cultivating an awareness of authentic mathematical 
practice in preservice teachers rests, by necessity, with teacher education. 
Mathematics teacher educators “have the dual responsibility of preparing 
teachers, both mathematically and pedagogically (Liljedahl, Chernoff, and Zazkis, 
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2007, p. 239).” Although many colleges and universities preserve an institutional 
separation between mathematics content courses and mathematics methods 
courses, undergraduate mathematics courses should not be the only 
opportunities for future teachers to develop a sense of and appreciation for 
authentic mathematical work. Learning to wonder mathematically can, and 
should, be a goal of teacher education courses. Experiences with mathematical 
discovery have been shown to have a profound, transformative effect on future 
teachers’ beliefs about the nature of mathematics and its teaching and learning 
(Liljedahl, 2005). Mathematics teacher education should make the processes and 
mechanisms of problem posing (including the generative moves of Table 1) 
explicit, and draw attention to how they can be used to navigate productively 
through open-ended problem spaces. Through engagement in, and explicit 
attention to, such mathematical activities, teachers might come to view 
mathematics differently. If they come to view mathematics differently, the 
disciplinary obligation that partly frames their instruction could lead to changes 
in what they deem valid representations of mathematics.  
Besides implementing tasks that model authentic mathematical practice, 
mathematics education classes could provide future teachers with exposure to 
examples of the rich mathematical thinking that students are capable of and 
often bring to the classroom. Mathematics education classes should also help 
future teachers consider how to value and capitalize on students’ wondering as 
well as how to promote problem posing by and mathematical curiosity in their 
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students. Future teachers need exposure to and interaction with representations 
of classroom instruction (like case studies, videos, animations, etc.) that model 
authentic mathematical practice. Ideally teacher educators should be able to 
provide both actual and hypothetical episodes of instruction to show both what 
is currently possible and being done as well as foreshadowing what might be 
possible if current norms were questioned.  
Mathematics educators could provide future (and also current) teachers 
opportunities to witness episodes of instruction that depart from normative 
practice but that exemplify authentic mathematical work. For teacher educators, 
a direct encounter with teachers’ reactions to such breaches can help make visible 
the (usually tacit) norms that guide the rationality of teaching. These encounters 
have the potential to shape or transform teachers’ views of the nature of 
mathematics and its teaching and learning. 
 
Conclusions 
The mathematics education community has a long history of efforts to 
improve teaching, and yet teaching remains largely resilient in the face of reform. 
One possible reason for this difficulty is that teacher education has struggled to 
instill a mathematical sensibility in preservice teachers, many of whom have little 
or no direct experience with authentic mathematical practice. A second possible 
reason for this difficulty is that reform efforts often fail to consider the norms that 
drive and sustain the practice of mathematics teaching as it exists currently. A 
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strong case can be made for the use of practical rationality as a lens for viewing 
both research and teacher education: if we are to design reforms that are viable 
and sustainable, it is crucial to understand the practical rationality that 
underpins teaching (Herbst & Chazan 2011). 
It may be somewhat naïve to expect that, simply by providing preservice 
teachers with opportunities to experience authentic mathematical practice, we 
will somehow transform them into a different kind of teacher, one who creates 
opportunities for his or her own students to engage in such practices. On the 
other hand, it seems to us unassailable that such preservice teacher education is a 
necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for such an outcome. It is almost 
impossible to imagine teachers engaging students in the processes of wondering 
mathematically, when the teachers themselves have never experienced such 
activity. Cultivating a richer vision of mathematics as a discipline may make it 
possible (although by no means certain) that teachers can, in the future, appeal to 
the disciplinary obligation as grounds for change. 
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Abstract: The world’s increasing complexity, competitiveness, interconnectivity, and 
dependence on technology generate new challenges for nations and individuals that 
cannot be met by “continuing education as usual” (The National Academies, 2009). 
With the proliferation of complex systems have come new technologies for 
communication, collaboration, and conceptualization. These technologies have led to 
significant changes in the forms of mathematical thinking that are required beyond the 
classroom. This paper argues for the need to incorporate future-oriented understandings 
and competencies within the mathematics curriculum, through intellectually stimulating 
activities that draw upon multidisciplinary content and contexts. The paper also argues 
for greater recognition of children’s learning potential, as increasingly complex learners 
capable of dealing with cognitively demanding tasks. 
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Although educational reformers have disagreed on many issues, there is a 
widely shared concern for enhancing opportunities for students to learn 
mathematics with understanding and thus a strong interest in promoting teaching 
mathematics for understanding. (Silver, Mesa, Morris, Star, & Benken, 2009, 
P.503). 
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Introduction 
In recent decades our global community has rapidly become a knowledge driven 
society, one that is increasingly dependent on the distribution and exchange of 
services and commodities (van Oers, 2009), and one that has become highly 
inventive where creativity, imagination, and innovation are key players. At the 
same time, the world has become governed by complex systems—financial 
corporations, the World Wide Web, education and health systems, traffic jams, 
and classrooms are just some of the complex systems we deal with on a regular 
basis. For all citizens, an appreciation and understanding of the world as 
interlocked complex systems is critical for making effective decisions about one’s 
life as both an individual and as a community member (Bar-Yam, 2004; Jacobson 
& Wilensky, 2006; Lesh, 2006). 
Complexity—the study of systems of interconnected components whose 
behavior cannot be explained solely by the properties of their parts but from the 
behavior that arises from their interconnectedness—is a field that has led to 
significant scientific methodological advances. With the proliferation of complex 
systems have come new technologies for communication, collaboration, and 
conceptualization. These technologies have led to significant changes in the 
forms of mathematical thinking that are needed beyond the classroom. For 
example, technology can ease the thinking needed in information storage, 
representation, retrieval, and transformation, but places increased demands on 
the complex thinking required for the interpretation of data and communication 
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of results. Computational skills alone are inadequate here—the ability to 
interpret, describe, and explain data and communicate results of data analyses is 
essential (Hamilton, 2007; Lesh, 2007a; Lesh, Middleton, Caylor & Gupta, 2008). 
The rapid increase in complex systems cannot be ignored in mathematics 
education. Indeed, educational leaders from different walks of life are 
emphasizing the importance of developing students’ abilities to deal with 
complex systems for success beyond school. Such abilities include: constructing, 
describing, explaining, manipulating, and predicting complex systems; working 
on multi-phase and multi-component component projects in which planning, 
monitoring, and communicating are critical for success; and adapting rapidly to 
ever-evolving conceptual tools (or complex artifacts) and resources (Gainsburg, 
2006; Lesh & Doerr, 2003; Lesh & Zawojewski, 2007). 
In this article I first consider future-oriented learning and then address some 
of the understandings and competencies needed for success beyond the 
classroom, which I argue need to be incorporated within the mathematics 
curriculum. A discussion on complex learners and complex learning, with 
mathematical modeling as an example, is presented in the remaining section. 
 
Future-oriented learning 
Every advanced industrial country knows that falling behind in science and 
mathematics means falling behind in commerce and property. (Brown, 2006).  
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Many nations are highlighting the need for a renaissance in the mathematical 
sciences as essential to the well-being of all citizens (e.g., Australian Academy of 
Science, 2006; Pearce, Flavell, & Dao-Cheng, 2010; The National Academies, 
2009). Indeed, the first recommendation of The National Academies’ Rising above 
the Gathering Storm (2007) was to vastly improve K-12 science and mathematics 
education. Likewise the Australian Academy of Science has indicated the need to 
address the “critical nature” of the mathematical sciences in schools and 
universities, especially given the unprecedented, worldwide demand for new 
mathematical solutions to complex problems. In addressing such demands, the 
Australian Academy emphasizes the importance of interdisciplinary research, 
given that the mathematical sciences underpin many areas of society including 
financial services, the arts, humanities, and social sciences. 
The interdisciplinary nature of the mathematical sciences is further evident in 
the rapid changes in the nature of the problem solving and reasoning needed 
beyond the school years (Lesh, 2007b). Indeed, numerous researchers and 
employer groups have expressed concerns that schools are not giving adequate 
attention to the understandings and abilities that are needed for success beyond 
school. For example, potential employees most in demand in the mathematical 
sciences are those that can (a) interpret and work effectively with complex 
systems, (b) function efficiently and communicate meaningfully within diverse 
teams of specialists, (c) plan, monitor, and assess progress within complex, multi-
stage projects, and (d) adapt quickly to continually developing technologies 
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(Lesh, 2008). Research indicates that such employees draw effectively on 
interdisciplinary knowledge in solving problems and communicating their 
findings. Furthermore, although such employees draw upon their school 
learning, they do so in a flexible and creative manner, often generating or 
reconstructing mathematical knowledge to suit the problem situation (unlike the 
way in which they experienced mathematics in school; Gainsburg 2006; 
Hamilton 2007; Zawojewski, Hjalmarson, Bowman, & Lesh, 2008). Indeed, such 
employees might not even recognize the relationship between their school 
mathematics and the mathematics they apply in solving problems in their daily 
work activities. We thus need to rethink the nature of the mathematical learning 
experiences we provide students, especially those experiences we classify as 
“problem solving;” we also need to recognize the increased capabilities of 
students in today’s era. 
In his preface to the book, Foundations for the Future in Mathematics Education, 
Lesh (2007b) pointed out that the kinds of mathematical understandings and 
competencies that are targeted in textbooks and tests tend to “represent only a 
shallow, narrow, and often non-central subset of those that are needed for 
success when the relevant ideas should be useful in ‘real life” situations” (p. viii). 
Lesh’s argument raises a number of issues, including: 
What kinds of understandings and competencies should be emphasized to 
reduce the gap between the mathematics addressed in the classroom (and in 
standardized testing), and the mathematics needed for success beyond the 
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classroom? 
How might we address the increasing complexity of learning and learners to 
advance their mathematical understanding within and beyond the 
classroom? 
 
Understandings and competencies for success beyond the classroom 
The advent of digital technologies changes the world of work for our students. 
As Clayton (1999) and others (e.g., Hoyles, Noss, Kent, & Bakker, 2010; Jenkins, 
Clinton, Purushotma, Robinson & Weigel, 2006; Lombardi & Lombardi, 2007; 
Roschelle, Kaput, & Stroup, 2000) have stressed, the availability of increasingly 
sophisticated technology has led to changes in the way mathematics is being 
used in work place settings; these technological changes have led to both the 
addition of new mathematical competencies and the elimination of existing 
mathematical skills that were once part of the worker's toolkit. 
Studies of the nature and role of mathematics used in the workplace and other 
everyday settings (e.g., nursing, engineering, grocery shopping, dieting, 
architecture, fish hatcheries) are important in helping us identify some of the key 
understandings and competencies for the 21st century (e.g., de Abreu, 2008; 
Gainsburg, 2006; Hoyles et al., 2010; Roth, 2005). A major finding of the 2002 
report on workplace mathematics by Hoyles, Wolf, Molyneux-Hodgson and 
Kent was that basic numeracy is being displaced as the minimum required 
mathematical competence by an ability to apply a much wider range of 
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mathematical concepts in using technological tools as part of working practice. 
Although we cannot simply list a number of mathematical competencies and 
assume these can be automatically applied to the workplace setting, there are 
several that employers generally consider to be essential to productive outcomes 
(e.g., Doerr & English, 2003; English, 2008; Gainsburg, 2006; Lesh & Zawojewski, 
2007). In particular, the following are some of the core competencies that have 
been identified as key elements of productive and innovative work place 
practices (English, Jones, Bartolini Bussi, Lesh, Tirosh, & Sriraman, 2008; Hoyles 
et al., 2010). I believe these competencies need to be embedded within our 
mathematics curricula: 
- Problem solving, including working collaboratively on complex problems 
where planning, overseeing, moderating, and communicating are essential 
elements for success; 
- Applying numerical and algebraic reasoning in an efficient, flexible, and 
creative manner; 
- Generating, analyzing, operating on, and transforming complex data sets; 
- Applying an understanding of core ideas from ratio and proportion, 
probability, rate, change, accumulation, continuity, and limit; 
- Constructing, describing, explaining, manipulating, and predicting complex 
systems; 
- Thinking critically and being able to make sound judgments, including 
being able to distinguish reliable from unreliable information sources; 
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- Synthesizing, where an extended argument is followed across multiple 
modalities; 
- Engaging in research activity involving the investigation, discovery, and 
dissemination of pertinent information in a credible manner; 
- Flexibility in working across disciplines to generate innovative and effective 
solutions. 
-  Techno-mathematical literacy (a “techno-mathematical literacy, where the 
mathematics is expressed through technological artefacts.” Hoyles et al., 2010, p. 
14).  
 
Although a good deal of research has been conducted on the relationship 
between the learning and application of mathematics in and out of the classroom 
(e.g., de Abreu 2008; Nunes & Bryant 1996; Saxe 1991), we still know 
comparatively little about students’ mathematical capabilities, especially 
problem solving, beyond the classroom. We need further knowledge on why 
students have difficulties in applying the mathematical concepts and abilities 
(that they presumably have learned in school) outside of school—or in classes in 
other disciplines. 
A prevailing explanation for these difficulties is the context-specific nature of 
learning and problem solving, that is, competencies that are learned in one 
situation take on features of that situation; transferring them to a new problem 
situation in a new context poses challenges (Lobato 2003). This suggests we need 
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to reassess the nature of the typical mathematical problem-solving experiences 
we give our students, with respect to the nature of the content and how it is 
presented, the problem contexts and the extent of their real-world links, the 
reasoning processes likely to be fostered, and the problem-solving tools that are 
available to the learner (English & Sriraman, 2010). This reassessment is 
especially needed, given that “problems themselves change as rapidly as the 
professions and social structures in which they are embedded change” 
(Hamilton, 2007, p. 2). The nature of learners and learning changes likewise. 
With the increasing availability of technology and exposure to a range of 
complex systems, children are different types of learners today, with a potential 
for learning that cannot be underestimated. 
 
Complex learners, complex learning 
Winn (2006) warned of the “dangers of simplification” when researching the 
complexity of learning, noting that learning is naturally confronted by three 
forms of complexity—the complexity of the learner, the complexity of the 
learning material, and the complexity of the learning environment (p. 237). We 
cannot underestimate these complexities. In particular, we need to give greater 
recognition to the complex learning that children are capable of—they have 
greater learning potential than they are often given credit for by their teachers 
and families (English, 2004; Lee & Ginsburg, 2007; Perry & Dockett, 2008; Curious 
Minds, 2008). They have access to a range of powerful ideas and processes and 
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can use these effectively to solve many of the mathematical problems they meet 
in daily life. Yet their mathematical curiosity and talent appear to wane as they 
progress through school, with current educational practice missing the goal of 
cultivating students’ capacities (National Research Council, 2005; Curious Minds, 
2008). The words of Johan van Benthem and Robert Dijkgraaf, the initiators of 
Curious Minds (2008), are worth quoting here: 
What people say about children is: “They can’t do this yet.” 
We turn it around and say: “Look, they can already do this.” 
And maybe it should be: “They can still do this now.” 
 
As Perry and Dockett (2008) noted, one of our main challenges here is to find 
ways to utilize the powerful mathematical competencies developed in the early 
years as a springboard for further mathematical power as students progress 
through the grade levels. I offer three interrelated suggestions for addressing this 
challenge: 
1. Recognize that learning is based within contexts and environments that we, 
as educators shape, rather than within children’s maturation (Lehrer & 
Schauble, 2007). 
2. Promote active processing rather than just static knowledge (Curious Minds, 
2008). 
3. Create learning activities that are of a high cognitive demand (Silver et al., 
2009). 
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In the remainder of this paper I give brief consideration to these suggestions. 
In doing so, I argue for fostering complex learning through activities that 
encourage knowledge generation and active processing. While complex learning 
can take many forms and involve numerous factors, there are four features that I 
consider especially important in advancing students’ mathematical learning. 
These appear in figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Key Features of Complex Learning 
 
Research in the elementary and middle school indicates that, with carefully 
designed and implemented learning experiences, we can capitalize on children’s 
conceptual resources and bootstrap them towards advanced forms of reasoning 
Students construct 
important ideas 
and processes 
Describe, explain, 
compare, assess, 
justify 
Use creations to 
make predictions 
Create multiple 
representations 
in format of 
choice 
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not typically observed in the regular classroom (e.g., English & Watters, 2005; 
Ginsburg, Cannon, Eisenband, & Pappas, 2006; Lehrer & Schauble, 2007). Most 
research on young students’ mathematical learning has been restricted to an 
analysis of their actual developmental level, which has failed to illuminate their 
potential for learning under stimulating conditions that challenge their 
thinking—“Research on children's current knowledge is not sufficient” 
(Ginsburg et al., 2006, p.224). We need to redress this situation by exploring 
effective ways of fashioning learning environments and experiences that 
challenge and advance students’ mathematical reasoning and optimize their 
mathematical understanding. 
Recent research has argued for students to be exposed to learning situations in 
which they are not given all of the required mathematical tools, but rather, are 
required to create their own versions of the tools as they determine what is 
needed (e.g., English & Sriraman, 2010; Hamilton, 2007; Lesh, Hamilton, & 
Kaput, 2007). For example, long-standing perspectives on classroom problem 
solving have treated it as an isolated topic, with problem-solving abilities 
assumed to develop through the initial learning of basic concepts and procedures 
that are then practised in solving word (“story”) problems. In solving such word 
problems, students generally engage in a one- or two-step process of mapping 
problem information onto arithmetic quantities and operations. These traditional 
word problems restrict problem-solving contexts to those that often artificially 
house and highlight the relevant concept (Hamilton, 2007). These problems thus 
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preclude students from creating their own mathematical constructs. More 
opportunities are needed for students to generate important concepts and 
processes in their own mathematical learning as they solve thought-provoking, 
authentic problems. Unfortunately, such opportunities appear scarce in many 
classrooms, despite repeated calls over the years for engaging students in tasks 
that promote high-level mathematical thinking and reasoning (e.g., Henningsen 
& Stein, 1997; Silver et al., 2009; Stein & Lane, 1996). 
Silver et al.’s recent research (2009) analyzing portfolios of “showcase” 
mathematics lessons submitted by teachers seeking certification of highly 
accomplished teaching, showed that activities were not consistently intellectually 
challenging across topics. About half of the teachers in the sample (N=32) failed 
to include a single activity that was cognitively demanding, such as those that 
call for reasoning about ideas, linking ideas, solving complex problems, and 
explaining and justifying solutions. Furthermore, the teachers were more likely 
to use cognitively demanding tasks for assessment purposes than for teaching to 
develop student understanding. While Silver et al.’s research revealed positive 
features of the teachers’ lessons, it also indicated that the use of cognitively 
demanding tasks in promoting mathematical understanding needs systematic 
attention. 
Modeling Activities 
One approach to promoting complex learning through intellectually 
challenging tasks is mathematical modeling. Mathematical models and modeling 
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have been interpreted variously in the literature (e.g., Romberg, Carpenter, & 
Kwako, 2005; Gravemeijer, Cobb, Bowers, & Whitenack, 2000; English & 
Sriraman, 2010; Greer, 1997; Lesh & Doerr, 2003). It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to address these various interpretations, however, but the perspective of 
Lesh and Doerr (e.g., Doerr & English, 2003; Lesh & Doerr, 2003) is frequently 
adopted, that is, models are “systems of elements, operations, relationships, and 
rules that can be used to describe, explain, or predict the behavior of some other 
familiar system” (Doerr & English, 2003, p.112). From this perspective, modeling 
problems are realistically complex situations where the problem solver engages 
in mathematical thinking beyond the usual school experience and where the 
products to be generated often include complex artifacts or conceptual tools that 
are needed for some purpose, or to accomplish some goal (Lesh & Zawojewski, 
2007). 
In one such activity, the Water Shortage Problem, two classes of 11-year-old 
students in Cyprus were presented with an interdisciplinary modeling activity 
that was set within an engineering context (English & Mousoulides, in press). In 
the Water Shortage Problem, constructed according to a number of design 
principles, students are given background information on the water shortage in 
Cyprus and are sent a letter from a client, the Ministry of Transportation, who 
needs a means of (model for) selecting a country that can supply Cyprus with 
water during the coming summer period. The letter asks students to develop 
such a model using the data given, as well as the Web. The quantitative and 
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qualitative data provided for each country include water supply per week, water 
price, tanker capacity, and ports’ facilities. Students can also obtain data from the 
Web about distance between countries, major ports in each country, and tanker 
oil consumption. After students have developed their model, they write a letter 
to the client detailing how their model selects the best country for supplying 
water. An extension of this problem gives students the opportunity to review 
their model and apply it to an expanded set of data. That is, students receive a 
second letter from the client including data for two more countries and are asked 
to test their model on the expanded data and improve their model, if needed. 
Modeling problems of this nature provide students with opportunities to 
repeatedly express, test, and refine or revise their current ways of thinking as 
they endeavor to create a structurally significant product—structural in the sense 
of generating powerful mathematical (and scientific) constructs. The problems 
are designed so that multiple solutions of varying mathematical and scientific 
sophistication are possible and students with a range of personal experiences and 
knowledge can participate. The products students create are documented, 
shareable, reusable, and modifiable models that provide teachers with a window 
into their students’ conceptual understanding. Furthermore, these modeling 
problems build communication (oral and written) and teamwork skills, both of 
which are essential to success beyond the classroom. 
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Concluding Points 
The world’s increasing complexity, competitiveness, interconnectivity, and 
dependence on technology generate new challenges for nations and individuals 
that cannot be met by “continuing education as usual” (The National Academies, 
2009). In this paper I have emphasized the need to incorporate future-oriented 
understandings and competencies within the mathematics curriculum, through 
intellectually stimulating activities that draw upon multidisciplinary content and 
contexts. I have also argued for greater recognition of children’s learning 
capabilities, as increasingly complex learners able to deal with cognitively 
demanding tasks.  
The need for more intellectually stimulating and challenging activities within 
the mathematics curriculum has also been highlighted. It is worth citing the 
words of Greer and Mukhopadhyay (2003) here, who commented that “the most 
salient features of most documents that lay out a K-12 program for mathematics 
education is that they make an intellectually exciting program boring,” a feature 
they refer to as “intellectual child abuse” (p. 4). Clearly, we need to make the 
mathematical experiences we include for our students more challenging, 
authentic, and meaningful. Developing students’ abilities to work creatively with 
and generate mathematical knowledge, as distinct from working creatively on 
tasks that provide the required knowledge (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 2006) is 
especially important in preparing our students for success in a knowledge-based 
economy. Furthermore, establishing collaborative, knowledge-building 
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communities in the mathematics classroom is a significant and challenging goal 
for the advancement of students’ mathematical learning (Scardamalia, 2002). 
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Learning progressions (LP) are playing an increasingly important role in 
mathematics and science education (NRC, 2001, 2007; Smith, Wiser, Anderson, & 
Krajcik, 2006).  They are strongly suggested for use in assessment, standards, and 
teaching.  In this article, I discuss the nature of learning progressions and related 
concepts in mathematics education, and I illustrate issues in their construction 
and use. I emphasize the different ways that LP and related constructs represent 
learning for teaching.  Finally, I illustrate the need that teachers have for LP.  
 
 
                                                 
1 The research described in this article was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant 
numbers 0099047, 0352898, 554470, 838137. The opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations, 
however, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science 
Foundation. 
2 battista.23@osu.edu 
Battista 
 
Definitions and Constructs  
According to the National Research Council, “Learning progressions are 
descriptions of the successively more sophisticated ways of thinking about a 
topic that can follow one another as children learn about and investigate a topic” 
(2007, p. 214).  A similar description of learning progressions is given by Smith et 
al. who define a learning progression “as a sequence of successively more 
complex ways of thinking about an idea that might reasonably follow one 
another in a student’s learning” (2006, pp. 5-6).  Unlike Piaget's stages, but 
similar to van Hiele's levels3, it is assumed that progress through learning 
progressions is "not developmentally inevitable" but depends on instruction 
(Smith et al., 2006). 
Common Characteristics of the LP Construct 
In the research literature, descriptions of the LP construct possess both 
differences and similarities.  The characteristics that seem most common to 
different views of learning progressions are as follows: 
 LP "are based on research syntheses and conceptual analyses” (Smith et 
al., 2006, p. 1); "Learning progressions should make systematic use of 
current research on children’s learning " (NRC, 2007, p. 219). 
 LP "are anchored on one end by what is known about the concepts and 
reasoning of students. … At the other end, learning progressions are 
                                                 
3 Because many of my examples refer to the van Hiele levels, I have included a very brief synopsis of the levels in 
Appendix 1. 
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anchored by societal expectations. … [LP also] propose the intermediate 
understandings between these anchor points that … contribute to 
building a more mature understanding" (NRC, 2007, p. 220). 
 LP focus on core ideas, conceptual knowledge, and connected procedural 
knowledge, not just skills.  LP organize "conceptual knowledge around 
core ideas" (NRC, 2007, p. 220).  LP "Suggest how well-grounded 
conceptual understanding can develop" (NRC, 2007, p. 219). 
 LP "recognize that all students will follow not one general sequence, but 
multiple (often interacting) sequences" (NRC, 2007, p. 220). 
Differences in LP Construct 
There are several differences in how the learning progressions construct is 
used in the literature. 
 LP differ in the time spans they describe.  Some progressions describe the 
development of students' thinking over a span of years; others describe 
the progression of thinking through a particular topic or instructional 
unit. 
 LP differ in the grain size of their descriptions.  Some are appropriate for 
describing minute-to-minute changes in students' development of 
thought, while others better describe more global progressions through 
school curricula. 
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 LP differ in the audience for which they are written.  Some LP are written 
for researchers, some for standards writers, some for assessment 
developers (formative and summative), and some for teachers. 
 LP differ in the research foundation on which they are built.  Some LP are 
syntheses of extant research; some synthesize extant research then 
perform additional research that elaborates the syntheses (the additional 
research may be cross-sectional or longitudinal). 
 LP differ in how they describe student learning.  Some focus on 
numerically "measuring" student progress, while others focus on 
describing the nature or categories of students' cognitive structures and 
reasoning. 
Learning Trajectories 
 Another important construct that is similar to, different from, and 
importantly related to, learning progressions is that of a "learning trajectory4."  I 
define a learning trajectory as a detailed description of the sequence of thoughts, 
ways of reasoning, and strategies that a student employs while involved in 
learning a topic, including specification of how the student deals with all 
instructional tasks and social interactions during this sequence.  There are two 
types of learning trajectories, hypothetical and actual.  Simon (1995) proposed 
that a "hypothetical learning trajectory is made up of three components: the 
                                                 
4
 Although some people use the terms "learning progression" and "learning trajectory" similarly, I think it 
is extremely useful to carefully distinguish learning progressions and learning trajectories. 
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learning goal…, the learning activities, and the hypothetical learning process—a 
prediction of how the students' thinking and understanding will evolve in the 
context of the learning activities" (p. 136).  In contrast, descriptions of actual 
learning trajectories can be specified only during and after a student has 
progressed through such a learning path. Simon states that an "actual learning 
trajectory is not knowable in advance" (p. 135).  Steffe described an actual 
learning trajectory as "a model of [children's] initial concepts and operations, an 
account of the observable changes in those concepts and operations as a result of 
the children's interactive mathematical activity in the situations of learning, and 
an account of the mathematical interactions that were involved in the changes. 
Such a learning trajectory of children is constructed during and after the 
experience in intensively interacting with children" (2004, p. 131).   
 Clements and Sarama's (2004) "conceptualize learning trajectories as 
descriptions of children's thinking and learning in a specific mathematical 
domain and a related, conjectured route through a set of instructional tasks 
designed to engender those mental processes or actions hypothesized to move 
children through a developmental progression of levels of thinking, created with 
the intent of supporting children's achievement of specific goals in that 
mathematical domain" (2004, p. 83).  In their hypothetical learning trajectories, they 
specify instructional tasks that promote (and assess) progression through their 
levels of thinking. 
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One critical difference between my definition of learning progressions and 
my definition of learning trajectories is that trajectories include descriptions of 
instruction, progressions do not.  One of the most difficult issues facing researchers 
who are constructing learning trajectories for curriculum development is 
determining how instructional variation affects trajectories.  That is, how specific 
is the trajectory to the instructional sequence in which it is embedded?  If the 
sequence has been tested for one curriculum, how well does it apply to other 
curricula?  Also, how do actual trajectories for individual students vary from the 
hypothetical trajectory for a curriculum?  That is, a learning trajectory for a 
curriculum is in some sense an "average" of actual trajectories for a sample of 
individual students—and, as an average, it is a prediction for a target population, 
and thus it is necessarily hypothetical.  And the "standard deviation" of the 
distribution of actual trajectories may be as relevant as the mean.  
Pedagogical Uses of LP  
Beyond the scientific value of LP/LT descriptions of students' 
mathematics learning, these descriptions are powerful tools for teaching.  LP/LT 
can be used for formative and summative assessment, and to guide instructional 
decisions made in curriculum development and moment-to-moment teaching.  
Indeed, Simon states, "I choose to use 'hypothetical learning trajectory' … to 
emphasize aspects of teacher thinking that are grounded in a constructivist 
perspective and that are common to both advanced planning and spontaneous 
decision making" (1995, p. 135).  Such a hypothesized trajectory (or LP) helps 
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teachers make instructional decisions based on their "best guess of how learning 
might proceed" (Simon, 1995, p. 135). Thus, from the constructivist perspective, 
LP and LT should ideally help teachers not only plan instruction, but understand 
students' learning on a moment-to-moment basis and appropriately and 
continuously adjust instruction to meet students' evolving learning needs. 
Another difference between learning progressions and learning 
trajectories derives from their intended use and consequent development.  If one 
is designing and testing a curriculum, one is more likely to develop a learning 
trajectory based on the fixed sequence of learning tasks in that curriculum.  If, in 
contrast, one is focusing on a formative assessment system that applies to many 
curricula, one is more likely to develop a learning progression based on many 
assessment tasks, not those in a fixed sequence.  A general learning progression 
describes students' various ways of reasoning about a topic, irrespective of 
curriculum; it focuses on understanding and reacting to students' current 
cognitive structures.  A curriculum-based learning trajectory describes students' 
ways of reasoning within a fixed curriculum; it focuses on understanding and 
reacting to students' cognitive structures, relative to the curriculum sequence.  
The advantage of learning progressions is that they are widely applicable and 
focus tightly on general student cognition.  The advantage of learning trajectories 
is their specificity in tracing students' movement through a fixed curriculum. 
LP as Cognitive Terrain 
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It is useful to think of learning progressions as describing the terrain on a 
mental mountain slope that students must ascend to learn and become fluent 
with particular mathematical topic.  From a curriculum-development, 
instructional planning perspective, we try to determine the most efficacious 
ascent path (the one for which most students are most likely to succeed), as 
depicted by the fixed path in Figure 1a (the hypothetical prototypical learning 
trajectory).  But to meet individual students' learning needs, often we must zoom 
in on individual deviations from the path to more precisely determine the next 
steps that students can make successfully.  Critical to aiding a student's moment-
to-moment climb is flexibly and reactively choosing tasks that provide them with 
successful hand- and foot-holds in this cognitive terrain (Figure 1b).   
           
     Figure 1a         Figure 1b 
Theoretical Frameworks for Learning Progressions 
Another way to understand differences between learning progressions is 
to examine their postulated learning mechanisms.  For instance, the original van 
Hiele theory relates progression through the levels of geometric thinking to 
phases of instruction.  In contrast, Battista uses constructivist constructs such as 
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levels of abstraction to describe students' progression through the van Hiele 
levels (see also the theories of abstraction of Simon, et al. (2004) and Mitchelmore 
& White (2000), as well as Pegg & Davey's analysis of geometric learning, 1998).   
We might also contrast a constructivist approach to teaching to the 
approach taken in Gagne's "programmed learning" hierarchies5, which seem 
much more fixed, logical, prescribed, and less interactive.   
Beginning with the final task, the question, is asked, What kind of 
capability would an individual have to possess if he were able to perform 
this task successfully, were we to give him only instructions? … Having 
done this, it was natural to think next of repeating the procedure with this 
newly defined entity (task). What would the individual have to know in 
order to be capable of doing this task without undertaking any learning, 
but given only some instructions? … Continuing to follow this procedure, 
we found that what we were defining was a hierarchy of subordinate 
knowledges [sic], growing increasingly "simple" … Our hypothesis was 
that (a) no individual could perform the final task without having these 
subordinate capabilities … and (b) that any superordinate task in the 
hierarchy could be performed by an individual provided suitable 
instructions were given, and provided the relevant subordinate 
knowledges could be recalled by him (Gagne, 1962, p. 356). 
                                                 
5 A hierarchy was empirically validated by examining student success rates on various items in the 
hierarchy (similar to examining item difficulties in current quantitative approaches).  So it was not intended 
that hierarchies be developed strictly logically. 
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It is interesting that, on the surface at least, representations of learning 
progressions from different theoretical frameworks can look similar.  For 
instance, compare the overall appearance of the learning progression of Confrey 
et al. (from a more constructivist perspective) to the Gagne-like hierarchy 
described by Novillis (see Figure 2).   It would be revealing to analyze how these 
progressions differ at a micro- versus macro-level. 
 
Confrey et al., 2009, p. 1-4 
Learning Trajectories Map for Rational Number Reasoning. 
 
Novillis, 1976, p. 132 
A Hierarchy of selected subconcepts of the fraction concept 
Figure 2.  Trajectory versus Hierarchy 
 
The Nature of Levels 
A critical component of learning progressions is the notion of "levels." 
Because the concept of level is not straightforward, and because how one defines 
level determines how one views (and measures) level attainment, I examine this 
concept in more detail, using the van Hiele levels as an example.  Indeed, the 
issues discussed below for the van Hiele levels are critical because any attempt to 
develop, assess, and use levels in learning progressions must address these 
issues in some way. 
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Levels, Stages, and Hierarchies 
Clements and Battista (1992) described the difference between researchers' 
use of the terms stage and level as follows.  A stage is a substantive period of time 
in which a particular type of cognition occurs across a variety of domains (as 
with Piagetian stages of cognitive development).  In contrast, a level is a period of 
time in which a distinct type of cognition occurs for a specific domain (but the 
size of the domain may be an issue).  Battista defines a third construct—a level of 
sophistication in student reasoning as a qualitatively distinct type of cognition that 
occurs within a hierarchy of cognition levels for a specific domain.   
Example: The van Hiele Levels 
In discussing the van Hiele levels, Clements and Battista (1992) suggested 
several characteristics that might apply to levels. 
• "Learning is a discontinuous process.  That is, there are 'jumps' in the learning 
curve which reveal the presence of discrete, qualitatively different levels of 
thinking. 
• The levels are sequential and hierarchical.  For students to function adequately 
at one of the advanced levels in the van Hiele hierarchy, they must have 
mastered large portions of the lower levels. … Progress from one level to the 
next is more dependent upon instruction than on age or biological maturation.  
… Students cannot bypass levels and achieve understanding (memorization is 
not an important feature of any level).  The latter requires working through 
certain “phases” of instruction" (1992, pp. 426-7). 
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Types of Levels-Hierarchies 
When considering hierarchies of levels in learning progressions, it is 
helpful to distinguish two types.  A "weak" levels-hierarchy refers to a set of 
levels that are ranked in order of sophistication, one above another, with no class 
inclusion relationship between the levels necessary.  A "strong" levels-hierarchy 
refers to a set of levels ranked in order of sophistication, one above another, with 
class inclusion relationships between the levels required.  That is, in a "strong" 
levels-hierarchy, students who are reasoning at level n are assumed to have 
progressed through reasoning at levels 1, 2,  … (n-1).  The van Hiele levels were 
originally hypothesized to form a strong levels-hierarchy (which is generally 
supported by the research—but there are issues), while Battista's levels of 
sophistication in reasoning about length to be discussed below form a weak 
levels-hierarchy.  (I will return to this idea when I discuss quantitative methods 
for examining learning progressions.) 
Being "At" a Level 
What, precisely, does it mean to be "at" a level?  Battista (2007) argued that 
students are at a van Hiele level when their overall cognitive structures and 
processing causes them to be disposed to and capable of thinking about a topic in 
a particular way.  So students are "at" van Hiele Level 1 when their overall 
cognitive organization and processing disposes them to think about geometric 
shapes in terms of visual wholes; they are at Level 2 when their overall cognitive 
organization disposes and enables them to think about shapes in terms of their 
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properties.  Also in this view, when students move from familiar content to 
unfamiliar content, their level of thinking might decrease temporarily; but 
because students are disposed to operate at the higher level, they look to use that 
level on the new material, and quickly become capable of using that level 
(Battista, 2007).  So, for instance, in moving from studying quadrilaterals to 
studying triangles, students who are at Level 2 for quadrilaterals might initially 
process triangles as visual wholes, but right from the start they look for, and 
fairly quickly discover and use, triangle properties. 
A Different Approach:  Vectors and Overlapping Waves 
Some studies indicate that people exhibit behaviors indicative of different 
van Hiele levels on different subtopics of geometry, or even on different kinds of 
tasks (Clements & Battista, 2001).  So an alternate view of the development of 
geometric reasoning is that students develop several van Hiele levels 
simultaneously.  To represent this view, Gutiérrez et al. (1991) used a vector with 
four components to indicate the degrees of acquisition of each of van Hiele levels 
1 through 4.  For example, a student’s degree of acquisition vector might be:  
96.67% for Level 1, 82.50% for Level 2, 50.00% for Level 3, and 3.75% for Level 4.  
Using this vector approach, Gutiérrez et al. described six profiles of level-
configurations in students’ reasoning about 3d geometry.  To illustrate, Profile 2 
was characterized by complete acquisition of Levels 1 and 2, high acquisition of 
Level 3, and low acquisition of Level 4.  However, even though level acquisition 
was described in terms of the vector model, the profiles could easily be re-
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interpreted in terms of levels only.  For instance, Profile 2 could be thought of as 
Level 2 or transition to Level 3.  
Similar to the vector approach to the van Hiele levels, several researchers 
have posited that different types of reasoning characteristic of the van Hiele 
levels develop simultaneously at different rates, and that at different periods of 
development, different types of reasoning are dominant, depending on the 
relative competence students exhibit with each type of reasoning (Clements & 
Battista, 2001; Lehrer et al., 1998; see Figure 3).  The "waves" depicted in Figure 3 
are the competence growth curves for the different types of reasoning.   
 
Figure 3.  Waves of acquisition of van Hiele levels 
Lehrer et al. (1998) argued that … geometric development should be 
characterized “by which ‘waves’ or forms of reasoning are most dominant at any 
single period of time” (p. 163).  Clements and Battista (2001) also proposed the 
view that the van Hiele levels (seen as types of reasoning) develop 
simultaneously but at different rates.  Visual-holistic knowledge, descriptive 
verbal knowledge, and, to a lesser extent initially, abstract symbolic knowledge 
grow simultaneously, as do interconnections between levels.  However, although 
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these different types of reasoning grow in tandem, one level tends to become 
ascendant or privileged in a child’s orientation toward geometric problems.  
Which level is privileged is influenced by age, experience, intentions, tasks, and 
skill in use of the various types of reasoning.  
Although the vector and wave models for the van Hiele theory have 
merit, embedded within both is a difficult issue—distinguishing type of reasoning 
from level of reasoning.  That is, sometimes the term visual-holistic is used to refer 
to that type of reasoning that is strictly visual in nature, and sometimes it is used 
to refer to a period of development of geometric thinking when an individual’s 
thinking is dominated and characterized by visual-holistic thinking.  For 
instance, Gutiérrez et al. (1991) used vectors to indicate students’ “capacity to use 
each one of the van Hiele levels” (p. 238).  This statement makes sense only if van 
Hiele levels are taken as types of reasoning, not periods of development 
characterized by qualitatively different kinds of thought.  Similarly, Clements 
and Battista (2001), along with Lehrer et al. (1998), talked about “waves of 
acquisition” of levels of reasoning defined by van Hiele.  Thus, broadly speaking, 
researchers have intermingled and not yet completely sorted out (a) van Hiele 
levels as types of reasoning, and (b) van Hiele levels as periods of development 
of geometric reasoning.  The waves theory described above is similar, but not 
identical, to Siegler's overlapping waves theory (2005).  Indeed, the vertical axis 
in Siegler's theory is "relative frequency" of use, not competence, as shown in the 
van Hiele interpretation above.  Frequency of use many be connected to 
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competence, but also to other factors such as personal preference, social pressure, 
and so on. 
In summary, given the variability in strategy use and reasoning that seems 
to accompany learning, even if we develop an adequate definition for what it 
means for a student to be "at" a level, the periods of time when students meet the 
strict requirement for being at levels may be short, with students spending most 
of the time "in transition."   
Level Determination 
Empirical determination of levels of reasoning is a major issue in the van 
Hiele theory, and LP/LT levels in general, because it operationalizes researchers’ 
conceptions of the qualitatively different types of reasoning that occur in the 
LP/LT.  For instance, consider some of the different ways that researchers have 
determined van Hiele levels. Some studies (Carroll 1998; Usiskin, 1982) used 
paper and pencil tests, judging that a level was achieved if a given number of 
items designed to assess that level were answered correctly.  In other studies 
(Fuys et al., 1988; Clements & Battista, 1992; Battista, in prep) students' reasoning 
(as recorded in interviews or open response written tasks) was coded by 
matching students' reasoning to characteristics of the van Hiele levels.  Beyond 
the answers versus reasoning dichotomy, there have been additional differences 
in level determination.  For instance, in the Usiskin van Hiele test, three of the 
tasks used to assess property-based (Level 2) reasoning about quadrilaterals 
involved diagonals, but the Battista and Clements and Battista studies focused on 
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visually salient "defining" properties of shapes.  Thus, the properties assessed by 
Usiskin's test were more likely to be unfamiliar to students than those assessed 
by Battista and Clements and Battista.  
A totally different approach to assessing van Hiele levels was devised by 
another group of researchers (Battista, 2007).  In a collaborative effort to find 
ways to assess elementary students’ acquisition of the van Hiele levels in 
interview situations, Battista, Clements, and Lehrer developed a triad sorting 
task, that, with variations, both Clements and Battista (2001), Lehrer et al. (1998), 
and Battista (in progress) used in separate research efforts.  In this task, students 
were presented with three polygons, such as those shown in Figure 4, and were 
asked, “Which two are most alike?  Why?”  Choosing B and C and saying that 
they “look the same, except that B is bent in” was taken as a Level 1 response.  
Choosing A and B and saying either that they both have two pairs of congruent 
sides or that they both have four sides was taken as a Level 2 response.  The 
purpose of this task was to determine the type of reasoning used on a task that 
students had not seen before (so it was unlikely to elicit instructionally 
programmed responses).   
 
Figure 4.  Triad polygon sorting task. 
One difficulty with this analysis is that giving the number of sides of a 
polygon is a “low-level” use of properties.  That is, there are different types of 
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geometric properties.  The simplest property involves describing the number of 
components in a shape.  For instance, a quadrilateral has four sides; a triangle 
has three angles.  A second, more sophisticated type of property describes spatial 
relationships that are particularly salient in identifying shapes (e.g., opposite 
sides of a rectangle are congruent and all angles are right angles).  In some sense, 
these properties are the "psychological defining characteristics" of shapes for 
Level 2 students. The third type of property describes other interesting but less 
salient relationships (e.g., the diagonals of a rectangle are congruent and bisect 
each other6).  These properties are likely to be derived once students understand 
the meaning of shape classification—so they are more likely to occur in Level 3.   
The distinction in properties described above suggests that students’ use 
of number of sides of a polygon may not be a very good indicator of Level 2 
thinking, which should focus on relational properties.  Thus some jumps in levels 
on triad tasks observed by Lehrer et al. (1998) may have been caused by coding 
students’ use of number of sides as Level 2.  Because a critical factor used in 
distinguishing van Hiele levels is how students deal with geometric properties, 
clarifying the meaning of properties, as it relates to the van Hiele levels, is 
important. 
Another factor that should be considered with the triad task is that saying 
Shape B is more like Shape C is not necessarily a less sophisticated response than 
focusing on number of sides.  That is, Shape B is actually more like Shape C if we 
                                                 
6 Of course, it is true that some "interesting" properties logically can be used to define shapes. 
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consider how much movement it takes to transform B into C, compared to B into 
A.  In fact, one could imagine a metric that quantifies the amount of movement 
required.  Thus, the “morphing” response described by Lehrer et al. (1998), and 
also observed by Clements and Battista (2001), may be an intuitive version of a 
notion whose mathematization is far beyond the reach of elementary students.   
Another issue with the triad-task approach is pointed out by differences in 
the ways the researchers used the triads.  Lehrer et al. (1998) construed each triad 
task as an indicator of type of reasoning.  So students’ use of different 
types/levels of reasoning on different triads was taken as evidence of differences 
in levels of response.  In contrast, Clements and Battista (2001) used a set of 9 
triad items as an indicator of level of students.  To be classified at a given level, a 
student had to give at least 5 responses at that level.  If a student gave 5 
responses at one level and at least 3 at a higher level, the student was considered 
to be in transition to the next higher level. Of course, because it aggregates 
responses, this approach obscures intertask differences and variability in 
reasoning.  It focuses on determining the predominant level of reasoning that a 
student used on the triad tasks.   
Another difference between the researchers’ approaches is also important.  
In analyzing students’ reasoning on the triad tasks, Lehrer et al. (1998) classified 
student responses solely on the basis of the type of reasoning that students 
employed.  In contrast, in determining students’ van Hiele levels, Clements and 
Battista (2001) attempted to also account for the “quality” of students’ 
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reasoning—each reason for choosing a pair in a triad was assessed to see if it 
correctly discriminated the pair that was chosen from the third item in the triad.  
In this scheme, the van Hiele levels for students were determined based on a 
complicated algorithm that accounted for both type of reasoning and 
discrimination score7,8.   
Cognition Based Assessment (CBA):  Levels, Progressions, Trajectories, and 
Profiles 
 I now describe my work on the Cognition Based Assessment project to 
illustrate the relationship between learning progressions and learning trajectories 
as representations of learning for teaching9.  The description of CBA also illustrates 
that to be useful for teachers, learning progressions must be embedded within an 
interconnected system of LP-based formative assessments, interpretations of 
students' reasoning, and instruction. 
The CBA View of Learning and Instruction 
According to the "psychological constructivist" view of how students learn 
mathematics with understanding, the way students construct, interpret, think 
about, and make sense of mathematical ideas is determined by the elements and 
                                                 
7
 Additional discussions of van Hiele levels measurement issues can be seen in articles by Wilson (1990), 
and Usiskin and Senk (1990). 
8 It is worth noting that quantitative methods for determining levels face the same issues described here for 
qualitative methods.  For instance, using the Saltus method can still leave us with many students who 
cannot be clearly placed in a level (e.g., Draney & Wilson, 2007).  
9 CBA development was partially supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Nos. ESI 
0099047and 0352898.  Opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations, however, are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.  
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organization of the relevant mental structures that the students are currently 
using to process their mathematical worlds (e.g., Battista, 2004).  To construct 
new knowledge and make sense of novel situations, students build on and revise 
their current mental structures through the processes of action, reflection, and 
abstraction.  A major component of psychological constructivist research on 
mathematics learning and teaching is its attention to students' construction of 
meaning for specific mathematical topics.  For numerous mathematical topics, 
researchers have found that students' development of conceptualizations and 
reasoning can be characterized in terms of "levels of sophistication" (e.g. Battista 
& Clements, 1996; Battista et al., 1998; Cobb & Wheatley, 1988; Steffe, 1992; van 
Hiele, 1986).  These levels lie at the heart of the CBA conceptual framework for 
understanding and building upon students' learning progress. Selecting/creating 
instructional tasks, adapting instruction to students' needs, and assessing 
students' learning progress require detailed, cognition-based knowledge of how 
students construct meanings for the specific mathematical topics targeted by 
instruction.  
CBA Assessment and Instruction 
To implement mathematics instruction that genuinely and effectively 
supports students' construction of mathematical meaning and competence, 
teachers must not only understand cognition-based research on students' 
learning of particular topics, they must be able to use that knowledge to 
determine, monitor, and guide the development of their own students' 
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reasoning. Cognition-Based Assessment supports these activities by including 
the following five critical components. 
1. Descriptions of core mathematical ideas and reasoning processes that 
form the foundation for students' sense making and understanding of 
elementary school mathematics.   
2. For each core idea, research-based descriptions of levels of sophistication 
in the development of students’ understanding of and reasoning about the 
idea (these are CBA LP).  
3. For each core idea, coherent sets of assessment tasks that enable teachers 
to investigate their students' mathematical thinking and precisely locate 
students' positions in the cognitive terrain for learning that idea. 
4. For each assessment task, a description of what each level of reasoning 
might look like for the task. 
5. For each core idea, descriptions of instructional activities specifically 
targeted for students at various levels to help them move to the next 
higher level.   
These five components are critical for an assessment "system" that focuses 
on understanding and guiding the development of students' mathematical 
reasoning. 
Learning Progressions and Trajectories for Length 
The CBA levels of sophistication, or learning progressions, for a topic (a) 
start with the informal, pre-instructional reasoning typically possessed by 
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students; (b) end with the formal mathematical concepts targeted by instruction; 
and (c) indicate cognitive plateaus reached by students in moving from (a) to (b).  
As an example, Figure 5 outlines the CBA levels of sophistication for the concept 
of length. 
Non-Measurement Reasoning Measurement Reasoning 
 
N0:  Student Compares Objects’ Lengths in Vague 
Visual Ways 
N1:  Student Correctly Compares Whole Objects’ 
Lengths Directly or Indirectly 
N2:  Student Compares Objects’ Lengths by 
Systematically Manipulating or Matching Their 
Parts 
N2.1.  Rearranging Parts to Directly Compare 
Whole Shapes 
N2.2.  One-to-One Matching of Parts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N3:  Student Compares Objects’ Lengths Using 
Geometric Properties 
 
M0:  Student Uses Numbers in Ways Unconnected to Iteration 
of Unit-Lengths 
M1:  Student Iterates Units Incorrectly 
M1.1:   Iterates Non-Length Units (e.g., Squares, Cubes, 
Dots) and Gets Incorrect Count of Unit-Lengths  
M1.2:  Iterates Unit-Lengths but Gets Incorrect Count 
M2.  Student Correctly Iterates ALL Unit-Lengths One-by-One 
M2.1:  Iterates Non-Length Units (e.g., Squares, Cubes) 
and Gets Correct Count of Unit-Lengths for 
Straight Paths  
M2.2:  Iterates Non-Length Units (e.g., Squares, Cubes) 
To Correctly Count Unit-Lengths for Non-Straight 
Paths 
M2.3:  Explicitly Iterates Unit-Lengths and Gets Correct 
Counts for Straight and Non-Straight Paths 
M3:  Student Correctly Operates on Composites of Visible 
Unit-Lengths 
M4:  Student Correctly and Meaningfully Determines Length 
Using only Numbers—No Visible Units or Iteration 
M5:  Student Understands and Uses Procedures/Formulas for 
Perimeter Formulas for Non-Rectangular Shapes 
Figure 5. CBA Levels for Students' Reasoning about Length (Battista, accepted) 
The set of CBA levels of sophistication for the topic of length are 
graphically depicted in Figure 6.  Also shown, are an ideal hypothetical learning 
trajectory (in red) and a typical actual learning trajectory for students (in green).  
The CBA levels represent the "cognitive terrain" that students must ascend 
during an actual learning trajectory.    
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Figure 6.  Levels of Sophistication Plateaus and Learning Trajectories for CBA Length 
 
A CBA levels-model for a topic describes not only cognitive plateaus, but 
what students can and cannot do, students’ conceptualizations and reasoning, 
cognitive obstacles that obstruct learning progress, and mental processes needed 
both for functioning at a level and for progressing to higher levels.  The levels are 
derived from analysis of both the mathematics to be learned and empirical 
research on students' developing conceptualizations of the topic.  The jumps in 
the ascending plateau structure of a CBA levels-model represent cognitive 
restructurings evidenced by observable increases in sophistication in students' 
reasoning about a topic.  Furthermore, an ideal CBA levels-of-sophistication 
model for a topic provides indications of jumps in sophistication that are small 
enough to fall within students "zones of construction."  That is, a student should 
be able to accomplish the jump from conceptualizing and reasoning at Level N to 
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conceptualizing and reasoning at Level N+1 by making a significant abstraction, 
in a particular context, while working to solve an appropriate problem or set of 
problems10.  For instance (See Figure 7), in Situation A the student has to make a 
cognitive jump that is too great.  In Situation B, the student can progress from 
Level 1 to Level 2 by making cognitive jumps to successive sublevels. 
 
Figure 7 
 
However, because the levels are compilations of empirical observations of 
the thinking of many students, and because students' learning backgrounds and 
mental processing differ, a particular student might not pass through every level 
for a topic; he or she might skip some levels or pass through them so quickly that 
the passage is difficult to detect.  Even with this variability, however, the levels 
still describe the plateaus that students achieve in their development of 
reasoning about a topic. They indicate major landmarks that research has shown 
students often pass through in "constructive itineraries" or learning trajectories 
                                                 
10 The jump in reasoning may apply to restricted contexts, not to all contexts connected with the 
mathematical topic.  That is, the jump may be tightly situated rather than global. 
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for these topics.  Thus, such levels provide an excellent conceptual framework for 
understanding the paths students travel to achieve meaningful learning of a 
topic.   
 
Digging Deeper into the LP/LT Representations 
As hypothetical or average learning trajectories, the trajectories depicted 
in Figure 6 are still simplifications of actual learning trajectories traversed by 
individual students.  To illustrate, I describe one portion of the actual learning 
trajectory of a fifth grader, RC, who was having particular difficulty with the 
concept of length (the trajectories of most other students were much simpler).  
Figure 8 shows RC's learning trajectory for 34 consecutive length items (start 
with the green point, end with the red point).  This actual learning trajectory is 
extremely complex because it contains so much back-and-forth movement 
between levels.  Note that RC's performance is consistent with the variability in 
strategy choice described by Siegler (2007, var). 
 
Figure 8 RC's learning trajectory for 34 consecutive length items 
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Figure 9 provides a better representation of this complicated portion of 
RC's learning trajectory.  This figure starts with RC's levels on initial assessment 
items, moves to his responses during an instructional intervention, and ends 
with his reasoning on reassessment items. 
 
Figure 9.  Another representation of RC's learning progress 
 
But even Figure 9 does not represent RC's learning trajectory with enough 
detail to be maximally useful for instruction.  We need a narrative description of 
(a) what tasks he was attempting, and (b) his level of reasoning on each task.  
Below, this information is provided for the critical period of instructional 
intervention in which RC made progress (see the three starred items in Figure 9).   
During the instructional intervention, RC was given items of the following 
type. 
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Item 23 (see Figure 10).  Suppose I pull the wires so they are 
straight. Which wire would be longer, or would they be the same?  
How do you know?  Predict an answer, then check with inch rods 
(the black/gray sections on the student sheet were each 1 inch in 
length). [Items 20-22 were similar.] 
 
Figure 10 
 On Item 23, RC counted unit lengths as 
shown in Figure 11 and concluded that the top wire 
was longer. He checked his answer by placing inch 
rods on both wires then straightening each set of 
rods to compare the lengths directly. 
 
Figure 11 
Importantly, on Item 23 and several other problems, RC used both M2.3 
and N2.1 reasoning.  On the last problem of this type (Item 24), RC did not check 
his answer by straightening—he seemed sure of his prediction, having 
empirically abstracted that comparing counts of unit lengths predicted the 
results of comparing straightened wires.    
In the reassessment period, RC's thinking regressed when he attempted 
problems that were different from the ones he successfully used M2.3 reasoning 
on.  For instance, on Item 27, at first, RC counted unequal segments, then dots 
(Measurement Reasoning), then imagined straightening paths (Non-
Measurement reasoning), forming contradictory conclusions. 
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Item 27.  Which path is shorter, or are they the same? How do you know? 
 
Figure 12 
RC: [Counts gaps between dots on the bottom path, then on the top path] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
Hmm.  Which one do I think is shorter… [Counts dots on the top path, then on the bottom path] 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. This one’s [pointing to the bottom path] shorter. … 
I: Okay. Now you got 6 both times?  But you still think this one [pointing to path B] is shorter? 
RC: Yep. 
I: Why is it shorter? 
RC: Because if you pull this one out [pinching the endpoints of A with his fingers]…it’ll be like right 
there [moving his fingers horizontally outwards to just past the endpoints of A]. You can’t pull this 
[pinching the endpoints of B] out anymore.  
So in the face of a seeming conflict between measurement and non-measurement 
reasoning, RC correctly relies on his non-measurement reasoning. 
I: Okay. Could using these rods help you think about this problem [placing inch rods on the paper]? 
RC: Yes.  [Counts the segments on path A.] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  … So here and right up here [draws marks at 
the two ends of the straight line of 5 rods he places above path A].  
 [RC counts gaps between dots on path B, then counts 5 inch rods that he places at the top of the 
sheet, between the two marks that he previously made when rearranging path A] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  1, 2, 
3, 4, 5. 
I: Okay, now how did you get 5? Is that for the bottom path? For B? 
RC: Yeah.  
I: How did you get B? Show me. 
RC: Because [counting gaps between dots on path B, then on path A] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
I: … Do 5 of these [rods] fit? Like if you put 1 here [placing a rod on the leftmost segment of the 
bottom path], and one here [places a second rod over the second and third gaps between dots from 
the left end of the bottom path]. 
RC: Well, I can make it like a string.  
I: Do you want to use this [hands RC a line of cylindrical inch rods strung on a wire]? 
RC: [Places the first 4 rods over path B and makes a mark at the right end with his pen.] 
I: So what are you thinking? 
RC: This one [pointing at line A] is longer. This one [pointing at path B] is shorter. 
I: Okay. And how did you figure that out?  
RC: I lined these up [pointing at the string of rods]. And there was some more right there [pointing to 
the ‘hill’ on the top path]. …   
In the above episode, the interviewer attempted to get RC to use inch rods and 
measurement M2 reasoning.  However, RC used the inch rods mainly to correctly 
implement the non-measurement N2.1 strategy.   
In the episode below, the interviewer was even more directive in encouraging RC 
to develop correct measurement reasoning. 
Item 32 
I: [See Figure 13a]  If these are wires and I pull them so they are straight, which will be longer, or 
will they be the same?  Is there any way that counting can help you solve this problem? 
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Figure 13a     Figure 13b 
 
RC: Um, yes. 
I: So what would you do? 
RC: Count these [counts the unequal straight portions of the bottom wire, but skips the second vertical 
segment from the left—see Figure 13b] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. [Counts the unequal straight portions  on 
the top wire] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
RC: But this one [pointing to the top wire] would actually be longer.  Because if you pull it out it’ll 
come right there [pulling his hands out from the endpoints of the top wire to several inches past 
the endpoints]. And if you pull it out, it’ll come right there [pulling his hands out from the 
endpoints of the bottom wire to a few inches past the margins]. 
So RC uses incorrect measurement and non-measurement reasoning on this task. 
Item 34 
I: Okay, could counting rods like this [tracing the unit segment at the left end of the top wire] help at 
all? 
 
Figure 14 
 
RC: I already counted that. [Pointing at each straight portion of the top wire again] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.  
I: Oh, but I was wondering if, could you count like [counting a few unit segments on the top wire, 
moving from left to right] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 like that [see Figure 14]? Would that help?… 
RC: I think so. [Counting squares along the top wire; see Figure 15] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 15. [Counting squares along the bottom wire] 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.  
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Figure 15 
 
I: So what do you think? 
RC: Probably the same length. 
Given this narrative data on RC's reasoning, how should we represent his 
current knowledge structure with respect to length in a way that is most helpful 
for instruction?  Rather than using an actual learning trajectory, the CBA 
approach is to construct a "profile" of RC's reasoning, using CBA LP levels of 
sophistication as the conceptual framework.  To see what this profile looks like, 
note that in the context of problems like Item 23, in which the "wires" could be 
straightened using actual inch rods, RC had seen empirically that counting unit 
lengths could predict which was longer.  So, for the last of these problems, he 
adopted the scheme of comparing wires by counting unit lengths in them.  At 
first, he checked his answers by physically straightening a set of inch rods for 
each wire; but he curtailed this physical check on the last problem.  We can 
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conclude that in this context, RC had abstracted a particular reasoning scheme.  
However, for problems in different contexts, where dots or squares were salient, 
RC did not apply his new scheme (but he also did not apply his original M0 
scheme).  Furthermore, throughout the sessions, RC kept returning to the non-
measurement scheme of straightening the paths (N2.1).  So, the profile of RC's 
reasoning in terms of the CBA LP for length is:  (a) he still relies heavily on non-
measurement N2.1 reasoning; (b) he has started to see that measurement 
reasoning M1.2 (counting rods) can help him determine which path is longer; but 
(c) he does not yet understand the critical properties of unit length iteration (no 
gaps, overlaps; uniform lengths—M2.3). 
So, future instruction must help RC (a) connect his iteration of inch rods 
(M2) to straightening paths (N2.1), (b) develop understanding of the properties 
of unit length iteration (M2.3), and (c) generalize a correct unit iteration scheme 
to new contexts (M2.3).  For instance, in problems like Item 32, we would 
encourage RC to use inch rods (matching square size) to check his answers by 
counting and straightening. In response to this type of instruction/intervention, 
many students constructed generally applicable schemes, overcoming the 
fixation on the visually salient squares.  Additionally, we also need to give RC 
tasks that highlight the importance of unit length iteration properties.  For 
instance, we need to give RC problems in which he can determine by 
straightening that counting unequal segments gives incorrect comparisons. 
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It is the condensed, synthesized narrative profile of RC's reasoning, 
described in terms of CBA tasks and levels, that enables us to appropriately 
characterize and diagnose RC's reasoning in a way that is most useful for 
designing instruction that best matches his learning needs.  Knowing the average 
CBA level for these tasks, or having a numerically valued vector or table of CBA 
level numbers, is insufficient for proper diagnosis and remediation.  
Qualitative versus Quantitative Approaches to Developing LP 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods have been used to develop 
learning progressions in mathematics (and science).  Both approaches are equally 
careful and scientific.  Generally, both approaches involve (a) synthesizing, 
integrating, and extending previous research to develop conceptual models of 
the development of student reasoning about a topic (hypothesized learning 
progressions); (b) developing and iteratively testing assessment tasks; (c) 
conducting several rounds of student interviews in support of steps (a) and (b); 
and (d) iteratively refining LP levels.  In qualitative approaches, the cycle of 
iteration, testing, and revising eventually "stabilizes" into final levels, as 
determined by current level descriptions being used to reliably code all data.  In 
contrast, quantitative methods compare the data to statistical model predictions 
(which often are derived using mathematical iteration), and, if needed, make 
adjustments to assessment item sets and levels. 
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Rash Rush to Rasch?  Issues with Quantitative Methods 
 There have been numerous recommendations (sometimes demands) to use 
quantitative techniques to develop learning progressions (e.g., NRC, 2001), with 
a hint that using non-quantitative techniques is less "scientific." For example, 
Stacey & Steinle state that there have been "repeated suggestions made by 
colleagues over the years, which implied that we had been remiss in not using 
this Rasch analysis with our data" (2006, p. 89).  However, using Rasch and other 
IRT approaches raises often-ignored serious issues that I now highlight. 
 First, Rasch/IRT models are "measurement" models.  For instance, Masters 
and Mislevy state that "The probabilistic partial credit model … enables measures 
of achievement to be constructed" [italics added] (1991, p. 16).  Or, Wilson, who 
describes the Saltus model as an example of "psychometric11 models suitable for 
the analysis of data from assessments of cognitive development" (Wilson, 1989, 
p. 276).   However, the whole enterprise of "measuring" in psychological research 
has been criticized, with less than compelling rebuttals (Michell, 2008). 
 Second, many of the assumptions of numerical models do not seem to fit 
our understanding of the process of learning and reasoning in mathematics.  For 
instance, the Saltus model "assumes that each member of group h applies the 
strategies typical of that level consistently across all items" (Wilson, 1989, p. 278).  
Or, "The saltus model assumes that all persons in class c answer all items in a 
                                                 
11 Of course psychometrics is "the measurement of mental capacity, thought processes, aspects of 
personality, etc., esp. by mathematical or statistical analysis of quantitative data" (OED online). 
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manner consistent with membership in that class…. In a Piagetian context, this 
means that a child in, say, the concrete operational stage is always in that stage, 
and answers all items accordingly.  The child does not show formal operational 
development for some items and concrete operational development for others" 
(Draney & Wilson, 2007, p. 121).  But, as has been discussed earlier, the levels in 
learning progressions are not necessarily stages, and often do not form a strong 
levels-hierarchy, making quantitative models problematic:  
"From this research, one can only conclude that there are situations in which 
students appear to reason systematically…When these situations arise, 
evidence about student understanding can be summarized by [numerical] 
learning progression level diagnoses, and educators can draw valid 
inferences about students’ current states of understanding. Unfortunately, 
inconsistent responding across problem contexts poses challenges to 
locating students at a single learning progression level and makes it unclear 
how to interpret students’ diagnostic scores. For example, how should one 
interpret a score of 2.6? A student with this score could be reasoning with a 
mixture of ideas from levels 2 and 3, but the student could also be reasoning 
with a mixture of ideas from levels 1, 2, 3, and 4. Such challenges prompt 
additional studies to support the valid interpretation of learning 
progression diagnoses" (Steedle & Shavelson,  2009, p. 704). 
 Thus, use of Rasch-like models to examine cognitive development, such as 
Wilson's Saltus model or latent class analysis, assumes that students are "at a 
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level" (Briggs…; Draney & Wilson), which returns us to the problem discussed 
earlier about a student being at a level.  Research on learning suggests that quite 
often, the state of student learning is not neatly characterized as "being at a 
specified level," which causes problems for interpretation of model results:  "The 
results from this study suggest that students cannot always be located at a single 
level of the learning progression studied here. Consequently, learning 
progression level diagnoses resulting from item response patterns cannot always 
be interpreted validly" (Steedle & Shavelson, 2009, p. 713).  See also my previous 
discussion of overlapping waves. 
 Third, Rasch/IRT models are based on item difficulty, which does not 
capture critical aspects of the nature of student reasoning, as Stacey and Steinle 
argue:  
Being correct on an item for the wrong reason characterises DCT2 [their 
decimal knowledge assessment]. It is one of the reasons why the DCT2 
data do not fit the Rasch model, because these items break with the 
normal assumption that correctness on an item indicates an advance in 
knowledge (or ability) that will not be ‘lost’ as the student further 
advances. …  A student’s total score on this test might increase or 
decrease depending on the particular misconception and the mix of items 
in the test. This does not fit the property of Rasch scaling stated in 
Swaminathan (1999), that 'the number right score contains all the 
information regarding an examinee’s proficiency level, that is, two 
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examinees who have the same number correct score have the same 
proficiency level' (p. 49). Neither the total score … nor Rasch 
measurement estimates provides a felicitous summary of student 
performance on the decimal comparison items of the DCT2 test" (2006, pp. 
87-88).   
 Indeed, Stacey and Steinle further state that, "Conceptual learning may not 
always be able to be measured on a scale, which is an essential feature of the 
Rasch approach. Instead, students move between categories of interpretations, 
which do not necessarily provide more correct answers even when they are 
based on an improved understanding of fundamental principles" (2006, p. 77).  
Even more, how to place rote performance on items becomes extremely 
problematic in such models.  For instance, in Noelting's hierarchy for 
proportional reasoning, the highest level is the formal operational stage in which 
the "child learns to deal formally with fractions, ratios, and percentages" (Draney 
& Wilson, 123). But using a formal procedure rotely is not a valid indication of 
formal operational reasoning. Stacey and Steinle concluded that there is nothing 
to gain in using the Rasch approach to the case of decimals that they studied and 
many other contexts.  "Learning as revealed by answers to test items is not 
always of the type that is best regarded as ‘measurable’, but instead learning may 
be better mapped across a landscape of conceptions and misconceptions" (2006, 
p. 89).   
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Methods for Determining Levels in Learning Progressions 
The most accurate way to determine levels in learning progressions (once the 
framework has been developed) is administering individual interviews, which 
are then coded by experts, using the LP levels framework.  The difficulty with 
this approach is that it is time consuming.  However, many teachers can learn to 
make such determinations, both with individual interviews and during class 
discussions.  Another way to gather such data is using open-ended questions.  
Again, students' written responses must be coded, and many students do not 
write enough for proper coding.  However, if teachers help students learn how to 
accurately describe their reasoning in writing, written responses can be a 
valuable means for gathering strategy information.  
An alternate, less time-consuming, way to gather data is through multiple 
choice items that have distracters that are generated from interviews and that 
correspond to specific levels (Briggs et al., 2006, have labeled format "Ordered 
Multiple-Choice").  CBA has also experimented with teacher coding sheets—
students describe their reasoning but the teacher or a classroom volunteer 
chooses the options in a multiple-choice-like coding sheet.  However, beyond 
convenience, there are several issues that one must consider when using these 
alternate formats (e.g., Alonzo & Steedle, 2008; Briggs & Alonzo, 2009; Steedle & 
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Shavelson, 2009)12?  For instance, students may not recognize which multiple-
choice description matches the strategy they used to solve the problem. 
When assessments are used summatively, however, taking a numerical 
approach can be both practical and useful. However, if one stores the data as 
numerical levels codes, in order to use the data for individual diagnoses, teachers 
must consult the theoretical model on learning that underlies the levels 
framework. 
In Summary 
When using quantitative methods to develop levels in learning progressions, 
the validity and usefulness of interpretations of results depends on (a) the 
adequacy of the underlying conceptual model of learning, (b) the fit between the 
statistical/mathematical model (including its assumptions) and the conceptual 
model of learning, and (c) the fit between the data and the 
statistical/mathematical model's predictions.  Unfortunately, use of quantitative 
methods often ignores factor (b).  For example, adopting the Saltus model might 
cause one to neglect explicit consideration of the critical issue of what it means to 
be at a level.  Also, although many users of quantitative approaches argue that 
implementing such approaches enables them to test their models, too often, these 
tests are restricted to factor (c).  Researchers in mathematics education need to 
resist external pressures to apply quantitative techniques without deeply 
                                                 
12 Also at issue is whether Rasch techniques are the appropriate model when Ordered Multiple-Choice 
format tasks are employed (Briggs & Alonzo, 2009).  
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questioning their validity, because such adoptions result in the techniques being 
applied in ways that we would call in other contexts instrumental or rote 
procedural.  Instead, researchers must investigate much more carefully the 
conceptual foundations of these techniques (a daunting task, given the 
statistical/mathematical complexity underlying the procedures)13.  
 
Learning Progressions and Curriculum/Assessment Standards 
In the current era of "high standards," testing, and accountability, it seems 
reasonable to base both the content and grade-level locations of standards on 
research-based learning progressions. Indeed, the CCSSM state, "the 
development of these Standards began with research-based learning 
progressions detailing what is known today about how students’ mathematical 
knowledge, skill, and understanding develop over time" (CCSSM, 2010, p. 4).  
However, there are aspects of the CCSSM, in particular for geometry, that seem 
to contradict this claim.  As an example, consider the consistency of the CCSSM 
with the van Hiele levels.  Although modern researchers have expressed several 
misgivings about the nature of the levels, recent reviews agree that "research 
generally supports that the van Hiele levels are useful in describing students' 
geometric concept development" (Clements, 2003, p. 153; Battista, 2007). 
A major landmark in the van Hiele levels is when students develop 
                                                 
13 One way to investigate the conceptual foundations of the approaches is to apply both to the same sets of 
data. 
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property-based reasoning about geometric shapes.  For instance, at van Hiele 
Level 2, a student conceptualizes a rectangle, not as a visual gestalt, but, say, as a 
figure that has the properties:14 "4 right angles," and "opposite sides parallel and 
equal."  The CCSSM rightly recognize the critical importance of Level 2 
reasoning.  However, they specify that the development of this reasoning occurs 
at grades 4 and 5, which ignores van Hiele-based research that strongly suggests 
that, for most students, this reasoning is very difficult to achieve before ninth 
grade (Battista, manuscript in preparation).  Indeed, the percent of students at or 
above Level 2, before and after high school geometry, has been reported as 31% 
before and 72% after by Usiskin (1982), and 51% before and 76% after by 
Frykholm (1994).  Even after high quality instruction specifically targeting 
increasing students' van Hiele levels, research shows that the highest percent of 
students in grades 5-7 that achieved Level 2 reasoning or above was about 58%.  
So existing research casts serious doubt on the achievability of the CCSSM 
geometry standards for most students.   
It should be noted, however, that this research often uses different kinds 
of level indicators.  For instance, in the Usiskin assessment of van Hiele levels 
(which was also used by Frykholm), property assessment tasks involved 
diagonals of quadrilaterals, which may have been studied less as opposed to 
basic defining, and more familiar, properties of classes of quadrilaterals.  
                                                 
14
 At Level 2, students do not understand minimal definitions.  Instead, definitions tend to be lists of all 
the visually salient properties that students know (stated in terms of formal geometric concepts). 
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Furthermore, in Battista's study of fifth grade students working in his Shape 
Makers curriculum, if Level 2 was assessed by the triad tasks described above 
(which should be considered "transfer" tasks), 58% achieved Level 2 or higher on 
the posttest.  But if Level 2 was assessed by students' knowledge of properties of 
shapes that had been explicitly explored in the curriculum, 83% were judged as 
achieving Level 2 or higher.  However, Battista's research also suggests that, in 
general, junior high students' level of reasoning on these same familiar 
quadrilaterals is quite low (only 22% achieving Level 2). 
This example illustrates several issues: 
1.  Standards too often are not sufficiently based on research.  For 
example, given the research cited above, expecting ALL fourth or fifth graders to 
achieve Level 2 reasoning seems unreasonable. 
2.  Integrating various research studies into coherent learning 
progressions can be difficult because of variability in methods and assessments.  
For instance, assessments of van Hiele Level 2 have variably focused on 
knowledge of properties of familiar shapes, use of properties in transfer tasks, 
and knowledge of derived/secondary, as opposed to defining, properties 
(Battista, in preparation).   
3.  Although it is sometimes possible for students to make great progress 
in LP when using LP-based curricula and being taught by excellent teachers, this 
situation is not the norm.  Basing standards on what happens in the best 
situations seems unwise.   
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4.  For learning progressions to be useful in standards setting, the goals of 
the standards must closely match the knowledge acquisition described in the 
progressions.  For instance, exactly which properties are targeted by CCSSM—
familiar defining properties, or unfamiliar derived properties? 
5.  Should standards set benchmarks that all or most (say 80%) students 
can achieve, or should they target benchmarks that only, say, 50% (or 30%) of 
students might reasonably be expected to achieve?  This is a critically important 
issue that may inadvertently place equity concerns in opposition to concerns 
about ensuring that sufficient numbers of students enter advanced mathematics 
and science careers in the US.  
Teachers' Use of and Need for Learning Progressions 
Professional recommendations and research advocate that mathematics 
teachers possess extensive knowledge of students' mathematical thinking (An, 
Kulm, Wu, 2004; Carpenter & Fennema, 1991; Clarke & Clarke, 2004; Fennema & 
Franke, 1992; Saxe et al., 2001; Schifter, 1998; Tirosh, 2000).  Teachers must "have 
an understanding of the general stages that students pass through in acquiring 
the concepts and procedures in the domain, the processes that are used to solve 
different problems at each stage, and the nature of the knowledge that underlies 
these processes" (Carpenter & Fennema, 1991, p. 11).  Research shows that such 
knowledge can improve students' learning (Fennema & Franke, 1992; Fennema et 
al., 1996).  Indeed, "There is a good deal of evidence that learning is enhanced 
when teachers pay attention to the knowledge and beliefs that learners bring to a 
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learning task, use this knowledge as a starting point for new instruction, and 
monitor students' changing conceptions as instruction proceeds" (Bransford et 
al., 1999, p. 11).  Thus, there is a great need to study teachers' learning, 
understanding, and use of learning progressions in mathematics. 
 Related to the study of teachers' use of learning progressions, there is 
much research investigating the nature of the knowledge teachers have and need 
to teach mathematics, with the scope of this work described by the "egg" domain-
map of Hill, Ball, and Schilling (2008, p. 377) (see Figure 16).  Battista's Cognition 
Based Assessment, Phase 2 (CBA2) research project is focusing on one 
component in this domain, “Knowledge of Content and Students” (KCS), which 
Hill et al. define as, “Content knowledge intertwined with knowledge of how 
students think about, know, or learn that content” (p. 378). 
 
Figure 16 
 The Hill/Ball/Schilling framework puts mathematical knowledge at the 
forefront in describing mathematics-related teacher knowledge.  Consistent with 
this content-primary perspective, Park and Oliver state, “it is transformation of 
subject matter knowledge for the purpose of teaching that is at the heart of the 
definition of PCK” (2008, p. 264). 
                                                                                                      TME, vol8, no.3, p .551 
 
 In contrast, the CBA2 approach to studying KCS focuses on teachers’ 
“cognitive/psychological knowledge” of students’ mathematical thinking, and a 
major component of this research is connected to teachers' understanding and 
use of learning progressions. Although cognitive/psychological knowledge and 
mathematical knowledge are distinct, they are intertwined with each other and 
with knowledge of teaching and curricula.  See Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17. Intertwined Teacher Knowledge [Mathematics gray, Psychological white, Teaching blue, 
Curricula red] 
  
In the CBA2 project, we are conducting case studies that qualitatively describe 
(a) the nature of teachers’ conceptualizations of students’ mathematical thinking, 
(b) the processes by which teachers come to understand research-based 
knowledge on the development of students’ mathematical thinking (as 
represented in CBA LP), and (c) how teachers use this knowledge (including 
CBA assessments and instructional guidance) in assessment and teaching.   
One Teacher's Use of CBA 
Before describing several issues in teachers' understanding and use of 
learning progressions, it is worthwhile to note the power that many teachers 
obtain with CBA's linked  LP, assessments, and instructional guidance.  So I 
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quickly summarize a case study of one teacher in the CBA project who used 
several extremely detailed CBA learning progressions in his teaching and 
assessment.  As Teacher 19 learned and used CBA ideas and materials, he made 
major progress in:   
 understanding students’ learning progressions 
 understanding assessment tasks 
 deciding what’s most important in the curriculum 
 diagnosing and remediating students’ learning difficulties 
 deciding on the effectiveness of instruction—are there problems in the 
teaching, or are students not quite ready to learn a particular concept 
 improving informal assessments by helping to him ask better questions 
and more quickly understanding what students say 
 understanding and building on students' reasoning and procedures as 
they occurred in frequent class discussion 
 helping parents understand their children’s mathematics program and 
progress through it. 
In much of T19’s discussion of CBA, he described how important it was 
for him to be able to say to himself, “Well, they’re here and this is where I need 
to take them,” a major affordance of CBA LP.  This is practical, decision-making 
information needed for everyday mathematics teaching. Finally, T19 was 
impressed by the great progress in learning his students made (especially those 
who were struggling), which he attributed to his learning about and use of CBA 
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materials.  As an especially important example for him, he described how one of 
his struggling students started the school year at a kindergarten level in 
mathematics and by mid-year was functioning at a third grade level. 
Teachers' Understanding of Students' Reasoning about Length: The Need for 
LP 
 To illustrate why research-based LP are so important for teachers, I 
describe one example of teachers' understanding and misunderstanding of 
students’ reasoning about length measurement, a topic that almost all elementary 
students have difficulty with.  Examination of this example illustrates the kind of 
content that is needed in LP written for teachers.   
Teachers were shown the work of Student X and asked to analyze it (see 
Figure 18). 
 
Student Problem 
Which sidewalk from home to school is longer, the 
dotted one, the gray one, or are they the same?   
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Teacher Task 
Consider Student X who used the strategy below on 
the Student Problem (above). 
Student X: [Counts squares along the gray path 1-14, 
then along the dotted path 1-15.]  The gray 
path is shorter because it has less squares.  
(a) Is Student X’s reasoning correct or incorrect? If it 
is incorrect, what is wrong with it?  
(b) What would you do instructionally [to help 
Student X]?  
 
 
Figure 18.  Student problem and teacher task 
 
 To illustrate the difficulties that teachers had with analyzing Student X's 
reasoning, I describe two examples of how teachers conceptualized (a) X’s 
reasoning, and (b) subsequent instruction for X.   
Teacher1:  [X’s reasoning] is incorrect because … she is counting the boxes instead of the side length for 
the unit.  Like on this first box [in the gray path; see Figure 19] she is just counting it as one unit even 
though there are two sides there that should be measured.  
Figure 19.   
 
Teacher3:  [X’s reasoning] is incorrect.  She is not recognizing that she is counting two segments as one 
[pointing to the first turn in the gray path] because she is looking at area.  So she is looking at the 
area of the squares, not counting the sides or segments.  
 
 Although both teachers understood that X’s reasoning is incorrect, several 
features of the teachers’ conceptualizations of X’s reasoning are problematic.  
First, there was no evidence in any of X’s work that she was mistaking area for 
length.  Instead, X implemented the procedure of “placing” squares along a path, 
without properly relating this procedure to unit-length iteration.  X did not 
understand the concept of unit-length iteration or the procedure for 
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implementing it.  Conceptualizing X’s error as looking at area mis-conceptualizes 
X’s reasoning psychologically.  One of the key features of LP is that they provide 
psychologically sound, and pedagogically useful, interpretations of students' 
reasoning. 
 The second important feature is the statement by both teachers that X is 
counting 2 length units instead of 1.  Thus, both teachers misinterpret X's 
conceptualization and error.  X is iterating squares, not different-sized linear units.   
Both teachers focus on the mathematical consequences of X’s errant strategy, 
rather than its psychological root. 
To further examine this misinterpretation and its consequences, we look at 
how the teachers’ conceptualizations of X’s reasoning affects their view of the 
instruction X needs. 
 
Int: What would you do instructionally to move X to this next type of reasoning [correct iteration]?  
T1:  Well I think she needs to understand what the unit is, and that the units have to be … consistent as she 
is measuring. So she would need to see that this unit that she labeled as one [draws Figure 20A] is 
more than this unit [draws Figure 20B].  
Figure 20.   
 So like you could show her that this unit and this unit are not the same cause if you straighten it out 
this would be two units, and this would just be the one unit.  
T3:   We used inch rods cut out of straws … and physically put those along [the paths] … And that helped 
them to recognize that they weren’t counting the sides when they were using squares. They were 
missing something. 
  
T1 has a valid long-term instructional goal—X must learn to iterate a constant 
unit-length.  However, because T1 misinterprets X’s conceptualization, she 
chooses an inappropriate short-term/immediate instructional goal. Telling X that 
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she counted 2 units instead of 1 would confuse X.  Students who are 
conceptualizing length measurement as iterating squares along a path must first 
see that a totally different kind of unit—linear—must be iterated. This is 
surprisingly difficult for many elementary school students.  Understanding the 
properties of unit-length iteration—equal-length units, no gaps/overlaps—
comes after understanding the nature of the iterated unit.  LP provide not only 
long-term instructional goals but the kind short-term/immediate instructional 
goals that are critical for guiding and supporting students' moment-to-moment 
learning.    
 In summary, T1 understands X’s reasoning mathematically but not 
psychologically.  It seems that focusing on the mathematical consequences of counting 
squares, while critical to determining the validity of X’s reasoning, caused T1 to 
incorrectly conceptualize the nature of X’s reasoning.  Consequently, although T1’s 
instructional goal was worthwhile, her plan does not adequately build on X’s 
current reasoning.  Interestingly, although T3’s conceptualization of X’s 
reasoning was also problematic, probably because she had previously been 
interactively guided in the appropriate use of length activities by CBA staff, she 
was still able to appropriately choose which CBA instructional activity was 
appropriate for X.  Nevertheless, to appropriately build on X's current reasoning, 
teachers must fully and psychologically understand the nature of her reasoning.  
It is insufficient to merely know that X is getting incorrect counts of units, or 
even where the incorrect counts occur.  Teachers must understand that X is using 
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the wrong kind of measurement unit. And it is the CBA LP on length that 
provides the appropriate framework for this understanding. 
To fully understand and respond to misconceptions like those of X and 
other students, teachers need research-based learning progressions that describe 
the range of conceptualizations that students possess about length and length 
measurement.  Knowledge of such progressions not only helps teachers 
understand students' thinking psychologically, it expands a teacher's focus 
beyond mathematical, to pedagogically critical psychological, interpretations of 
students' mathematical thinking.  And for LP to be maximally useful for teachers 
in instruction, LP must be linked to (a) appropriate assessment tasks that reveal 
students' reasoning, and (b) instructional tasks specifically designed to address 
students' learning needs at various locations in the LP. 
Balance:  How Much Detail Is Needed in LP for Teachers? 
In discussing the use of learning progressions for formative assessment by 
teachers, Popham states, "It's important to stress that there must always be a 
balance between (1) the level of analytic sophistication that goes into a learning 
progression and (2) the likelihood of the learning progression being used by 
teachers and students" (2008, p. 29).  So a central issue in describing learning 
progressions written for teachers is how much detail teachers can handle in the 
progression descriptions.   
Battista 
 
Although space does not permit me to provide a full analysis of this issue 
in the CBA2 project, it is true that almost all of the teachers who participated in 
the CBA2 project for at least a year did learn to use the great amount of detail in 
CBA LP.  However, a comment made by many teachers who participated in the 
CBA2 project is that most/many teachers would have difficulty learning the 
great amount of detail in the CBA materials.  Consequently, some of these 
teachers suggested giving teachers simplified versions of the CBA materials.  The 
following episode illustrates that this approach, if it oversimplifies a LP, can lead 
to difficulties. 
Misinterpretation of "Simplified" Level Descriptions 
 One idea that we experimented with in the CBA2 project is providing 
"simplified" descriptions of CBA levels to teachers.  As an example, in the regular 
CBA materials, Level M1 for length was described and numerous examples of 
student work were provided.  In contrast, some teachers were given the very 
abbreviated description of Level M1 below.  Notice that in this abbreviated 
description, the terms "gaps" and "overlaps" were not elaborated or illustrated.  It 
was assumed that teachers would understand the terms, given the context. 
Abbreviated Version  
"CBA Length Level M1.  Incorrect Unit Iteration 
Students do not fully understand the process of unit-length iteration; their iterations contain gaps, 
overlaps, or different length units, and are incorrect."   
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How several teachers misinterpreted the terms "gaps" and "overlaps" is 
revealing.  T1715 made the following comment in deciding which CBA level 
Student X evidenced on the home-to-school problem. 
T17:  Well what do you mean gap? An opening that is not counted.  … [X] didn’t count it [pointing at 
the "2" on the dotted path, See Figure 21a]. …  So it has to be a gap. 
 
Figure 21a     Figure 21b 
 
In this case, T17 interpreted the term "gap" as a mismatch in the 
correspondence between the number sequence "1, 2, 3" and the sequence of 4 
unit-lengths that should have been iterated along the portion of the dotted path 
shown above.  If X were counting unit lengths, she should have counted "1, 2, 3, 
4" for this portion of the path.  But she omitted the count for the third segment; 
so there was a "gap" in her counting sequence (see Figure 21b).  T17's 
interpretation of gap was very different from the meaning of gap that the CBA 
author intended (see CBA document excerpt below).  And, like T3 and T1 above, 
T17's interpretation of gap seemed to contribute to her mis-interpretation of X's 
conceptual difficulty. 
"M1.2:  Iterates Unit-Lengths but Gets Incorrect Count   
Students iterate unit-lengths rather than shapes.  So when iterating unit-lengths, they draw line 
segments, not squares, rectangles, or rods.  However, because they do not understand the properties of 
                                                 
15
 T1 and T3 had read the full CBA document on length; T17 had not read any CBA length material other than the 
abbreviated desriptions like that shown above. 
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unit-length iteration, their iterations contain gaps, overlaps, or different length units (see below)" 
(Battista, in press). 
 
gaps  
overlaps  
different length units  
 
The issue of determining how teachers can use learning progressions in 
their teaching and formative assessment, and how learning progressions should 
be described to facilitate this use, is central to supporting mathematics teaching 
that develops deep conceptual knowledge and problem-solving proficiency in 
students. 
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Appendix 1:  The van Hiele Levels 
 
 Below I describe the van Hiele levels in a way that is consistent with 
Clements' and Battista's (1992) analysis and synthesis of research on the levels.  
My recent elaborations and extensions of the levels are described in Battista 
(2007, 2009). 
Level 0  Pre–recognition 
 At the pre-recognition level16, children perceive geometric shapes, but 
perhaps because of a deficiency in perceptual activity, may attend to only a 
subset of a shape's visual characteristics.  They are unable to identify many 
common shapes.  They may distinguish between figures that are curvilinear and 
those that are rectilinear but not among figures in the same class.  That is, they 
may differentiate between a square and a circle, but not between a square and a 
triangle.  
Level 1  Visual 
Students identify and operate on geometric shapes according to their 
appearance.  They recognize figures as visual gestalts.  In identifying figures, 
they often use visual prototypes, saying that a given figure is a rectangle, for 
instance, because "it looks like a door."  They do not, however, attend to 
geometric properties or traits that are characteristic of the class of figures 
represented.  That is, although figures are determined by their properties, 
students at this level are not conscious of the properties.  For example, they 
might distinguish one figure from another without being able to name a single 
property of either figure, or they might judge that two figures are congruent 
because they look the same; "There is no why, one just sees it" (van Hiele, 1986, p. 
83).  By the statement "This figure is a rhombus," the student means "This figure 
has the shape I have learned to call 'rhombus'"  (van Hiele, 1986, p. 109).   
Level 2  Descriptive/analytic 
Students recognize and can characterize shapes by their properties.  For 
instance, a student might think of a rhombus as a figure that has four equal sides; 
so the term "rhombus" refers to a collection of “properties that he has learned to 
call 'rhombus'" (van Hiele, 1986, p. 109).  Students see figures as wholes, but now 
as collections of properties rather than as visual gestalts; the image begins to fall 
into the background.  The objects about which students reason are classes of 
figures, thought about in terms of the sets of properties that the students 
associate with those figures.  Students experientially discover that some 
combinations of properties signal a class of figures and some do not.  Students at 
this level do not see relationships between classes of figures (e.g., a student might 
contend that figure is not a rectangle because it is a square).   
                                                 
16 Not described by van Hiele, but argued for by Clements and Battista (1992). 
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Level 3  Abstract/relational 
Students can form abstract definitions, distinguish between necessary and 
sufficient sets of conditions for a concept, and understand and sometimes even 
provide logical arguments in the geometric domain.  They can classify figures 
hierarchically (by ordering their properties) and give informal arguments to 
justify their classifications (e.g., a square is identified as a rhombus because it can 
be thought of as a "rhombus with some extra properties"). Thus, for instance, the 
"properties are ordered, and the person will know that the figure is a rhombus if 
it satisfies the definition of quadrangle with four equal sides" [van Hiele, 1986], 
p. 109).  
As students discover properties of various shapes, they feel a need to 
organize the properties.  One property can signal other properties, so definitions 
can be seen not merely as descriptions but as a way of logically organizing 
properties.  It becomes clear why, for example, a square is a rectangle.  The 
students still, however, do not grasp that logical deduction is the method for 
establishing geometric truths. 
Level 4  Formal deduction 
Students establish theorems within an axiomatic system.  They recognize 
the difference among undefined terms, definitions, axioms, and theorems.  They 
are capable of constructing original proofs.  That is, they can produce a sequence 
of statements that logically justifies a conclusion as a consequence of the "givens."  
Level 5  Rigor/metamathematical 
Students reason formally about mathematical systems. They can analyze 
and compare axiom sets.    
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Learning mathematics is a complex and multidimensional if not an inherently 
indeterminate process. A necessary goal of research on learning is to simplify 
this complexity without sacrificing the ability of research to inform teaching. This 
goal has been addressed in part by researchers focusing on how to represent 
research on learning for teachers and on how to support teachers to use and 
generate models of students’ learning (e.g., Franke, Carpenter, Levi, & Fennema, 
et al., 2001; Hammer & Schifter, 2001; Simon & Tzur, 2004; Steffe, 2004). Recently, 
the idea of learning trajectories has gained attention as a way to focus research on 
learning in service of instruction and assessment. It is influencing curriculum 
standards, assessment design, and funding priorities. In this paper – which grew 
out of my response to Michael Battista’s keynote address on learning trajectories 
at the last annual meeting of the North American chapter of Psychology in 
Mathematics Education (Battista, 2010) – I examine the idea of learning 
trajectories and speculate on its usefulness in mathematics education. 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Jennifer Knudsen of SRI International for invaluable feedback. 
2 empson@mail.utexas.edu  
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The National Research Council (2007) described learning progressions as 
“successively more sophisticated ways of thinking about a topic that can follow 
one another as children learn about and investigate a topic” (p. 214). The recently 
released Common Core Standards in Mathematics (CCSM) (2010), noted that the 
“development of these Standards began with research-based learning 
progressions detailing what is known today about how students’ mathematical 
knowledge, skill, and understanding develop over time” (p. 4). The idea of 
learning trajectories has a great deal of intuitive appeal and may offer a way to 
bring coherence to how we think about learning and the curriculum. As research 
on learning trajectories proliferates and is brought to bear on some of the most 
vexing problems in teaching and learning mathematics, however, it is worth 
considering what it foregrounds and what it may obscure. 
In this paper, I briefly describe the origins of learning trajectories in 
mathematics education and then consider three points for us to keep in mind as 
we study learning and apply our findings to serve the purposes of 
understanding and addressing the problems of practice.  
1) The idea that learning progresses is not especially new. What do we know 
about learning mathematics and how does it fit with the idea of a 
trajectory? 
2) Learning trajectories focus on specific domains of conceptual development 
and may be limited in characterizing other valued aspects of the 
mathematics curriculum. 
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3) Learning in school is function of teaching. Too tight a focus on learning 
trajectories may lead us to oversimplify or ignore critical drivers of 
learning associated with teaching. 
My goal in making these points is not to state the obvious but to foreground the 
question of what the idea of learning trajectories affords us education researchers 
and practitioners, and what it might obscure. 
Origins of Learning Trajectories 
The term learning trajectory appears to have been first used in mathematics 
education in Marty Simon’s oft-cited 1995 paper, “Reconstructing Mathematics 
Pedagogy from a Constructivist Perspective.” As I reread this paper, the most 
important things I noticed – besides the fact that that the actual words “learning 
trajectory” did not appear until 21 pages into the article – were that a) a learning 
trajectory did not exist for Simon in the absence of an agent and a purpose and b) 
it was introduced in the context of a theory of teaching. According to Simon, a 
hypothetical learning trajectory is a teaching construct – something a teacher 
conjectures as a way to make sense of where students are and where the teacher 
might take them. It is hypothetical because an “actual learning trajectory is not 
knowable in advance” (p. 135). Teachers are agents who hypothesize learning 
trajectories for the purposes of planning tasks that connect students’ current 
thinking activity with possible future thinking activity. A teacher might ask, 
“What does this student understand? What could this student learn next and 
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how could they learn it?” and create a hypothetical learning trajectory as a way 
to prospectively grapple with these questions.  
The idea of learning progressions appears to have emerged first in the context 
of science education and is now virtually synonymous with learning trajectory. 
In a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics, and Technology 
Education devoted to the topic of “long-term studies” of learning in science 
education, Shapiro (2004) traced the notion of learning progression in part to 
Rosalind Driver in her 1989 article, "Students' Conceptions and the Learning of 
Science." In it, Driver drew attention to the increasing number of studies of the 
development of children’s thinking in specific science domains that documented 
patterns in what she called conceptual progressions and sequences of conceptual 
progressions, which she termed conceptual trajectories  (Shapiro, 2004, p. 3). In 
contrast to Simon, the focus in that special issue of CJSMT was on describing 
children’s learning as it had actually occurred under a given set of conditions, 
rather than on a thought experiment about how it could occur. Neither of these 
senses of learning trajectory – as a teacher-conjectured possible progression or a 
researcher-documented progression of actual learners– predominates in current 
conceptions of the notion.  
Since 2004, there has been a groundswell of research that explicitly identifies 
itself as concerned with learning trajectories or progressions, as reflected in 
conferences and special journal issues (Clements & Sarama, 2004; Duncan & 
Hmelo-Silver, 2009), reports (Catley, Lehrer, & Reiser, 2005; Cocoran, Mosher, & 
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Rogat, 2009; Daro, Mosher, & Cocoran, 2011), and books (Clements & Sarama, 
2009). A report by the Center for Continuous Improvement in Instruction (Daro, 
et al., 2011) treats learning trajectories as interchangeable with learning 
progressions, reflecting the general trend. 
Because the metaphor of trajectory implies a sequenced path, researchers who 
focus explicitly on learning trajectories have taken pains to draw attention to 
their multidimensional character. For example, Clements and Sarama (2004) 
defined learning trajectories as complex constructions that include “the 
simultaneous consideration of mathematics goals, models of children’s thinking, 
teachers’ and researchers’ models of children’s thinking, sequences of 
instructional tasks, and the interaction of these at a detailed level of analysis of 
processes” (p. 87). Confrey and colleagues (2009) defined them as “researcher-
conjectured, empirically-supported description[s] of the ordered network of 
experiences a student encounters through instruction … in order to move from 
informal ideas … towards increasingly complex concepts over time” (p. 2).  
Three Points to Keep in Mind 
Learning Trajectories are Not Really New – So What does the Metaphor Buy Us? 
The idea that students’ learning progresses in some way as a result of 
instruction is at the very heart of the enterprise of mathematics education. 
Researchers have been studying students’ mathematics thinking and what it 
could mean for that thinking to progress in identifiable ways since long before 
the term learning trajectories was introduced. Chains of inquiry focused on 
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children’s mathematics learning – we could call these research trajectories – have 
stretched over decades. For example, Glenadine Gibbs’s (1956) study of students’ 
thinking about subtraction word problems helped to pave the way for later 
researchers such as Carpenter and Moser (1984) to create frameworks portraying 
the development of children’s thinking about addition and subtraction, and for 
Carpenter, Fennema, and Peterson to study how teachers used this information 
about children’s thinking to teach for understanding (Carpenter, et al., 1989; 
Carpenter, et al., 1999). Les Steffe and John Olive’s recent (2010) book on 
Children’s Fractional Knowledge detailing the evolution of children’s conceptual 
schemes for operating on fractions synthesized two decades’ worth of prior 
research, as did Karen Fuson’s findings on the development children’s multidigit 
operations (1992). None this work mentioned learning trajectories as such, but 
each focused on elucidating the development of children’s understanding and 
identifying major conceptual advances.  
Why then talk about learning trajectories now? The metaphor emphasizes the 
orderly development of children’s thinking and draws our attention to learning 
targets and possible milestones along the way.  
To what extent is this kind of assumption about learning warranted? That is, 
in what sense does children’s mathematics learning follow predictable 
trajectories? Some domains appear to readily lend themselves to analysis in 
terms of a pathway, such as the development of young children’s counting skills 
(Gelman & Gallistel, 1986). The progression of children’s strategies for addition 
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and subtraction story problems from direct modeling, to counting, to the use of 
derived and recalled facts also has been well established (Carpenter et al., 1999; 
Carpenter, 1985; Fuson, 1992). Yet even given such a robust progression in a 
basic content domain, how and when – and sometimes whether – children come 
to understand and use these strategies depends on a variety of factors differing 
from classroom to classroom and from child to child. Trying to represent 
research on learning in terms of trajectories quickly gets complicated, even for as 
fundamental a concept as rational number (e.g., Figure 2 “Learning Trajectories 
Map for Rational Number Reasoning,” in Confrey, Maloney, Nguyen, et al., 
2009) or measurement (Figure 1).  
  
Figure 1. Battista’s (2010) representation of one student’s actual learning path in 
measurement 
 
Other research suggests that the development of much of children’s thinking 
is more piece-meal and context-dependent than representations of learning 
trajectories might lead us believe (DiSessa, 2000; Greeno & MMAP, 1998). For 
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example, in a cross-sectional, cross-cultural study, Liu and Tang (2004) found 
differences in progressions of students’ conceptions of energy in Canada and 
China over several years of schooling, which they attributed to differences in 
curriculum and instruction in each country. The topic of rational numbers in 
mathematics has an ample research base that illustrates, in some cases 
meticulously, how children’s thinking about fractions could progress (Behr, 
Harel, Post, & Lesh, 1992; Davydov & Tsvetkovich, 1991; Empson & Levi, 2011; 
Hackenberg, 2010; Steffe & Olive, 2010; Streefland, 1991; Tzur, 1999). Taken 
collectively this research does not appear to converge on a single trajectory of 
learning.  
Why might this be? In practice, learning cannot be separated from tasks and 
the instructional context; the “selection of learning tasks and the hypotheses 
about the process of student learning are interdependent” (Simon & Tzur, 2004, 
p. 93). What children learn is sensitive to the context in which they learn it – a 
context that is constituted by many factors, including most immediately the 
types of instructional tasks and how teachers organize students’ engagement 
with these tasks.  
For example, in classrooms where part-whole tasks (Fig. 2a) dominate 
instruction on fractions, children learn to think about fractions in terms of 
counting parts rather than as magnitudes (Thompson & Saldanha, 2003). 
Students are likely to think about 5/8 as “5 out of 8” and of 8/5 as an impossible 
fraction. In classrooms where teachers have students solve and discuss equal 
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sharing tasks (Fig. 2b), children learn to think about fractions in terms of 
relationships between quantities and later in terms of a multiplicative 
relationship between numerator and denominator (Empson, Junk, Dominguez, & 
Turner, 2005; Empson & Levi, 2011). They are more likely to think of 5/8, for 
example, as 5 groups each of size 1/8, instead of “5 out of 8.” In classrooms 
where teachers engage students in reasoning about multiplicative comparisons 
of measures (Fig. 2c), students learn to think about fractions as a ratio of 
measures (Brousseau, Brousseau, & Warfield, 2004; Davydov &Tsvetkovich, 
1991; Steffe & Olive, 2010). Children learn to interpret 5/8 as a multiplicative 
comparison between 5 and 8. Both of these latter types of tasks – equal sharing 
and measuring – coupled with norms for engaging in tasks that put a premium 
on intellectual effort and agency (Hiebert & Grouws, 2007) – appear to constitute 
productive approaches to learning fractions. 
 
How much pizza is left on the plate? 
 
 
(a) 
 
8 children want to share 10 candy bars so that each one gets 
the same amount. How many candy bars can each child 
have? 
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(b) 
 
How long is B compared to A? A compared to B? 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 2. Examples of types of tasks to teach fractions: a) part-whole, b) equal 
sharing (with sample solution), and c) measurement 
 
Within the context of documenting regularities and patterns in the 
development of children’s thinking, however, it’s important to recognize 
individual children’s ways of reasoning and the significant contributions this 
reasoning could make to a group’s learning. To return to my research on equal 
sharing, for example, we found that students frequently produced strategies for 
solving problems that were, from the perspective of a trajectory, “out of 
sequence” and presented rich learning opportunities for other students (e.g., 
Turner et al., in press). There was a progression in what students learned but 
“deviations” were consistent and numerous, and, I am suggesting, fruitful – not 
anomalies to be ignored but significant occurrences that teachers could use to 
advance everyone’s learning.  
Consider first a simple progression of strategies for equal sharing (Empson & 
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Levi, 2011). To figure out how much one person got if 8 people were sharing 6 
burritos equally, a child using a basic strategy might draw all 6 burritos, decide 
to split each burrito into 8 pieces, and give each person 1 piece from each burrito 
for a total of 6 pieces. A more sophisticated strategy would involve imagining 
that each burrito could be split into 8 pieces and mentally combining those pieces 
to conclude that one person’s share consisted of 6 groups of 1/8 burrito or 6/8 
burrito. Ultimately, children come to the understanding that the problem can be 
represented by 6÷8, which is the same as 6/8.  
Within this simplified progression, there are several other ways to solve the 
problem that do not fall into a sequence and do not appear as an inevitable 
consequence of development. These other strategies were a function of specific 
quantities in a problem as well as what tools children were using and children’s 
prior knowledge. For example, a fifth grader solved the problem by reducing it 
to an equivalent ratio involving 1 1/2 burritos and 2 children, which she easily 
solved by finding half of 1 and half of 1/2 and combining the amounts (Fig. 3). 
Another fifth grader used a similar strategy, but used cubes to represent each 
quantity (8 total cubes for sharers, 6 total cubes for burritos), specifically 
highlighting the ratio character of the strategy. These strategies were 
appropriated by several children who saw them as more efficient and they 
provided an opportunity for the teachers to address concepts of fraction and 
ratio equivalence. 
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Figure 3. A solution for 6÷8 involving the equivalent ratios 3 for 4 and 1 1/2 for 2 
 
As students’ understanding develops and diversifies, they become more 
likely to see and make connections between their ways of thinking and different 
ways of thinking expressed by their fellow students. Making these connections 
enriches learners’ understanding and cultivates their ability to recognize and 
pursue new avenues of reasoning independently of the teacher’s direction and to 
monitor their thinking. The balance in instruction between supporting students’ 
agentic initiative and aiming to instill specific conceptions can be difficult to 
manage. Indeed, some researchers have cautioned that representing learning as 
progressive sequences of content understanding could lead teachers to direct 
students through the sequences at the expense of allowing students to “express, 
test, and revise their own ways of thinking” (Lesh & Yoon, 2004, p. 206; Sikorski 
& Hammer, 2010). At the same time, other research suggests that, at the right 
level of abstraction, representations of the progressive development of students’ 
understanding can enhance teachers’ ability to respond to students’ thinking in 
ways that open up or are generative of new possibilities (e.g., Franke et al. 2001). 
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In either case, it’s important to recognize that research on learning in specific 
mathematics domains has a long history that, while concerned with progress, 
may not fit easily into the idea of a single trajectory.  
Learning Trajectories Involve Specific Domains of Conceptual Development – So Their 
Reach May be Limited 
Researchers have made the study of mathematics learning more tractable 
by focusing in particular on conceptual development in specific content domains, 
represented by sets of well-defined, interrelated tasks. Steffe and Olive’s (2010) 
research on the development of fraction concepts and Clements and Sarama’s 
(2009) research on children’s understanding of measurement are examples of 
such an approach. This work, like a great deal of the research in mathematics 
education including my own, is informed by a Piagetian-like view of learning, if 
not in its emphasis on levels, then certainly in its emphasis on a conceptual 
trajectory, in which less sophisticated concepts give way to more sophisticated 
concepts. Because this work is based on children’s thinking about specific types 
of tasks, its power lies in its capacity to inform teachers’ use and interpretation of 
these tasks to foster students’ conceptual development in a coherent unit of 
study (e.g., Fennema et al, 1996; Simon & Tzur, 2004).  
However powerful, these kinds of portrayals of learning necessarily 
represent only one dimension or a small set of what we value as a field about 
mathematics and wish for students to learn. Learning is a multidimensional 
process, comprised of a variety of intertwined cognitive and social processes. In 
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particular, since the publication of Everyone Counts (National Research Council, 
1989) and the Curriculum and Evaluation Standards (National Council of Teachers 
of Mathematics, 1988), mathematics educators have increasingly focused on 
teaching students to engage in practices such as posing and solving problems 
(Hiebert et al., 1996), constructing models (Lesh & Doerr, 2003), and making 
convincing arguments (Lehrer & Schauble, 2007) – that is, to do mathematics. 
Doing mathematics involves a complex and integrated set of content 
understanding and disciplinary practices (Bass, 2011; Kilpatrick, Swafford, & 
Findell, 2001) as well as the ability to monitor the interplay between these things 
(Schoenfeld, 1992).  
The ability to engage in mathematical practices such as the ones above is 
as critical as content knowledge to a well-developed capacity to think 
mathematically, but it is less amenable to analysis in terms of sequences of 
development. For example, students engaged in mathematical modeling or 
problem solving may draw on multiple content domains and work 
collaboratively on tasks that have many possible resolutions such that the 
solutions they produce appear to follow no predictable trajectory over time. 
Examples of such tasks include creating simulations of disease spread (Stroup, 
Ares, & Hurford, 2005), optimizing the occupancy of a hotel during tourist 
season (Aliprantis & Carmona, 2003), and designing a template to generate a 
quilt pattern (Lesh & Doerr, 2003). These kinds of tasks and thinking practices 
pose considerable challenge for researchers seeking to codify and systematically 
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represent learning in terms of a trajectory, because of the variety of 
understanding and practices that students bring to bear in the their solutions. 
Learning trajectories may be limited in what they can and cannot specify 
in terms of learning mathematics over time; and in particular, they may not be 
applicable to certain critical aspects of the mathematics curriculum. Catley, 
Lehrer, and Reiser (2005) recognized this potential limitation when they argued 
that “scientific concepts are never developed without participation in specialized 
forms of practice” and “concepts are contingent on these practices” (p. 4) – such 
as the ones listed in the Common Core Standards in Mathematics (2010). Among 
others, these practices include making sense of problems and persevering in 
solving them; using appropriate tools strategically; attending to precision; and 
looking for and making use of structure (CCSM, 2010, pp. 6-8). Most, if not all, 
current characterizations of learning trajectories do not address the practices that 
engender the development of concepts – although it’s worth thinking about 
alternative ways to characterize curriculum standards and learning trajectories 
that draw teachers’ attention to specific aspects of students’ mathematical 
practices as well as the content that might be the aim of that practice.  
What is a reasonable unit of students’ mathematical activity for teachers to 
notice? If a unit is too small or requires a great deal of inference (e.g., a mental 
operation), then teachers in their moment-to-moment decision-making may not 
be able to detect it and respond to it; likewise if a unit is too broad or stretches 
over too long a period of time (e.g., “critical thinking”), teachers may not 
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recognize it when they are seeing it. The most productive kinds of units of 
mathematical activity would allow teachers to see and respond to clearly defined 
instances of student’s thinking during instruction and to gather information 
about students’ progress relative to instructional goals. For example, in research 
in elementary mathematics, strategies and types of reasoning are productive units 
because we know that teachers can learn to differentiate students’ strategies and 
use what they learn about students’ thinking to successfully guide instruction 
(e.g., Fennema, et al., 1996). Catley and colleagues (2005) proposed “learning 
performances” as a way to represent the “cognitive processes and associated 
practices linked to particular standards” (p. 5). Formative assessments that 
include a variety of points of access and possible solutions and that require 
students to engage in various mathematics practices could also yield rich 
information about students’ understanding of and engagement in mathematics 
(cf., Aliprantis & Carmona, 2003; Lesh & Doerr, 2003). The important thing is to 
take into account the interplay of practices and content in students’ learning over 
time.  
Teaching is Integral to Learning and Learning Trajectories 
Learning school mathematics depends on teaching. To support learning, 
teachers need be able to “understand, plan, and react instructionally, on a 
moment-to-moment basis, to students' developing reasoning” and coordinate 
these interactions with learning goals (Battista, 2010). Similarly, Daro and 
colleagues (2011) concluded that:  
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Teachers are going to have to find ways to attend more closely and regularly 
to each of their students during instruction to determine where they are in 
their progress toward meeting the standards, and the kinds of problems they 
might be having along the way. Then teachers must use that information to 
decide what to do to help each student continue to progress, to provide 
students with feedback, and help them overcome their particular problems to 
get back on a path to success. (Daro et al., 2011, p. 15)  
 
We know very little about how teachers do these things, in contrast to what 
we know about children’s learning, whether it falls under the rubric of learning 
trajectory research or not. As teachers interact with students and decide how to 
proceed, there are many types of decisions to be made – how to gather 
information about children’s thinking, how to respond to it appropriately in the 
moment, how to design tasks that extend it, and even what to pay attention to. 
With the right tools, teachers have access to the most up-to-date information 
about each student, what they understand and are able to do, their disposition, 
their history, and so on, and can make decisions based on their own informed 
understanding of these things and their relationships. Good tools, such as 
formative assessment frameworks in particular, enhance this knowledge and 
support teachers to engage in the active, contingent process of creating 
instructional trajectories informed by knowledge of actual children’s learning. 
Further, learning mathematics in school takes work and depends 
fundamentally on interpersonal relationships of trust and respect, which cannot 
be designed into a tool or a list of learning goals. Teaching is a relational act and 
the relationship between the teacher and the student is at the center of students’ 
learning in school (Gergen, 2009; Grossman & McDonald, 2008). These 
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relationships can have a profound effect on what students learn and how they 
come to see themselves.  
In the face of what can seem like a tidal wave of top-down mandates, I 
suggest that we mathematics educators keep sight of the fact that teaching is 
driven essentially by interpersonal relationships and happens from the bottom 
up, beginning with the teacher and the student relating to each other and the 
content. We need to be sure that teachers are equipped with knowledge of the 
domain and its learning milestones without forgetting that both teachers and 
students are active agents in learning.  
Closing Thoughts 
 “Clearly … the trajectories followed by those who learn will be extremely 
diverse and may not be predictable” (Lave & Wenger, 1991) 
In choosing to focus on learning trajectories, we embrace a metaphor that, for 
all its appeal, implies that learning unfolds following a predictable, sequenced 
path. Everyone knows it is not that simple; researchers and educators alike 
acknowledge the complexity of learning. As Simon (1995) emphasized, learning 
trajectories are essentially provisional. We can think of them as the provisional 
creation of teachers who are deliberating about how to support students’ 
learning and we can think of them as the provisional creation of researchers 
attempting to understand students’ learning and to represent it in a way that is 
useful for teachers, curriculum designers, and test makers.  
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I firmly believe that a critical part of our mission as researchers is to produce 
something that is of use to the field and serves as a resource for teachers and 
curriculum designers to optimize student learning. No doubt this includes 
creating, testing, and refining empirically based representations of students’ 
learning for teachers to use in professional decision-making and, further, 
investigating ways to support teachers’ decision-making without stripping 
teachers of the agency needed to hypothesize learning trajectories for individual 
children as they teach. This focus would add a layer of complexity to our 
research on learning and invite us to think seriously about how to support 
teachers to incorporate knowledge of children’s learning into their purposeful 
decision-making about instruction. Further, I suggest we consider, in the end, 
“Whose responsibility is it to construct learning trajectories?” (Steffe, 2004, p. 
130). If we researchers can figure out how to supply teachers with knowledge 
frameworks and formative assessment tools to facilitate their work, teachers will 
be able to exercise this responsibility with increasing skill, professionalism, and 
effectiveness.  
Because of the growing popularity of learning trajectories in education circles, 
it is worth thinking hard about the role of learning trajectory representations in 
teaching, and in particular, whether a learning trajectory can exist meaningfully 
apart from the relationship between a teacher and a student at a specific time and 
place. Simon’s (1995) perspective on teaching and learning suggests not. As the 
field moves forward with research on learning trajectories and strive for 
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coherence in learning across the grades, I would like to remain mindful of both 
the affordances and constraints this particular type of representation offers for 
teachers and students alike. 
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and adaptation to mathematics education of the cognitive psychology dual-processing 
theory (DPT) in terms of (a) the problem significance and (b) features of the theory he 
adapts. Then, I discuss DPT in light of a constructivist stance on the inseparability 
between thinking and learning. In particular, I propose a brain-based account of 
conceptual learning—the Reflection on Activity-Effect Relationship (Ref*AER) 
framework—as a plausible alternative to DPT. I discuss advantages of the Ref*AER 
framework over DPT for mathematics education. 
Key Words: constructivism, reflection, anticipation, activity-effect, dual 
processing, heuristic-and-bias, intuitive, analytic, brain. 
 
 
This theoretical paper extends an article (Tzur, 2010b) in which I discussed Uri 
Leron’s (2010) plenary address during the last annual meeting of PME-NA. Being 
invited to discuss his paper re-acquainted me with the inspiring empirical and 
theoretical work that he and his colleagues were conducting in the last two 
decades (Leron & Hazzan, 2006, 2009). It also provided me with an important 
window into literature outside mathematics education (e.g., cognitive 
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psychology), which I consider as both thought provoking and relevant to our 
field. Last but not least, after reading his paper(s) I realized how naturally his 
approach linked with recent efforts in which I have been participating—to relate 
mathematics education research with cognitive neuroscience (brain studies). I 
concur with Leron’s belief that bridging between intuition and analytical 
thinking can contribute to optimizing student mathematical understandings and 
am delighted to provide my reflections on this endeavor. 
In itself, the main thesis that human thinking and judgment (or 
rationality) consist of two qualitatively distinct modes is not new to mathematics 
education. Skemp’s (1979) seminal work has already articulated and linked both 
modes, which he termed intuitive and reflective intelligences. To the best of my 
knowledge, Skemp’s constructivist theory evolved independently of the 
commencement of the ‘heuristic and bias’ approach (Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1983). 
Moreover, I believe that, in mathematics education, this distinction can be traced 
back to Dewey’s (1933) notion of reflective thought (contrasted with unconscious 
mental processes), and to Vygotsky’s (1986) notion of ZPD  and his related 
distinction between spontaneous and scientific concepts.  
However, two novelties in Leron’s contribution seemed very useful for 
mathematics education. First, his review of cognitive psychology literature 
pointed out to empirical studies in which a dual view of thinking processes has 
been robustly elaborated on (Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
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Stanovich, 2008) and ‘mapped’ onto corresponding, differentiated brain regions 
(Lieberman, 2003, 2008). Thus, a similarly important and timely direction, of 
linking mathematics education with brain studies (Medina, 2008), is supported 
by relevant findings from cognitive psychology (see Section 2). Second, he 
reported on studies (Leron & Hazzan, 2006, 2009) informed by DPT that 
demonstrated its applicability to our field, including articulation of instructional 
goals and design criteria. Next, I further discuss both contributions. 
1. SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS! USEFUL THEORY? 
1.1 Significance of DPT 
Like many teachers of mathematics and mathematics educators, Leron 
and his colleagues noticed a phenomenon that seemed to equally puzzle 
researchers in other fields. Quite often, researchers observing people’s solutions 
to various problems framed them as recurring faulty judgments (reasoning 
processes and conclusions). Examples of such solutions abound in the 
aforementioned papers; I will present three of my own below. Interestingly, 
studies of such examples in the ‘80s and ‘90s fueled a debate about human 
rationality that quite tightly conjoined epistemology and psychology (Goldman, 
1994; Kim, 1994; Nisbett & Ross, 1994; Quine, 1994). For example, alluding to 
computational complexity, Cherniak (1994) considered ‘ideal’  (normative) 
rationality as intractable. Instead, using the example of mathematicians working 
on unfeasibly long proofs he proposed ‘minimal’ rationality, owing much of its 
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functionality to ‘quick-and-dirty’ heuristics that evade practical (mental) 
paralysis.  
As I see it, addressing this puzzling phenomenon and significant problem 
by mathematics educators is more pressing and weighty than by cognitive 
psychologists and/or economists. As challenging as it might be to solidly explain 
why/how the human mind produces erroneous judgments, in those other fields 
it may suffice. The works of Leron (Leron, 2010; Leron & Hazzan, 2006, 2009) and 
others (Katz & Katz, 2010; Viholainen, 2008) indicate, however, that in our field 
such an explanation is but a start. In this sense, Leron made two key 
contributions: (a) clarifying a goal for student and teacher learning—closing the 
rather prevalent gap between intuitive and analytic reasoning, and (b) explicating 
mathematics educators’ duty to figure out ways of thinking about, designing, and 
implementing teaching that can foster student development of and disposition 
toward analytic reasoning. To these ends, Leron identified four vital questions 
for mathematics educators: 
i) What differentiates among those who solve problems correctly and 
incorrectly, that is, why do the latter fail to use analytic reasoning 
whereas the former do so? 
ii) Using the above as a basis—how can we explain observations about 
the ‘cueing impact’ of changes in a problem format or context have on 
correctly solving a problem, and what does this entail for instructional 
design? 
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iii) When using puzzling problem situations in our teaching (e.g., earth 
circumference), what strategies can be used to effectively capitalize on 
students’ “Aha” moments that follow those puzzlements? 
iv) How may we design instruction to promote (a) students’ (and 
teachers’) awareness of the potential use of improper intuitive reasoning 
and (b) disposition toward constant activation of analytic reasoning to 
override the faulty intuitions (i.e., resist and critique the intuitive)? 
1.2 Dual Processing Theory (DPT): Is It Useful for Mathematics Education? 
To articulate what purposes DPT can serve in mathematics education, I 
first briefly present its key features by alluding to one of Leron’s examples and 
three of mine (to keep it short, language does not precisely replicate the original 
problems).  
A. Adults with college education were asked: Two items cost $1.10; the 
difference in price is $1. How much does each item cost? (Over 50% 
submit to impulse and respond: $1 & $0.10) 
B. In the elevator, the 7th floor button is already lit. A person who also 
wanted that floor gets on the elevator and, though seeing the lit button, 
pressed it again. 
C. Grade 3 students were asked to reason which side will a next (fair) coin 
flip show, ‘Head or Tail’, after it showed 4 ‘Heads’ in a row. Roughly 
50% said ‘Head’, because it’s always been the case; the rest said ‘Tail’, 
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because it could not always be ‘Head’. Virtually no one reasoned 50-50, 
and that previous flips were irrelevant. 
D. As a Sudoku enthusiast, I made two careless errors while solving a 
‘black-belt’ puzzle (see Figure 1). In the puzzle on the left (1a), I 
considered and almost wrote ‘4’ in the bottom-middle square while 
transposing the digits to a different cell and ignoring the vertical 
‘conflict’. Two minutes later, while solving the puzzle on the right (1b), 
I actually committed a similar error (considering only vertical ‘9’ and 
writing the small ‘9’ digits where the top one conflicts with a 
horizontal, given ‘9’). 
 
Figure 1a. Processing error not committed; 
almost placing ‘4’ in mid-lower left cell 
(transpose row, ignore vertical) 
 
Figure 1b. Same error repeated & 
committed; ‘9’ in left-lower cell 
(checked for vertical only)  
The key insight about human thinking, which led to different variants of 
DPT, is that responses to vastly diverse problems, faulty or correct, may all share 
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a common root. As implied by its name, the basic tenet of DPT is that two 
different modes of brain processing are at work (Evans, 2003, 2006; Stanovich, 
2008; Stanovich & West, 2000). The first mode, ‘intuitive reasoning’ (or 
‘heuristic’), is considered evolutionary more ancient and shared with animals. It 
is characterized by automatic (reflexive, sub-conscious), rapid, and parallel in 
nature processing, with only its final product available to consciousness. The 
second mode, ‘analytic reasoning’, is evolutionary recent and considered unique 
to humans. It is intentional (reflective, conscious), relatively slow, and sequential 
in nature. The principal roles attributed by DPT to the second mode are 
monitoring, critiquing, and correcting judgments produced by the first mode. 
Said differently, the second mode of processing suppresses/inhibits default 
responses; it serves as a failure-prevention-and-correction mental device. As 
Leron (2010) pointed out, some cognitive psychologists refer to the intuitive 
mode as System-1 (S1) and to the analytic mode as System-2 (S2). They further 
emphasize that, quite often, both systems work in tandem, which basically 
means that S1 produced a proper judgment that S2 did not need to correct. 
A second tenet of DPT is that, in essence, faulty responses given by 
problem solvers reflect failure of their analytic processes to prevent-and-correct 
output from their intuitive processes. A key, corresponding assumption that 
seems to be taken-as-shared by most proponents of DPT and to underlie the 
notion of ‘rational judgment/actions’, is that at any given problem situation a 
person intends to accomplish a correct solution that serves her or his own 
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purposes (e.g., economic benefit, academic success, etc.). In the four examples 
above, a person would like to properly solve the problems but, as DPT explains, 
the fast-reacting insuppressible S1 tends to “hijack” the subject’s attention and 
thus yields a non-normative answer (Leron, 2010). Thus, in Example A, S1 ‘falls 
prey’ to the cost of one item ($1) being equal to the difference. In Example B, S1 
brings forth and directs execution of the planned action (get on elevator, identify-
and-press 7th floor button) before S2 could re-evaluate necessity in the 
circumstances. In Example D (Figure 1b), S1 directed my actions to place the 
digits with only partial checking before S2 detected that partiality. This occurred 
soon after I actually thought of placing the ‘4’ where it is shown in Figure 1a, but 
then consciously (S2 override) avoided this error. Example C (predicting results 
of a coin flip) was selected to highlight a few hurdles with DPT, particularly the 
impact of problem solvers’ cognitive abilities on their solutions (Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Clearly, what to an observer would appear as non-normative 
responses (e.g., it’s most likely to be ‘Head’) was the proper response within the 
children’s cognitive system—a case of S1 and S2 working in tandem for the 
reasoner, though erroneously for an observer. 
Before turning to hindrances I find in DPT, a few more comments seem 
noteworthy. Evans (2006) highlighted a key distinction to keep in mind—
between dual processes and dual systems. This is important for mathematics 
education particularly because, as he asserted, dual system theories are too 
broad. Thus, he asserted the need to elaborate specific dual-reasoning accounts at 
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an intermediate level that explains solutions to particular tasks. To me, his goal 
(particular task) seems primary whereas the means (dual accounts, or singular, 
or triple) seems secondary.  
This leads to my second comment—the need to pay particular attention to 
solution processes—and kinds of problem situations—in which 
analytic/reflective processes successfully monitor and correct S1’s ‘run’ before 
reaching and submitting to the latter’s judgment. For example, when I first read 
Example A in Leron’s paper, I immediately identified the task as ‘inviting’ the 
faulty conclusion. I also immediately noticed my conscious, pro-active ‘flagging’ 
of this tendency and, consequently, selected an analytic process instead. This 
mental adjustment happened before I even calculated the faulty difference (90 
cents), precisely the desired state of affairs indicated in question #iv above. My 
case indicates the need for precisely analyzing the way intuitive and analytic 
processes interact. Initial forms of DPT assumed sequential operation, where 
outcomes of intuitive processes (or S1) serve as input for analytic processes only 
when/if S2 identified S1’s output as a faulty response. Recently, the possibility 
for parallel processing of both modes was postulated, including the idea that 
they often compete for the immediate or final judgment in a given problem 
situation (Evans, 2006). To further theorize such interaction, Evans suggested 3 
principles: (a) singularity—epistemic mental models are generated and judged 
one-at-a-time, (b) relevance—intuitive (heuristic) processes contextualize 
problems to maximize relevance to the person’s current goals, and (c) 
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satisficing—analytic processes tend to accept intuitive judgments unless there is a 
good reason to reject and override them. While essential, it seems that these 
principles fall short of accounting for how I solved Example A.  
My last comment refers to factors that were found to make a difference in 
ways groups of people, or even an individual, solve particular problems. 
Stanovich and colleagues (2008; Stanovich & West, 2000) provided a good review 
of those. Here, I refer to a critical factor for mathematics education that was 
highlighted in Leron’s (2010) address, namely, the impact of problem format 
(‘packaging’) on suppression of intuitive judgments. A substantial portion of 
Leron’s work, which I see as a major contribution to our field, focused on the 
design of bridging tasks that are more likely to trigger what he considered 
solvers’ available analytic processes. These tasks, in turn, enabled student 
solutions of the mathematically congruent tasks that were difficult to unpack 
without such bridging. This indirect allusion to assimilatory conceptions of those 
for whom bridging is required points to a hindrance. 
From a constructivist perspective, a major theoretical and practical 
hindrance I find in DPT is the unproblematic application of an observer’s frame 
of reference—considered as ‘normative’—to the evaluation of people’s 
responses—considered as ‘rational’ (or not, or partial). In essence, if the ‘same’ 
task is solved differently by people of different cognitive abilities (the observing 
researchers included), and if many who failed on a structurally identical task can 
solve a bridging task (and later also the failed one), then what a problem solver 
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brings to the task must be explicitly distinguished from the observer’s cognitive 
toolbox. Simply put, the presence of two cognitive frames of reference is glossed 
over by DPT’s equating of normative with rational (for more about this, see 
Nisbett & Ross, 1994).  
Theoretically, and crucial for mathematics education, what this lack of 
distinction fails to acknowledge is both the different interpretation(s) of a task 
and different mental activities available to the observed person for solving it. 
That is, it fails to acknowledge the core construct of assimilation (Piaget, 1980, 
1985; von Glasersfeld, 1995). Recent research in cognitive psychology did point 
out to possible differences between observer and observed interpretations 
(Stanovich & West, 2000), but the key theoretical implication of those findings—
simultaneously addressing two frames of reference—did not seem to follow. In 
my view, distinguishing the observer (Roth & Bautista, 2011; Steffe, 1995; von 
Glasersfeld, 1991) and using assimilation as a starting point is necessary in our 
field in order to move beyond cognitive psychology’s focus on thinking and 
reasoning into accounts of learning as a conceptual advance that can be 
observed, and fostered, in other people’s minds. And, as Skemp (1979) so 
eloquently asserted, for a mathematics education theory of teaching to be 
useful—at its core one must articulate learning as a process of cognitive change 
in what the learner already knows.  
Practically, overlooking learners’ available conceptions when analyzing 
their solutions, correct or faulty, precludes the powerful design of bridging tasks 
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demonstrated in Leron’s (2010) paper. Indirectly, both the specific features of 
those tasks (e.g., the need to cue for a nested sub-set, or steps to ‘see’ the 
invariant length of string-around-earth when different shapes increase) and the 
rationale and criteria he provided for introducing those features (e.g., make the 
problem accessible to the solver’s intuition), draw on conjectured inferences about 
how a person may interpret and solve the alternative tasks. That is, such tasks 
require inferences into students’ existing (assimilatory) conceptions. This leads to 
the discussion of DPT’s core hindrance.  
2. A CONSTRUCTIVIST LENS ON DPT: ‘BRAINY’ MATHEMATICS 
EDUCATION 
2.1 Taking Issue with DPT 
As a constructivist, I adhere to the core premise common to Piaget’s (1970, 
1971, 1985), Dewey’s (Dewey, 1902; 1949), and Vygotsky’s (1978, 1986) grand 
theories, that knowing (thinking, reasoning) cannot be understood apart from the 
‘historical process’ in which one’s knowing evolved. This premise entails my 
twofold thesis about hurdles in adopting and adapting DPT to mathematics 
education. First, a sole focus on normative and faulty modes of 
thinking/reasoning in mathematics or other domains (aka cognitive psychology), 
falls short of the theoretical accounts needed to intentionally foster optimal 
student (and teacher) understandings. Second, although DPT can inform our 
work, mathematics education already has frameworks that interweave 
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articulated accounts of knowing, coming to know (learning), and teaching 
(Dreyfus, 2002; Dubinsky & Lewin, 1986; Hershkowitz, Schwarz, & Dreyfus, 
2001; Pirie & Kieren, 1992, 1994; Sfard, 1991, 2000; Steffe, 1990, 2010; Tall & 
Vinner, 1981; Thompson, 2002, 2010; Thompson, Carlson, & Silverman, 2007). As 
I shall discuss below, one framework that my colleagues and I have been 
developing—reflection on activity-effect relationship (Ref*AER)—seems to (a) 
singularly resolve issues of faulty/normative reasoning and of conceptual learning 
(with or without teaching) and (b) explain different modes of thinking without 
alluding to 2 systems (or distinct processes). Moreover, the Ref*AER framework 
is supported by and gives support to cognitive neuroscience models of the brain. 
Due to space limitations, the brief exposition below makes wide use of references 
to comprehensive versions. I begin by listing seven critical questions for 
mathematics education that Leron’s work and accounts of DPT raised, and a 
framework such as Ref*AER needs to address:  
1. Why does the mental system of some people make an error (e.g., selects 
$1 and 10 cents in the price example A) whereas other people focus also 
on the difference? Unless one considers solvers’ assimilatory 
conceptions, this question (and 2-4 below) cannot be resolved by DPT 
assumptions that S2 has no direct access to the perceived information or 
that S2 selects accessible instead of relevant information. 
2. When a person’s response is non-normative, is it a case of (a) having the 
required conceptions but failing to trigger them (e.g., Sudoku and 
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elevator examples), (b) having a rudimentary form of those conceptions 
that require explicit prompting (e.g., sub-set in Leron’s (2010) bridging 
task; renegotiating the difference aspect in the price problem and/or 
making the numbers more ‘difficult’), or (c) not having a conception for 
monitoring S1 (e.g., my next coin-flip example and the original medical 
base-rate example in Leron’s paper)? And how can we distinguish 
among these three cases? 
3. How does S2, which failed to monitor S1 in a specific task, become 
capable of doing so? Is the process of learning different for each of the 
three cases above? 
4. How do new monitoring capacities learned by S2 ‘migrate’ to S1 
(become automatic)? 
5. What is the source of learners’ surprise (e.g., string-around-earth 
example), how may it be linked to learning, and how might teaching 
capitalize on this? 
6. What role do specific examples play in learning (by S2 and/or S1)? 
7. Can we explain why particular bridging tasks promote some learning 
in some students but not others, and provide explicit ideas for changing 
them in the latter case? 
2.2 A Brain-Based Model of Knowing and Learning 
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In recent years, a few cross-disciplinary meetings among cognitive 
neuroscientists and mathematics educators took place. One of those (Vanderbilt, 
2006) focused on the design of tasks that (a) reveal difficult milestones in 
mathematics and (b) can be examined at the brain level (e.g., fMRI). Using the 
Ref*AER framework of knowing and learning (Simon & Tzur, 2004; Simon, Tzur, 
Heinz, & Kinzel, 2004; Tzur, 2007; Tzur & Simon, 2004; Tzur, Xin, Si, Woodward, 
& Jin, 2009), I presented fractional tasks to the group. This presentation, and the 
fertile dialogue with brain researchers that ensued, led to an elaborated, brain-
based Ref*AER account (Tzur, accepted for publication) that seems highly 
consistent with DPT studies of the brain (Lieberman, 2003, 2008).  
Briefly, Ref*AER depicts knowing (having a conception) as anticipating and 
justifying an invariant relationship between a single (goal-directed) activity-
sequence the mental system executes at any given moment (Evans’ Singularity 
principle; see also Medina, 2008), potentially or actually, and the effect it must 
bring forth. Learning is explained as transformation in such anticipation via two 
basic types of reflection. Reflection Type-I consists of ongoing, automatic 
comparison the mental system executes continually between the goal it sets for the 
activity-sequence and subsequent effects produced and noticed. As Piaget (1985) 
asserted, the internal global goal (anticipated effect) serves as a regulator of the 
execution for both interim effects and the final one (Evans’ Relevance principle) 
(see also Stich, 1994). The effects either match the anticipation or not (Evans’ 
Satisficing principle). By default, the mental system runs an activity-sequence to 
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its completion as determined by the goal (e.g., the elevator example). Yet, the 
execution may stop earlier if (a) the goal detects unanticipated sub-effects (e.g., 
Sudoku example in Figure 1a) or (b) a different goal became the regulator, 
including possibly a sub-goal within the activity-sequence overriding the global 
goal. Reflection Type-II consists of comparison across (mental) records of experiences, 
each containing a linked, re-presented bit of a ‘run’ of the activity and its effect 
(AER), sorted as match or no-match. Critically, Type-II reflection does not 
happen automatically—the brain may or may not execute it. The recurring, 
invariant AER across those experiences are linked with the situation(s) in which 
they were found anticipatory of the proper goal and registered as a new 
conception.  
Accordingly, Ref*AER postulates that the construction of a new conception 
proceeds through two stages. The first, participatory, necessitates reflection Type-I 
and is marked by an anticipation that a problem solver can access only when and if 
somehow prompted for the novel, provisional AER (Tzur & Lambert, in press, 
linked this stage with the Zone of Proximal Development—ZPD). The second, 
anticipatory stage necessitates reflection Type-II and is marked by independent, 
spontaneous bringing forth, running, and possibly justifying the novel 
anticipation. It should be noted that although developed independently, Ref*AER 
is consistent with Skemp’s (1979) theory; the reflection types and stage 
distinctions extend his work. 
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To link the Ref*AER framework with brain studies, I separated and 
‘distributed’ von Glasersfeld’s (1995) tripartite notion of scheme—situation, 
activity, and result—across three major neuronal systems in which they are 
postulated to be processed. The assumption regarding both knowing and 
learning is that the fundamental unit of analysis in the brain is not a single 
synaptic connection or a neuron (Hebb, 1949, cited in Baars & Gage, 2007; Crick 
& Koch, 2003; Fuster, 1997, 2003). To stress neuronal ‘firing’ in the brain and the 
life-long growth, change, and decay of neuronal networks (Medina, 2008), I use 
the term Synapse Inhibition/Excitation Constellation (SIEC)—any-size aggregate 
of synapses of connected neurons that, once ‘firing’ and updating, forms a stable 
pattern of activity (Baars, 2007b). The roles and functions of SIECs are described 
in terms of the three neuronal networks where they may be activated (Baars, 
2007a): a ‘Recognition System’ (RecSys), which includes the sensory input/buffer 
and various long-term memories; a ‘Strategic System’ (StrSys), which includes 
the Central Executive; and an ‘Engagement-Emotive System’ (EngSys). Within 
these networks, solving a problem, as well as learning through problem solving, 
is postulated as follows (indices in the diagram correspond to those in the text 
below): 
1. Solving a problem begins with assimilating it via one’s sensory 
modalities into the Situation part of an extant scheme in the RecSys. 
This SIEC is firing and updating until reaching its activity pattern 
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(recognizing state), and activates firing and updating of a Goal SIEC in 
the StrSys. 
2. A Goal SIEC is set in the StrSys as a desired inhibition-excitation state 
that regulates the execution and termination of an activity sequence. The 
goal SIEC also triggers: 
a. Corresponding SIECs in the EngSys that set the desirability of the 
experience and the sense of control the learner has over the activity 
(McGaugh, 2002; Medina, 2008; Tzur, 1996; Zull, 2002). These were 
found linked to activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (Bush, Luu, 
& Posner, 2000; Lieberman, 2003, 2008). 
b. A temporary auxiliary SIEC checks if an activity has already been 
partly executed and can thus be resumed. If its output is ‘Yes’, it re-
triggers the AER’s execution in the StrSys from the stopping point 
(go to #4); if ‘No,’ it triggers the Goal SIEC to trigger #3 below. 
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Figure 2. Brain problem solving and learning processes 
3. A SIEC responsible for searching-and-selecting an available AER is 
triggered by the Goal SIEC. The search operates on three different 
long-term memory ‘storages’ of SIECs (3a, 3b, 3c below). Using a 
metaphor of ‘road-map’, Skemp (1979) explained that, within every 
universe of discourse (e.g., math, economy), the ‘path’ from a present 
state to a goal state may consist of multiple activity-sequences, among 
which one that is eventually executed is selected (see also multiple-
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trace theory in Nadel, Samsonovich, Ryan, & Moscovitch, 2000). 
Searched and selected AERs include: 
a. Anticipatory AERs – a mental operation carried out and its 
anticipated effect; 
b. Participatory AERs that the learner is currently forming and can 
thus be called up only if prompted, as indicated by the dotted 
arrow; 
c. Mental (e.g., mathematical) ‘objects,’ which are essentially 
anticipatory AERs established and encapsulated previously (e.g., 
‘number’ is the anticipated effect of a counting operation). 
4. Once an operation and an ‘object’ AERs were selected, the brain 
executes them while monitoring progress to the goal via a meta-
cognitive SIEC in the StrSys responsible for Type-I reflections. Skemp’s 
(1979, see ch. 11) model articulates this component in great details, 
including how it can be carried out automatically (intuitive) and/or 
reflectively (analytic). This goal-based monitoring component seems 
compatible with Norman and Shallice’s (2000) model of schema 
activation, Corbetta and Sulman’s (2002) notion of ‘circuit breaker’, 
and Kalbfleisch, Van Meter, and Zeffiro’s (2006) identification of brain 
internal evaluation of response correctness. Mathematical operations 
are mainly activated in the Intraparietal Sulcus (IPS, see Nieder, 2005). 
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5. The execution of the selected AER is constantly monitored by Type-I 
reflection to determine 3 features: 
a. Was the learner’s goal, as set in SIEC 2a, met? 
b. Is the AER execution moving toward or away from the goal (see 
McGovern, 2007 for relevant emotions)?  
c. Is the final effect of the executed portion of the AER different from 
the anticipated, set goal? Goldberg and Bougakov (2007) suggested 
that this is a function of prefrontal cortex (PFC). 
Each feature (5a, 5b, 5c) can stop the currently executed AER (e.g., 
seeing the lit elevator button halts the process leading to pressing it 
again). If the output of 5c is ‘No’, that ‘run’ of the AER is registered as 
another record of experience of the existing scheme (see Zull, 2002). 
Symbolically, such no-novelty can be written: Situation0-Goal0-AER0 
(Tzur & Simon, 2004). If the output is ‘Yes’, symbolized as Situation0-
Goal0-AER1, a new conceptualization may commence (see next). This 
perturbing state of the mental system (von Glasersfeld, 1995), seems 
related to anticorrelations of brain networks (Fox, et al., 2005). 
6. Type-II reflective comparisons may then operate on the output records 
of Type-I reflection. Whenever the output of Type-I question 5c is 
‘Yes,’ the brain updates a new SIEC for that recently run AER and stores 
it in a temporary auxiliary in the RecSys (symbolized A0-E1, or AER1). 
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Each repetition of the solution process for which the output of 5c is 
‘Yes’ adds another such record to the temporary auxiliary. 
7. The accruing records of temporary AER1 (novel) compounds are 
continually monitored by Type-II reflective comparison SIEC in terms 
of two features: 
a. Is the effect of the new AER (E1) closer to or further away from the 
Goal? 
b. How is the new AER1 similar to or different from the extant 
anticipatory and/or participatory AERs in the RecSys? This aspect 
of Type-II reflection seems supported by Moscovitch et al.’s (2007) 
articulation of the constant interchanges between MTL and PFC. 
The output of recurring Type-II reflective comparisons is a new SIEC 
(AER1). The anticipatory-participatory stage distinction implies that a new SIEC 
can initially be accessed by the Search-an-Select SIEC (#3) only if the learner is 
prompted for the activity (A0), which generates the noticed effect (E1) and thus 
‘opens’ the neuronal path to using AER1 in response to the triggering situation 
(Situation0). Over time, Type-II comparisons of the repeated use of AER1 for 
Situation0 produces a new neuronal pathway from the Situation0 SIEC to the 
newly formed AER1, that is, to the construction of a new, directly retrievable, 
anticipatory SIEC (scheme symbolized as Situation1-Goal1-AER1). This 
construction of an anticipatory AER seems to explain how repeatedly correct 
analytic judgments may become intuitive (automatic). 
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3. DISCUSSION: BRAIN-BASED REF*AER VS. DPT 
I contend that Ref*AER, with its brain-based elaboration, simultaneously 
resolves not only the reasoning puzzlement addressed by DPT, but also central 
problems of mathematics learning and teaching. Concerning what an observer 
considers normative solutions, Ref*AER explains and predicts their production as 
the outcome of either an anticipatory conception, which can run automatically 
and/or reflectively, or a compatible participatory conception that was made 
accessible by a prompt—self/internal (e.g., Soduku-1a) or external (e.g., Leron’s 
bridging task, apple falling on Newton’s head). Accordingly, faulty solutions may 
be the outcome of (a) partial, inefficient, and/or flawed execution of a suitable 
anticipatory conception (e.g., Soduku-1, elevator), (b) prompt-dependent 
inability to access a suitable participatory conception (e.g., solving the $1.10 
incorrectly when difference=$1 and correctly with other amounts), and, quite 
often, (c) lack of a suitable conception for correctly solving the given problem 
(e.g., 3rd graders facing the next coin-flip problem, Leron’s students who could 
not solve the bridging task).  
I further contend that, for mathematics education purposes, and possibly 
also cognitive psychology, Ref*AER resolves DPT problems better. Instead of 
postulating two systems (or processes), it explains how the brain gives rise to a 
multi-part single thought process by which a problem solver may reach a 
normative or a faulty answer. Furthermore, it stresses that a ‘solution’ must 
encompass not only the answer, but also the crucial (inferred) solver’s reasoning 
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processes used for producing it. A good demonstration of such analysis, and the 
vitality of intuitive solutions (e.g., for finding limits of sequences), were provided 
by Hersh (2011). Ref*AER accomplishes such inferences via analyzing the 
solver’s: (i) goal and sub-goals (see Stanovich & West, 2000, for differing 
researcher/subject goals), (ii) entire or partial activity-sequence selected and 
executed (see Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, for the notion of Attribute 
Substitution), (iii) suitability of objects operated on (see Leron’s, 2010, specific 
explication of objects, such as length gap in the string-around-earth task and the 
nested sub-set in his RMP task), (iv) sub- and final effects noticed, and (v) 
successful/failed reflections (both types).  
Most importantly, Ref*AER analyses are rooted in an explicit distinction 
between two frames of reference operating in the evaluation of solvers’ 
judgments—the observer’s advanced, well-justified frame and the observed’s 
evolving and sensible frame in terms of his or her extant conceptions (Roth & 
Bautista, 2011; Steffe, 1995). Thus, consistent with Stich’s (1994) assertion that 
cognitive systems serve one’s goals and not absolute truths, Ref*AER evades the 
pitfalls of equating normative with rational. Instead, it clarifies that upon a 
solver’s assimilation of a problem situation and setting her/his goal(s), one path 
among multiple extant activity-sequences (spontaneously known or prompted) is 
selected, executed and being monitored by the goal. By default, the brain runs 
the sequence to its completion, which is signaled via Type-I comparison (goal 
SIEC), and can thus be portrayed by an observer as intuitive/automatic. 
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However, at any given moment during the activity-sequence execution or after 
its completion, the system’s regulator (goal SIEC) may notice effects that require 
interruption and/or correction to the run and/or even to the goal itself 
(portrayed as analytic/reflective). In paraphrasing Gigerenzer’s (2005) “I think, 
therefore I err”, we shall say: “I learn to think, therefore I may adjust (initially) 
erroneous anticipations.” 
Consequently, Ref*AER seems to provide a basis for resolving two 
problems that, while not addressed by DPT, are vital for mathematics education, 
namely, explaining (a) how learning to reason—both intuitively and 
analytically—may occur and (b) how can teaching capitalize on it and foster 
(optimize) students’ mathematical progress. The former has been articulated 
above in a way that seems to address each of the 7 questions presented in Section 
2. The latter (implications for teaching) exceeds the scope of this paper; it was 
articulated elsewhere (Tzur, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a) as a 7-step cycle that proceeds 
from analysis of students’ extant conceptions. To briefly convey the potential of 
this Ref*AER-based 7-step cycle, I return to Leron’s example of a bridging (RMP) 
task.  
In designing that task, Leron made explicit the two-phase activity-
sequence of considering base-rate (1/1000) and diagnostic information (5% false 
positive) as necessarily linked sub-goals. What’s more, the ‘objects’ on which his 
alternative sequence would operate were replaced, from multiplicatively related 
quantities (fractions, percents) to frequencies of whole numbers considered 
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additively up to the final multiplicative calculation. In terms of Ref*AER, these 
alterations explain why some of the students who incorrectly solved the DMP 
problem could correctly solve the RMP problem. The alteration was more likely 
to orient solvers to (a) explicitly coordinated sub-goals (specifying each of the 
nested sub-sets) of the task’s global goal and (b) selection of and operation on 
accessible quantities—anticipatory AER (‘objects’)—in place of quantities that are 
notoriously prompt-dependent (or lacking) in youngsters and adults and thus, 
not surprisingly, ‘neglected’. Accordingly, these insightfully designed task 
alterations explain the educative power of a bridging task. It seemed to bring 
forth an anticipatory AER that, I conjecture, could have served Leron’s students 
as an internal prompt for correctly selecting-and-executing the entire activity-
sequence for operating similarly on the more difficult-to-grasp multiplicative 
quantities and relationships.  
Leron’s design of bridging task not only fits well within the Ref*AER-
based, 7-step teaching cycle, but also with a teaching practice we recently found 
in China (Gu, Huang, & Marton, 2006; Jin & Tzur, 2011). Our study was based on 
Xianyan Jin’s dissertation, which provided a penetrating inspection of how 
bridging (‘xianjie’) tasks are consistently fitted within a 4-component lesson 
structure in Chinese mathematics teaching. She further ‘mapped’ the 7-step cycle 
onto the Chinese lesson structure, while highlighting the role that bridging tasks, 
like those designed by Leron et al. (Leron, 2010; Leron & Hazzan, 2009), can play 
in the cycle’s critical first step—activating students’ extant (assimilatory) 
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conceptions. Alluding to Leron’s (2010) closing slogan, I believe that, without 
positing thinking dualities, mathematics teaching informed by the brain-based 
Ref*AER framework, and designed to bridge between available (assimilatory) 
and intended mathematical ideas, can nurture the power of natural (intuitive) 
thinking, address the challenge of stretching it, and inform the beauty of 
overcoming it (via anticipatory analytic processes). 
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